

# Abdul Ghaffar Khan, 98, a Follower of Gandhi

NYT

Abdul Ghaffar Khan, a Moslem disciple of Mahatma K. Gandhi who opposed British rule in India and partition of the subcontinent, died yesterday in a hospital in Peshawar, Pakistan. He was 98 years old and had suffered a stroke six months ago.

A tough Pashan tribesman from India's northwestern frontier, Mr. Ghaffar Khan's martial back of a nose and towering and powerful physique — at six and a half feet, he once weighed 220 pounds — made him look capable in earlier years of wrestling a bullock to the ground.

His cousin dressed like his mentor in homespun clothes and with his hair and beard clipped short, Mr. Ghaffar Khan passed a lifetime advocating nonviolence to achieve his political aims — and at least 25 years in British and Pakistani jails for doing so.

The causes he fought for from the early 1920's until his last arrest by the Pakistan Government in 1976 were the independence of India, a unified India as homeland for both Hindu and Moslem, and Pashan autonomy in the Pashan created when India gained independence in 1947. The only goal he attained was the first.

The Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, stopped in Peshawar yesterday on his way to Sweden to pay tribute to the man who was known in India during the long struggle with the British as the "Frontier Gandhi," and who last year was honored with India's highest civilian award, the Jewel of India.

## 'A Freedom Fighter'

Prime Minister Gandhi hailed Mr. Ghaffar Khan as a "freedom fighter" who was devoted to "nonviolence and wonderful humanity." The world, Mr. Gandhi said, "has lost a very good man."

A measure of the different feelings about Mr. Ghaffar Khan in India and Pakistan was the immediate declaration of a five-day period of mourning for him in India and the lack of a similar declaration in Pakistan.

Mr. Ghaffar Khan, whose father was a Pashan tribal chief, was born in 1889 in the scrubby mountains that spill across the border into Afghanistan. In those days of the British Raj and Kipling's tales of valor at the Khyber Pass, Mr. Ghaffar Khan tried the hereditary warrior landowning title of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and, informally as he gained prominence, the King of Khans.

But all the trappings of rank were to change after he met Mahatma Gandhi in 1919. Over the next decade, Mr. Ghaffar Khan grew increasingly close to Mr. Gandhi until by the late 1930's

Patel were among Gandhi's inner circle of advisers and leaders in the Congress Party, the dominant political expression of Indian nationalism.

In the late 1920's, Mr. Ghaffar Khan established a nonviolence movement called, interchangeably, the Servants of God and the Red Shirts. Its adherents, initially drawn from the poor and the peasantry, were urged to wear the Koran to follow the teachings of Islam and, if persecuted, to refrain from violent resistance.

For almost two decades, Mr. Ghaffar Khan and his Red Shirts, so-called because of the bright scarlet color of their marching uniforms, walked thousands of miles around India urging Hindu and Moslem alike to practice civil disobedience and to join the political struggle for freedom.

Mr. Ghaffar Khan's leadership of the Red Shirts led to several arrests by the British without changing his attitude because, as he said once when emerging from a British jail, "With love you can persuade a Pashan to go to hell, but by force you cannot take him even to heaven." In the end, the Red Shirts became an auxiliary of the Congress Party.

By 1943, with the Moslem League under Mohammed Ali Jinnah gaining ascendancy over Mr. Ghaffar Khan's Congress Party movement as the voice of India's Moslems, Mr. Ghaffar Khan campaigned vigorously against Hindu-Moslem communal violence and the growing prospect of partition. In 1946, a year of bloody communal violence, Mr. Ghaffar Khan was hospitalized in Peshawar after being hit by stones thrown by rioters of his own faith.

Realizing on the eve of India's independence that partition could not be blocked, Mr. Ghaffar Khan unsuccessfully sought the establishment of a separate Northwest Frontier State to avoid the old Pashan province's absorption into Pakistan.

The new state of Pakistan, of which Mr. Jinnah was the Governor-General, promptly jailed Mr. Ghaffar Khan and his politically active older brother, Dr. M.L.A. Sahib Khan, for anti-state activities. They were held for six years, until 1954.

Although Dr. Sahib Khan made peace with his jailers and joined Pakistan's first Constituent Government as a Minister of Communications in October 1954, Mr. Ghaffar Khan took a different path. He refused to put his hand back in jail on many occasions in the years ahead: the drive for an autonomous Pashanistan. In the 1960's, still at odds with the Pakistan Government, Mr. Ghaffar Khan went into exile in neighboring Afghanistan.

In his will, Mr. Ghaffar Khan said he wanted to be buried at Jalalabad, 60

miles west of Peshawar, in Afghanistan, where he owned a house. His son said that his father's wishes would be carried out and that the funeral procession would head for the Khyber Pass after today's scheduled funeral in Jinnah Park in Peshawar.

An Associated Press report from Peshawar said both the Afghanistan and Pakistan Governments had indicated they would not interfere with the procession.

JANUARY 21, 1988



An explosion killed at least 17 people and injured 25 others during the funeral of Abdul Ghaffar Khan, in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, on Friday. The explosion, in a bus or buses near where the 98-year-old Moslem leader was buried, mangled some of the mourners' vehicles. More than 200,000 mourners, including Afghan leader Najib, attended the funeral.

Houston Chronicle 1/23

SCMP 1/23

The funeral ceremony, attended by Afghan President Najibullah and Indian Vice-President Mr. Shankar Dayal Sharma, was punctuated by the sound of distant artillery and one closer detonation which might have been the car bomb, a witness said.

India declared a five-day national period of mourning and called a national holiday yesterday to mark the funeral.

Muslims fighting against the Soviet-backed Kabul Government were reported to have called an unofficial two-day truce and Kabul, in an unusual gesture, agreed to allow thousands of Pakistan Pashutun to stream across the border for the funeral.

There was a heavy Afghan military presence at the ceremony but little sign of the Soviet troops which back the Soviet Government and have been in Afghanistan since 1979.

LA Times 1/23

There was no sign of the violence to come early Friday morning. The long motorcade followed a large red truck carrying Ghaffar Khan's body over the Khyber Pass and toward border checkpoints into Afghanistan.

## Reminders of War

Once in Afghanistan, however, there were quick reminders of the eight-year guerrilla war against the Soviet-backed government. The roadway, badly damaged in places, was guarded by tanks and artillery dug into roadside emplacements and facing outward toward snow-capped mountains from which the *moushedmen* normally attack.

While the roadways into Jalalabad showed marks of war, the city itself seemed relatively unscathed and there were signs of cultivation in nearby fields.

In his speech, Afghan President Najibullah said Ghaffar Khan had labeled the resistance movement "anti-revolutionaries" and he appealed for "unity of the Afghan and Pushtun peoples," saying this, too, was a goal of the Pushtun leader.

Indian Vice President Shankar Dayal Sharma recalled Ghaffar Khan's long-term links with India. Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi had visited Peshawar on Wednesday to pay his respects, as did Pakistani President Zia ul-Haq on Thursday.

# Bomb kills 17 at Ghaffar Khan's funeral

JALALABAD, Afghanistan (AP) — Two bombs exploded Friday during the funeral of Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the "Frontier Gandhi" who preached non-violence resistance to British rule, and witnesses said as many as 17 people were killed.

The funeral, which drew more than 200,000 mourners and dignitaries that included Afghan leader Najib, also was marred by rocket attacks and gunfire despite assurances from the Afghan army and guerrillas that the ceremonies for the Pashan leader would be peaceful.

The bombs also injured 25 people. Witnesses, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said the explosions occurred in a bus or buses parked three miles from the site where the 98-year-old Moslem leader was buried.

They said the blasts occurred as Ghaffar Khan, who died Wednesday, was laid to rest with a 21-gun salute.

The coffin, carried in a red truck, was in Jalalabad after snaking 70

miles from Pakistan through the Khyber Pass, dwarfed by snow-capped mountains. When it reached Jalalabad, it was put on a caisson for the journey to the house Ghaffar Khan had owned. He was buried in a garden in accordance with his last wishes.

Thousands more lined the road on both sides of the border Friday as the truck, covered in flowers and red bunting, passed.

"Long live Ghaffar Khan!" they shouted.

There were conflicting reports on the number of dead.

Some witnesses said that up to 17 people were killed, while others said only eight people were slain. The United News of India reported that 15 people died in the blasts.

At least eight of the victims were Pakistanis who had crossed the border to pay their last respects to Ghaffar Khan, witnesses said. They were among the first Pakistanis legally allowed into Afghanistan since the Soviets occupied

the country in 1979.

"The explosion was so powerful that I jumped out of my seat," said a man who was sitting in a car about 600 feet from the bus.

There were no claims of responsibility for the bombing. Islamabad has in the past routinely blamed Afghanistan government agents for explosions in crowded Pakistani bus terminals.

But Radio Kabul, in a broadcast Friday night, blamed Yunis Khalis, the head of the Afghan guerrilla movement.

Khalis, in a statement released in Islamabad, denied responsibility and blamed the Soviet KGB.

The incident in Jalalabad was a plot of the communists in Kabul which caused the death of innocent people, and we strongly condemn it," the statement said. "If we wanted to break the ceasefire announcement before Ghaffar Khan's funeral, how would (Afghanistan leader) Najib and other puppets be able to fly in a helicopter and drive in tanks

# Afghan rebels hit 'jihad' in Afghanistan siege town again

By Richard Ehrlich  
SPECIAL TO THE PAKISTAN TIMES

**By Robin Lodge**  
KHOST, Wednesday: The airstrip at the newly-relieved Afghan garrison town of Khost came under rocket attack today as Muslim guerrillas sought to demonstrate the shabby hold of the Soviet and Afghan Government on the town.

The attack came just after midnight as two Afghan air force Antonov-26 transport planes, carrying foreign journalists back to Kabul after a Government-sponsored visit to Khost, were preparing to take off.

Two rockets landed on either side of the first plane, each at a distance of some 500 metres, making Afghan troops guarding the airfield rush headlong for cover.

The attack was preceded by a series of crashes and explosions as Afghan and Soviet aircraft outposts nearby fired with guerrillas in traded hill positions.

Half a minute after the first plane took off, it was possible to see from its unlit windows a third explosion close to the dirt runway below.

Its engines screaming, the Antonov scattered a succession of flares to deflect possible incoming heat-seeking missiles.

**The Sydney Morning Herald, Thursday, January 21, 1988**

Excerpts from Philip Taubman's report on Khost from the NYT 1/20:

The trip, organized by the Government with the approval of the authorities in Moscow, was designed to show the success of the Soviet-led government operation that defeated guerrilla forces late last year in one of the longest, most intense battles of the eight-year war.

A series of events, clearly planned to coincide with the visit and make a positive impression, filled the daylong schedule. At one point, a convoy of more than 100 Afghan trucks pulled into town with fresh supplies of grain, tea and other goods. The convoy was escorted into the town by Afghan, armed vehicles, one of which was bedecked with red and blue banners and blared festive music from loudspeakers outside Khost, its local residents.

At a number of small settlements outside Khost, local gentlemen clad in robes and the colorful headgear that is native to the region, assembled to collect their share of the provisions from Afghan soldiers.

But the day, like the war, proved impossible for the Government to manage. In the end, instead of demonstrating the strength of the Afghan Army and its Soviet partners, events and vigils underscored the tenuous nature of Government control and suggested just how volatile the war, and Afghanistan itself, remain as the Soviet Union moves cautiously toward a withdrawal of some kind.

The battle for Khost actually began more than eight years ago, when, as Soviet forces swept into Afghanistan, guerrillas gained control of Khost's only overland link to the outside world, the winding, mountainous road to Gardez, 90 miles away.

Although the Government intermittently regained control of the road, it was unable to pry the guerrillas permanently from their positions in the highlands of eastern Afghanistan.

In recent years the Government resupplied Khost primarily by air, but the guerrillas' access to Stingers began to make that untenable last year. In Oc-

tober, the insurgents severed the air link entirely. Precise information is not available, but apparently the guerrillas shot down at least four Government aircraft that were en route to Khost last year, possibly including one flying at night. The supply flights were stopped.

The campaign to relieve Khost, initiated by the need to get provisions to the inhabitants, turned in November and December into a political and psychological operation as well, designed to show Soviet and Afghan strength after years of stalemate warfare in Afghanistan and signs of emboldened guerrilla activity in 1987.

Unlike previous battles in the war, which received little coverage in the Soviet Union, the fight on the Khost-Gardez road became a running news story for Russians at the end of the year.

The object of the fierce fighting is a primitive town composed of four or five square blocks of dried-mud buildings and shops. It is located in the middle of a barren but strangely beautiful valley surrounded by towering mountains.

Half the people visible in the town today were in uniform and armed, including many young boys who could not have been older than 15.

The road to Gardez is paved. It begins at the edge of the town and the part viewed by reporters was heavily guarded by Afghan and Soviet troops. Within the first 10 miles from Khost, there were three deserts.

The road to get around a bridge that had been destroyed by the guerrillas, the two deserts were covered in pavement damaged by mine explosions.

As dogs sniffed in the dust alongside the highway about 10 miles outside Khost, Major Povorov, dressed in combat fatigues and a gray fur hat, ordered his men to demonstrate the use of sensing devices. Several armored vehicles outfitted for locating and neutralizing mines sat in the background.

The commanding officer, Major Yuri Povorov, told journalists the road was now safe for traffic although the guerrillas were still trying to infiltrate the area.

"They make many attempts to lay new mines at night, but without success," the Major said, adding that the special units have located and neutralized a total of 4,500 mines, using electronic detectors, probes and sniffer dogs.

Major Povorov said his unit had suffered no casualties, although there had been some near-misses.

He pointed to buckled plating on the side of an armoured personnel carrier. He said this had been caused by a mine explosion.

"Now it's all peace and quiet. You can see how we can walk about normally, and have meals without worrying," he said, apparently oblivious to a fresh barrage of artillery fire in the background.

As he spoke, four loud bursts rang out from the direction of Khost, followed a few seconds later by corresponding explosions from the foothills. Four plumes of smoke and dust rose in succession from a distant settlement.

**PESHAWAR, Pakistan —** Mules! "Tennessee mules" to be precise.

"This isn't a CIA program. The mules are a legitimate aid program," said a Western official in Pakistan, who asked not to be identified.

"Already, a couple of hundred mules have been given to the mujahideen," he said. The program started six months ago. It is still continuing.

One report said more than 2,000 mules may be destined to join the Moslem rebels battling the communist government in Afghanistan.

The mules are only a tiny part of the estimated \$715 million in military and humanitarian aid Washington gave the rebels last year. The assistance includes sophisticated surface-to-air missiles and other

The mules are often loaded with Stinger missiles and other war material while trekking across mountainous war zones. Western eyewitnesses said.

Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev has demanded that the United States end all such assistance to the rebels in exchange for a Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan.

U.S. officials say the high death rate of Afghan mules from land mines and other attacks has created a mule shortage.

The mules-for-war program is highly embarrassing to the U.S.-backed Pakistan government because the animals arrive in Pakistan,

then are handed over to the rebels, who maintain their headquarters and camps here, one source said.

The guerrillas load up the beasts and, thrashing them with sticks, move the mule convoys west across the nearby Afghan border.

"We don't talk about such cross-border programs because the Pakistan government publicly says these programs do not exist," the official said.

Pakistan does not like the publicity because it gives an appearance that Pakistan is too much in bed with the United States. It is bad for Pakistan's political health," he added.

The mule program is especially controversial because it involves U.S. citizens advising the rebels, albeit on how to take better care of the animals.

"The United States brings the mules here and trains the mujahideen how to load a mule and handle a mule," the Western official said.

Afghans traditionally abuse their mules. The United States advises them that keeping your mule healthy and happy is the key to the jihad," he said, referring to the Islamic "holy war" the rebels are fighting.

Asked how many Americans were in Pakistan directly involved in the mule seminars, the official replied, "Four." He refused to elaborate.

Critics say it is a classic case of sending coils to Newcastle, because mules are popular and relatively inexpensive in Pakistan, where they are used extensively in agriculture, transport and hard labor.

Buying mules in the United States and shipping them halfway around the world is more costly than haggling for mules in local Pakistani markets, critics say. An audit of the mule deals was not available.

The unusual program of drafting mules to fight the Soviets is backed by Rep. Charles Wilson, Texas Democrat, who has been officially described as a "mujahideen groupie" because of his zealous support of the guerrillas.

"Charlie Wilson came to Pakistan and said he had seen the mules, they are here and they are beautiful," the official said.

Mr. Wilson, an influential member of the House panels on intelligence and appropriations, was recently quoted as saying: "In Vietnam, we lost more mules than we have in Afghanistan. The Soviets may have lost 25,000. That means they owe us another 33,000."

The mules' impact on the war against 115,500 Soviet troops was "impossible to measure, but it's going well," the official added.


The guerrillas, however, are not entirely happy.

Rebel commanders have complained the Tennessee mules are not as strong as Afghan mules, which are accustomed to the country's blistering hot summers, freezing winters and bone-dry air.

"I heard from some mujahideen that some of the mules are behaving crazily," said one observer of rebel affairs.

"The mules are kicking like mad and some could not be used in a few cases. Also, the mules are not good climbing down mountains. They are good going up the mountains, but not down, he said. "No one knows why."

Washington Times 2/18



The Pakistan Times, Friday, January 1, 1988.

# Let the Afghan Rebels Speak for themselves

By Ashraf Ghani

**I**N BALTIMORE, in the military hall of the Afghanistans tipping away from the Soviet-installed regime, it is time Pakistan yielded its role as spokesman at the negotiating table for the Afghan rebels. The rebels, having borne the brunt of the casualties of the nine-year war, have earned the right to choose their own political representative.

Ashraf Ghani, formerly a lecturer at Kabul University, is assistant professor of anthropology at the Johns Hopkins University.

Moreover, even if a peace plan is finally reached, the fragile accord will quickly dissolve in factional rivalry unless the superpowers and Pakistan commit themselves to a regional economic reconstruction program.

Until now, Pakistan and the Soviet representatives in Kabul have been the main interlocutors at the United Nations-sponsored talks. The premise of these talks has been the expectation of an eventual Soviet military success—a fact that has recently been put in question, partly owing to Stinger missiles and other United States aid to their force of nearly \$1 billion to the Afghan rebels.

I have to expect Pakistanis at the negotiating table to ignore their own national interests in order to promote the Afghans' right to a free government in their homeland. From the

outset, Gen. Zia ul-Haq of Pakistan has recognized the potential benefits of the Afghan quagmire. In recent years, he has masterfully turned his country into the third largest recipient of American aid while also pursuing a nuclear policy. He has cited this important international role as an excuse to outmaneuver and suppress domestic opposition.

Thus, Afghanistan has been too important to the General to leave it to the Afghans. He has taken a keen interest in the leadership of the resistance did not emerge from the ranks of the resistance would become a government in exile in two of the most sensitive and potentially volatile frontier provinces of Pakistan.

Curiously, the leadership of the Afghan resistance has shown no visible sign of fighting for Afghan national-

ism. In a struggle engaging the majority of rebels, the almost total absence of reference to nationalism has been remarkable. Rather, Islam has united the resistance, though this is not surprising. Most Afghans are Moslems, and regardless of whether the resistance, Islam would have been an important rallying symbol.

What is surprising, however, is the identity of those who have been chosen to speak in the name of the Afghan resistance. The seven groups under the leadership of the resistance did not emerge from the ranks of the resistance. They were selected by the Pakistanis, who denied a voice to many important strands of Afghan opinion.

Pakistan control over the distribution of money and arms to the rebels from newly frozen sources, a key point on which the Pakistanis have insisted, has permitted the Zia regime to keep the resistance in line without compromising its military efficiency. But to expect the emergence of a unified Afghan resistance under these conditions is ridiculous.

The only way to find out whether any of the rebel leaders or others could act as representatives in Geneva is to ask the Afghans. To help break the deadlock in Afghanistan, therefore, the United Nations should conduct a referendum among Afghan refugees to let them choose their own leadership. General Zia's willingness to permit such a referendum would be the litmus test of his publicly stated desire to find a political solution to the crisis.

Any peace agreement that does not have the support of the majority of Afghans will be severely flawed. Only an Afghan leadership, secure in the knowledge of a mandate from the majority of the people, will have the moral credibility and the power necessary to bring an end to this bloody and senseless conflict.

While a referendum would allow Afghans to represent themselves, an international pact for the reconstruction of the torn country would allow Afghans to look forward to a secure future. This second step in the peace process is crucial.

The Afghan economy, which was making a major transition to capitalist agriculture in 1978, has been devastated by the war. But peace alone will not solve the economic problems caused by the war; the Afghan economy would be swallowed up by the more dynamic Pakistani economy. What is needed is a comprehensive plan to create balanced regional economic development and to consolidate the many political factions and ethnic groups behind a central government. Only a prosperous Afghanistan can remain independent, stable and neutral.

The participation in such a plan by Western and Moslem governments that support the rebels will prove to the Afghans whether the international commitment to their movement is genuine or whether the contributions to the struggle should be viewed merely as payments to mercenaries fighting a proxy war.

## As Soviet troops prepare to quit, the world waits for a bloodbath

The Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan nine years ago sparked a wave of international condemnation and demands for an immediate withdrawal. But with a Soviet withdrawal likely this year, there are fears that, left to its own devices, Afghanistan will explode into a bloodbath of civil war. **BRYAN BOWELL reports**

THE announcement this week that a group of rebels is drawing up plans for a government of an independent Afghanistan is alarming Western diplomats.

They fear that, after the Soviets pull out, this wild country will be as ungovernable as it is now with them.

A decade of civil war has brought to the fore the undercurrents of tribal, ethnic, secular and tribal tensions. These tensions are exacerbated by the actions of outside nations, the main concern of which is to see their interests secured in whatever emerges when Moscow retreats.

For some time, there has been a feeling that post-pullback Kabul will become a battle ground between tribal groups which share few common bonds.

Part of the problem in the early days with the rebels was their inability to overcome tribal differences and unite under a common banner. After a decade of fighting, this has not happened, and the guerrillas of the eastern group of tribes have little or no contact with or interest in the fate of those fighting in the south-west of the country.

And where the mountain rebels have become increasingly cohesive under the banner of Islam, those in the south-west have shunned any move in that direction, partly because they are not as religious and partly because they do not want to give Iran any excuse to move into their territory after the Soviets leave.

Meanwhile, no matter how unpopular the Soviet occupation may have been, the fact is that, in urban centers, there are firms and an educated, communist, socialist, anti-royalist and generally politically aware sectors. Many want a Western-style, elected government in which the religious aspect is acknowledged but not dominant.

Outside the country, there are the royalists waiting to return with the king, 71-year-old Mohammed Zahir Shah, who now lives quietly, if hopefully, in Italy and Washington.

The splits between the rivals

were obvious earlier this month when UN mediator, Mr. Diego Cordovez, visited Pakistan for more of his shuttle diplomacy and discovered that half of the rebels did not want to meet him. Others had not even been told by their leaders to Islamabad that he was coming.

Maulvi Younis Khalid, head of the alliance and who would become prime minister, said point blank that the rebels would not meet him. He told Mujahiddin, head of the Jabha-i-Nakli-Milli, said that Khalid was not for him and he would be glad to meet the UN envoy, Syed Ahmed Ghalani. But the Mujahiddin of Milli-Islami, said the announcement of the visit came out of the blue.

The alliance is a grouping of seven rebel leaders who have been meeting twice a week for some time but still cannot agree on concerted strategies, even on a matter as small (yet important) as whether they should meet a particular envoy.

Meanwhile, Oulubuddin Hekmatyari, whose fundamentalist Herbi-Islami party is the largest guerrilla force in Afghanistan, is believed to have been having private discussions with envoys from Moscow.

Hekmatyari, a former teacher of Islamic Law at Kabul University, is involved in a dangerous feud with Zia, whose guerrillas may be smaller in number but are more powerful and better armed.

Hekmatyari has made it plain he wants a pure Islamic State in religion and society, with the laws of the Koran applied at every level. This may suit him but not those Afghans who are Sunni Moslems.

Where he and the others are in agreement is that they will not share any post-pullout power with the People's Democratic Party. Moscow's puppet regime in Kabul.

All of these divisions can be expected to be exacerbated as the date of the pull-out approaches, and to lead to open conflict, perhaps even a new civil war.

What many observers now believe may happen is that Afghanistan will become fragmented into self-governing

States within an 'Afghanistan' identity—one in the mountains bordering Pakistan, another around Jalalabad and up to the Soviet border and a third in the south-west. Pakistani President Zia ul-Haq already has said he will not sign an Afghan peace accord with the regime in Kabul headed by President Najibullah. Zia's objections are founded in his continuing worry about Moscow's intentions.

He has seen Moscow building India up to a regional superpower, with the allocation of three new nuclear warheads and a wing of MiG-28s.

There is no doubt that, with its cross-border attacks over the past few years, Moscow has been carrying out a strategy to destabilize Pakistan.

Pakistan now wants the United States to supply it with AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control Systems) to protect its border in the run-up to and after the pullout. It is worried that a Moscow-protected Kabul will use the Afghan Airforce (perhaps with Soviet help) for cross-border attacks on rebels or remain open to it, or for try to set up a separate mountain State.

The suspicion is, ironically, sent India running to Moscow for similar treatment and the result is that New Delhi is getting its planes from the Soviets while Zia waits as the US studies his case.

Meanwhile, India has its own finger in the Afghan pie with its support of the Soviet invasion and its offer to give assistance to Afghan communist leaders if they have to flee after the Soviet withdrawal.

New Delhi's wooing of Moscow ties in with its own aim to become the regional superpower. This move has also worried Pakistan, which is more inclined to support anyone in Afghanistan who is able to pull that country out of any kind of consuming Soviet sphere of influence.

Meanwhile, Iran may have its hands in the shooting war with Iraq and the war of words with everyone else, but it also sees Afghanistan as probably the first country to which it can export successfully its Islamic revolution.

Tehran already has been in contact with leading Shia Islamic fundamentalists in Afghanistan, and while it cannot act directly too much, it has the means of keeping up pressure on the Sunni Afghans in the south-west who do not share such faith in the Islamic future.

Iran's comeback has been weapons from the rebels which should have been used to fight the Soviets, but who instead have been fed through the pipeline so they can be used in the Araboid's war against Baghdad.

China also has its finger in the pie with its support of both Pakistan and the rebels because the Soviet invasion has meant China is blocked on its eastern front.

THE AUSTRALIAN  
Thursday, February 4, 1988



Mohammed Zahir Shah... sitting out his exile

## The Real U.S. Commitment on Afghan Pullout

NYT

To the Editor:

You report that in December 1985 the United States made a commitment to provide the knowledge to end aid to the Afghan resistance at the beginning of a Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan. I am sure that the United States has worked on this issue during three years on the National Security Council staff. I believe I can set the record straight.

Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union has participated in the indirect, United Nations-sponsored talks between Pakistan and the Kabul Government that began in 1982. During their discussions, however, the parties asked whether the superpowers and other governments would be willing to associate themselves with the terms of an eventual agreement, becoming (in diplomatic parlance) "guarantors." After some deliberation the Administration reached a consensus: Although in no position to guarantee that the parties would abide by the agreement, the United States was prepared formally to lend support to it and to take no action that would undercut it.

Cont. on p. 14

# Text of Gorbachev Statement

Following is Mikhail S. Gorbachev's statement on Afghanistan yesterday, as distributed in translation by the Soviet press agency Tass:

The military conflict in Afghanistan has been going on for a long time now. It is one of the most bitter and painful regional conflicts. Judging by everything, certain prerequisites have now emerged for its political settlement. In this context the Soviet leadership considers it necessary to set forth its views and to make its position totally clear.

In the near future, a new round of talks conducted by Afghanistan and Pakistan through the personal representative of the United Nations Secretary General will be held in Geneva. There are considerable chances that this round will become a final one.

By now documents covering all aspects of a settlement have been almost fully worked out at the Geneva negotiations. They include agreements between Afghanistan and Pakistan on non-interference in each other's internal affairs and on the return of Afghan refugees from Pakistan; international guarantees of non-interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs; a document on the interrelationship of all elements of political settlement. There is also agreement on establishing a verification mechanism.

So what remains to be done? It is to establish a time frame for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan that would be acceptable to all. Precisely that — a time frame, since the fundamental political decision to withdraw Soviet troops from Afghanistan was adopted by us, in agreement with the Afghan leadership, some time ago, and announced at that same time.

## Technical and Political Aspects

The question of time frame has both a technical and a political aspect. As for the technical aspect, it is clear that the actual withdrawal of troops will take a certain amount of time. There is hardly any need to go into the details of that here.

As for the political aspect of the matter, it is that the withdrawal of Soviet troops is, quite naturally, linked with precluding interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs.

Prerequisites for that have now been reached. It is time to move forward.

Seeking to facilitate a speedy and successful conclusion of the Geneva talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Government of the U.S.S.R. and the Republic of Afghanistan have agreed to set a specific date for beginning the withdrawal of Soviet troops — May 15, 1988 — and to complete their withdrawal within 10 months. The date is set based on the assumption that agreements on the settlement would be signed no later than March 15, 1988, and that, accordingly, they would all enter into force simultaneously two months after that. If the agreements are signed before March 15, the withdrawal of troops will, accordingly, begin earlier.

Recently, another question has been raised, whether the phasing of the withdrawal of Soviet troops should be arranged in such a way as to withdraw, during the first phase already, a relatively greater portion of the Soviet contingent. Well, that too could be



Mikhail S. Gorbachev

done. The Afghan leadership and we agree to it.

## Conditions for an Agreement

All of this creates the necessary conditions for signing the settlement agreement in the very near future.

That, of course, does not mean that no one could now obstruct the settlement, or push the talks backwards. But we would not like to think that some states or political figures might want to be held accountable by the Afghan nation and other nations for scuttling a settlement. We believe that common sense will prevail.

The question of the withdrawal of our troops from Afghanistan was raised at the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

That was a reflection of our current political thinking of new, modern views of the world. We wanted thereby to reaffirm our commitment to the tradition of good-neighborliness, good will and mutual respect which trace back to Vladimir Lenin and the first Soviet-Afghan treaty signed in 1921. Progressive forces of Afghan society have understood and accepted our sincere desire for peace and tranquility between our two neighboring countries, which for several decades were showing an example of peaceful coexistence and mutually beneficial equitable cooperation.

Any armed conflict, including an internal one, can poison the atmosphere in an entire region and create a situation of anxiety and alarm for a country's neighbors, to say nothing of the suffering and losses among its own people. That is why we are against any armed conflicts. We know that the Afghan leadership, too, takes the same attitude.

## 'A Profound Rethinking'

It is well known that all of that has caused the Afghan leadership, headed by President Najibullah, to undertake a profound rethinking of political course, which has crystallized in the patriotic and realistic policy of national reconciliation. It was an act of great courage and bravery — not merely an appeal to cease armed clashes but a proposal to set up a coalition government and share power with the opposition, including those who wage armed struggle against the Government and even those who, while being abroad, direct

the rebels' operations and supply them with weapons and combat equipment obtained from foreign countries. And that proposal was made by a Government vested with constitutional authority and wielding real power in the country.

The policy of national reconciliation is a reflection of new political thinking on the Afghan side. It is not a sign of weakness, but rather of the force of spirit, wisdom and dignity of the free, honest and responsible political leaders concerned about their country's present and future.

Success of the policy of national reconciliation has already made it possible to begin withdrawing Soviet troops from portions of the Afghan territory. At present there are no Soviet troops in 13 Afghan provinces because armed clashes have ceased there. We can well be said that the more rapidly peace is brought to Afghanistan, the easier it will be for Soviet troops to leave.

The policy of national reconciliation has provided a political platform for all those who want peace in Afghanistan. What kind of peace? The kind that the Afghan people will choose. The proud, freedom-loving and courageous Afghan people, which has gone through many centuries of struggle for freedom and independence, has been and will continue to be, the master of its own country, which, as President Najibullah has said, is built on a tradition of multi-party politics and of a multiple-strategy economy.

## Status of Afghanistan

The Afghans themselves will decide the final status of their country among other nations. Most often it is being said that the future peaceful Afghanistan will be an independent, nonaligned and neutral state. Well, we would only be happy to have such a neighbor on our southern borders.

In connection with the question of beginning the withdrawal of Soviet troops, there is a need to make clear our position on yet another aspect — whether the withdrawal is linked with the completion of efforts to set up a new coalition government in Afghanistan, i.e. with bringing the policy of national reconciliation to fruition. We are convinced that it is not.

The withdrawal of Soviet troops, combined with other aspects of the settlement, including the cessation of non-interference, is one thing. Various states are involved in it. Speaking of this, we believe that Iran, a neighboring country, should not stand aside from political settlement.

Nations reconciliation and the establishment of a coalition government is another thing. This is a purely internal Afghan issue. It can only be resolved by the Afghans themselves, though they belong to different and even opposing camps. When, however, it is hinted to us that the Soviet Union should take part in talks on that issue, and even talk to third countries, our answer is firm and clear: Don't expect us to do it; it is none of our business, or yours, for that matter.

## Resurgence of Hostilities

But could hostilities flare up even more after Soviet troops leave? It would hardly be appropriate to prophesy, but I think that such a course of events could be prevented if

those now fighting against their brothers take a responsible attitude and try indeed to get involved in peace-building. If however, they are guided, not by the arguments of reason, but by emotions, multiplied by fanaticism, then they would be confronted with the greatly increased will of the Afghan people to see their country pacified and with the obligations of states no longer to interfere in its internal affairs. The Geneva obligations will close the channels for outside assistance to those who hope to impose their will on the whole nation by armed force.

And, if necessary, consideration could be given at that stage to using the possibilities available to the United Nations and its Security Council.

And now about our boys, our soldiers in Afghanistan. They have been doing their duty bravely, performing acts of self-denial and heroism.

Our people profoundly respect those who were called to serve in Afghanistan. The state provides for them, as a matter of priority, good educational opportunities and a chance to get interesting, worthy work.

The memory of those who have died a hero's death in Afghanistan is sacred to us. It is the duty of party and Soviet authorities to make sure that their families and relatives are taken care of with concern, attention and kindness.

And, finally, when the Afghan knot is untied, it will have the most profound impact on other regional conflicts too.

Whereas the arms race, which we are working so hard — and with some success — to stop, is mankind's mad race to the abyss, regional conflicts are bleeding wounds which can result in gangrenous growth on the body of mankind.

The earth is literally spotted with such wounds. Each of them means pain not only for the nations directly involved but for all — whether in Afghanistan, in the Middle East, in connection with the Iran-Iraq war, in southern Africa, in Kampuchea, or in Central America.

Who gains from those conflicts? No one except the arms merchants and various reactionary expansionist circles who are used to exploiting and turning war profits on people's misfortunes and tragedies.

Implementing political settlement in Afghanistan will be an important rupture in the chain of regional conflicts.

Just as the agreement to eliminate intermediate- and shorter-range missiles is to be followed by a series of further major steps towards disarmament, with negotiations on them already underway or being planned, likewise behind the political settlement in Afghanistan already looms a question: Which conflict will be set free next? And it is certain that more is to follow.

States and nations have sufficient reserves of responsibility, political will and determination to put an end to all regional conflicts within a few years. This is worth working for. The Soviet Union will spare no effort in this most important cause.

# As Afghan Peace Nears, Rebels Battle for Power

By RONE TEMPEST, Times Staff Writer

**PESHAWAR, Pakistan**—As talk of a potential settlement in the 8-year-old war in Afghanistan increases here, the loosely affiliated Afghan rebels, known collectively as the *mujahadeen*, or holy warriors, are engaged in a contest for postwar primacy that has foreign journalists and aid workers caught in the crossfire.

In September, one of the largest rebel groups in Afghanistan hijacked a French medical relief mission headed for Badakhshan province. The group, known as the Hizb-i-Islami, held seven French doctors and three relief workers captive for 10 days and confiscated their pack train and \$700,000 worth of medicines consigned to a clandestine French hospital in Badakhshan province.

In October and December, two other French aid missions were intercepted by the Hizb-i-Islami. In one incident, near the village of Kantiwah in the Nuristan district, the equivalent of more than \$100,000 in Afghan currency was taken from the French group.

In January, a British woman charged here that her husband, a free-lance cameraman on an assignment for the British Broadcasting Corp., had been robbed and killed by the Hizb-i-Islami, also near Kantiwah.

What these incidents have in common is that the victims were all intercepted by the Hizb-i-Islami as they were headed for an area controlled by a rival rebel group, the Jamiat-i-Islami.

The Hizb-i-Islami and the Jamiat-i-Islami are probably the two strongest of the Afghan rebel groups that for eight years have been fighting Soviet troops and the Soviet-backed Afghan government troops.

They are also enemies in a power struggle that pits fundamentalist Islamic forces against more moderate elements in the Afghan resistance.

On another level, the internecine battle is for a greater share of the millions of dollars in cash and weapons that the United States provides to the rebels. Last year, the United States, with the support of China and Saudi Arabia, gave the Afghan rebels equipment valued at more than \$600 million, including Stinger ground-to-air missiles.

"Now is a bad time to be in Afghanistan because the different parties imagine a solution in sight," Edward Lagourgue, a leader with the French aid organization Guide du Raid, told a reporter. "The fighting between them is now very hot, particularly between the moderates and the fundamentalists."

The atmosphere of suspicion and hatred among the rebel groups has tarnished the image of cohesion and unified cause they wish to

project through such organizations as the seven-party alliance that includes both the Hizb-i-Islami and Jamiat-i-Islami.

The fighting and angry words lend credence to the idea that if the war is settled, a war in which a million or more Afghans may have been killed already, a blood bath will follow as leaders of the various groups fight it out for supremacy.

Various rebel factions often charge tolls when others travel through their territory, and ammunition shipments are considered a particularly good source of revenue.

Lagourgue said that on a recent six-week trip to the Bamian district in central Afghanistan, he passed through 45 checkpoints manned by the men of 15 different groups of the *mujahadeen*. He said his rebel escorts, who were attached to an ammunition supply train of the Jamiat-i-Islami, had to pay a total of 1 million afghans—the equivalent, at an unofficial rate of exchange, of \$65,000—in tolls at the 45 checkpoints.

Along the way, he said, he saw a fierce fight between Jamiat-i-Islami and Hizb-i-Islami forces, but no fighting against the Soviets.

"The only party fighting the Soviet is the Harakat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami," he said. "The others are all fighting each other."


## Accusations Traded

Leaders of the Hizb-i-Islami accuse the most famous commander of the Jamiat-i-Islami, Ahmad Shah Massoud, of killing six Hizb-i-Islami commanders. Nawab Salim, a spokesman for the Hizb-i-Islami, said: "Massoud attacks us in the northern areas of Afghanistan. He killed six of our commanders. Otherwise, he is a gentleman."

Leaders of the Jamiat-i-Islami accuse the Hizb-i-Islami of stealing money and supplies, including the French medicines bound for area controlled by the Jamiat-i-Islami.

Reports of fighting among the main rebel groups—there are seven of them—are nearly as common as reports of battles with the Soviet and Afghan government forces. Caught in the middle are the journalists and volunteer foreign aid missions that operate clandestinely in Afghanistan. Scores of French medical and agricultural specialists live and work in Afghanistan, for the most part in territory controlled by the Jamiat-i-Islami.

Also in the crossfire is the huge, covert U.S. aid program, the largest CIA operation since the Vietnam War. Aid organizations, bitter over the hostile behavior of the fundamentalist rebel elements—exemplified by two factions within the Hizb-i-Islami, the Hekmatyar and the Khalis—have urged the United States and its allies to reconsider



rebels.

Despite the anti-American position often taken by the Hizb-i-Islami—it says it is against either Soviet or American domination—much of the U.S. aid has gone to the Hizb-i-Islami, particularly its Hekmatyar faction.

The Hekmatyar, named after its charismatic leader, an engineer named Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, has long been the favorite of the Pakistani intelligence agencies that oversee the distribution of weapons for the Americans.

Critics of the program argue that the time has come for the United States to redirect its effort. Many say the aid might be better utilized by the Jamiat-i-Islami, which is headed by a former professor at Kabul University, Burhanuddin Rabbani, and counts among its leaders Commander Massoud, a famous combat commander in the Panjshir Valley in northeastern Afghanistan.

Leaders of the Hizb-i-Islami contend that they are the victims of a propaganda campaign that pictures their organization as extremists in order to frighten off U.S. support.

"America should have no reason to be afraid of the Hizb-i-Islami," spokesman Salim said. "We are a progressive party. We are not like [the Ayatollah Ruhollah] Khomeini [of Iran] or [Libyan leader Moammar] Kadhafi or anyone else. These people want to label us as fiends and fanatics, but we don't want to go back 1,400 years. We believe in progressive advancement . . . in self-reliance."

U.S. diplomats, asking not to be identified by name, agree that the charges of Hizb-i-Islami involvement in various misdeeds are probably exaggerated.

Hizb-i-Islami leaders admit that one of their commanders, known as Gen. Nooristani, stopped the French medical mission in September, but they insist that no one was harmed.

"A few French volunteers were detained for 10 days by our commander without taking the time to confer," spokesman Salim said. "But they were treated well."

The leaders deny any involvement in robberies. They were particularly vehement in denying charges that they had killed foreign journalists.

Abdul Qadeem Karyab, chairman of the Hizb-i-Islami's political committee, said: "We know the importance of these journalists in Afghanistan. We need them. Why should we kill them?"

Karyab said that two free-lance American journalists, Lee Shapiro and James Lindelof, were killed in

a Soviet helicopter attack. The two men were traveling with a Hizb-i-Islami guide when they were killed on Oct. 11 near Kabul.

Some opponents of the Hizb-i-Islami say that Shapiro and Lindelof were killed in fighting between two rebel groups, but U.S. officials who investigated the deaths say they believe the Hizb-i-Islami account to be true.

To the charge by the British woman, Christine Gregory, that Hizb-i-Islami people killed her husband, free-lance cameraman Andy Skrzpkowiak, Hizb-i-Islami leaders also plead not guilty.

Skrzpkowiak, 38, a former British paratrooper, disappeared in November, near Kantiwah, which is controlled by the Hizb-i-Islami. Others traveling along the same mountainous trail report that Skrzpkowiak, who developed a hatred for the Soviets in Polish refugee camps in England, was last seen being led away by four well-known Hizb-i-Islami fighters.

Later, an expensive camera matching the description of the one he carried into Afghanistan was offered for sale in the Pakistan border city of Chitral.

Skrzpkowiak was often identified as a close friend of Massoud, the Jamiat-i-Islami commander. His wife said he once gave Massoud an expensive watch.

"Hizb killed him," she said. "They have taken off the mark one of the most capable reporters of the *jihad* [holy war]."

Karyab said that "in Afghanistan, there is always a risk of life, danger every inch."

He made no effort to hide his bitterness over the attention paid to leaders of the Jamiat-i-Islami, particularly Massoud.

"Millions of dollars are going into Afghanistan through these voluntary organizations," Karyab said, "and it is all going to Massoud. All of it. How is he using it? He is killing Hizb leaders. American money is being used to kill our people."

Karyab said that after one of the French aid missions was robbed, U.S. diplomats in Pakistan telephoned and demanded the money.

"That is our money," he said the Americans told him. "We want it back."

U.S. diplomats, in keeping with their policy of not officially acknowledging the covert aid, refused to confirm or deny the story.

## Los Angeles Times

February 10, 1988

## Cont. from p.12

In December 1985 American officials communicated this answer to the United Nations Secretary General, noting the United States would have to evaluate the agreement once its provisions had been worked out.

There "was nothing secret about this," Deputy Secretary of State John Whitehead stated the same position in public. Nor was it a matter of great significance. The United States had not taken a position on a still largely

Cont. on p. 22

# The Great Game Goes On

Mikhail Gorbachev faces a challenge entirely worthy of his abilities as a master politician.

The task before him is to make sure that a withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, if it takes place, does not diminish full Soviet control of the country.

His predecessors spilled Soviet blood to invade Afghanistan. Mr. Gorbachev will build on what they achieved — Soviet domination of Afghanistan for the first time in history. He will struggle to keep Soviet control without more cost in Soviet lives. If he succeeds he will be a hero at home and in the world and still maintain Soviet power in South Asia.

He will not have to be a cynic or even particularly skeptical about Mr. Gorbachev to realize that this is his immediate goal. He already has established much of the political and military structure in Afghanistan necessary to achieve it. This will be left behind when Soviet troops march out.

He would fail in his duty as guardian of Soviet power if he did not at least try. He would be turning his back on what Moscow historically has believed — that Russian interests in Afghanistan. He would be betraying the Soviet Army's sacrifices. He could not last long in power if he just gave up and walked away from Afghanistan.

For almost 200 years, Russian rulers, Czarist or Bolshevik, have tried to control Afghanistan. Kipling called it "the Great Game."

Now, control of Afghanistan puts the Soviet empire at the doors of the Indian subcontinent. Moscow will not invade Pakistan and India. All it has to do is knock firmly; it will be heard.

Afghanistan also puts Soviet power over the tank divisions of the warm waters of the Indian Ocean. From Af-

ghanistan, the Soviet Union can move deep into Iran. A true prize, Afghanistan, for a great imperial power.

But the Afghan resistance made Moscow pay a price: 10,000 Soviet lives, a wound that never was stanchied, bitterness in the mouths of Soviet parents. Mr. Gorbachev is flexible enough to see that perhaps control can now be maintained without the Red Army and that in the future 10,000 Afghan blood need be shed.

Soviet troop withdrawal will leave behind a puppet government with ministries are faced with Soviet "advisers." This regime has international recognition. It also has a well-trained army, years of military supplies, and a

ance, to struggle for it.

1. Moscow must agree to meet with the Afghan resistance. Three countries — the U.S., Pakistan, the Soviet Union — are determining the fate of a fourth. Something like this happened once before, in 1938, in Munich.

2. The U.S. should try to wriggle out of its incredible commitment to end aid to the resistance who the Russians begin to pull out, replacing it with a phased cutoff.

3. The withdrawal agreements should remove not just Soviet troops but the small army of "experts."

4. The powerful Soviet air and communication bases must be dismantled, not turned over to Kabul and the "experts."

5. Territory along the Soviet-Afghan frontier that has been annexed de facto by Moscow should be returned. So should the 10,000 Afghan children in the Soviet Union.

6. The secret police should be dis-

band. 7. Afghanistan should be ruled not by the Kabul regime but by an interim government selected by a traditional council of elders in which Kabul would be a participant — along with resistance politicians and military leaders and representatives of Afghan clans and tribes. The permanent government should be chosen by an election in which the Communists can run, after the millions of refugees return.

This would mean a concession by the resistance, which loathes the Communists and wants them out or dead, preferably both. It would also mean the end of total Soviet domination.

It would be a new, more difficult challenge for Mr. Gorbachev — to show whether he is wise and to welcome peace for Afghanistan or is just playing another card in the game.

— NYT

2/13

## What Soviet pullout will leave behind.

Soviet-created air force. It has a powerful secret police with close ties to the K.G.B. It has the prospect of unending Soviet-bloc economic assistance.

The Afghan resistance will find itself alone, without the U.S. military assistance that has kept it fighting. It will be under pressure to join a Communist-dominated government. If it does not, the world will shake its finger, call them naughty and turn away.

One million Afghans have died. Five million, a third of the nation, are in exile. The Afghans deserve an honorable peace. It is up to the United States, which profited from the stunning bravery of the Afghan resist-

ance support as those people became aware of the American willingness to negotiate with North Vietnam.

The Afghan government sustained by the Soviet Union seems to have very little popular support and Moscow has not been able to establish any kind of negotiation with the fighting opposition. (We must also remember that during the Vietnam War, the Soviets gave significantly few arms to the North Vietnamese, whereas the American support to the Afghan guerrillas has become significant and, in certain instances, perhaps even decisive.)

There is a greater difference. Afghanistan is not Indochina. Asia is a vast continent, all without any of its relative geographic and cultural and racial homogeneity of Europe. The history, the character, the situation of Afghanistan and Vietnam differ far more than, say, those of Scotland and Bulgaria. Among other things, Vietnam was for many decades part of a European colonial empire. Even in the heyday of imperialism, Afghanistan was never conquered or subdued by a white nation. In the 19th Century, British were twice forced to give up their forays into Afghanistan, and in 1921, at the peak of their power, (and when their Soviet opponents in Central Asia were down and out) were pushed out again. (It is worth noting the fact that the Soviets had rejected one tribal Communist Party leader and his group with another (after a bloody fight among those tribal chieftains themselves). We were also told by our "experts" that the

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was, of course, but the first step of their planned march to the warm waters of the Persian Gulf. It was nothing of the kind. What worried the Soviets was the same kind of fierce Muslim nationalism that had led to our humiliations in Iran; while Iran is many thousands of miles from the United States, this kind of nationalism could spill over into the populations of the Muslim-inhabited republics of the Soviet Union itself.

But those Soviet "experts" who convinced Leonid Brezhnev to go into Afghanistan were even worse than ours at giving advice. The Soviets have done very poorly in Afghanistan. They must cut their losses.

This is all to the good. Therefore it is in our interest to turn, and to welcome, the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan with, out any American interference. Contrary to the position of President Reagan and Secretary of State George P. Shultz, all American support to the Afghan guerrillas ought to stop — that is, completely stop — not after but during, and possibly even before, the withdrawal of the Russian troops. We ought to remember that the Afghan resistance to the Soviets and to their local satellites had begun well before the first American arms shipments got there; it is likely to continue, in whatever form, after their American supplies stop.

To call the Afghan guerrillas "freedom fighters" is just as absurd as to call the Contras effort in Nicaragua the local equivalent of 1776. The Afghans are tribal patriots, incarnating a fierce religious nationalism that may menace the integrity and the cohesion of the Soviet Union itself. But this should be no great comfort to the United States (whose integrity is not menaced, and whose interests are, at the moment, indirectly threatened by the government of Nicaragua).

Moscow would now willingly settle for an Afghanistan that is neither communist

Will second thoughts, or Pakistani pressure, get the Afghan leaders to agree to let some communists into the government? The alliance chief, Mr. Khalis, sounds genuinely unbending. Since he has done some fighting himself (the resistance is only invited to try to have done so), and has a 16-year-old wife, one does not ignore him.

He was chosen as leader of the seven-party alliance last October. Towards the end of his 18-month term of office he is supposed to hold an election for an interim Afghan government. If the Russians leave before the election, the seven leaders will themselves form that government, to oversee the transition. An Islamic government will be established in Kabul after an election or a *loya jirga* (an assembly of elders and notables). It sounds vague, but it is all the political leaders have managed agree on. This disappoints commanders like Mr. Abdul Haq, who have improved co-operation between guerrillas on the ground.

While all Afghans are Muslims (except, presumably, the communists), no one in the *shahar* will say what an Islamic government might be like, except that it will not be like Iran's or Pakistan's. The debate about the form of a new government is unlikely to welcome the refugees. They have been well looked after in Pakistan, but 90-95% are expected to return home if they can.

Afghans are said to care about three things: Islam, family honour and their plot of land. This is, it is argued, makes a post-withdrawal civil war unlikely (although a settling of local scores is inevitable), because most Afghans are said not to care much who rules in Kabul, so long as it is not the Communists. Old wars are favoured. Mr. Haq thinks the sort of legal system that prevailed under the former King Zahir Shah will do. But Mr. Rabbani, who is Islamic law, has argued that the old law was not Islamic enough.

Diplomats and aid workers agree that an Iranian-like fundamentalist regime is improbable. Most Afghans are Sunni Muslims and do not have the religious hierarchy of Iran's Shias. The Afghans are deeply pious, but not fussy about the forms of religion; they find it difficult to take their clergy too seriously. Mr. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the hard-line political leader thought most likely to try to impose a government on the Iranian model, lacks the religious qualifications to command wide support.

Curiously, Mr. Cordover's long and patient negotiations have yielded no public proposals about a future Afghan government. Even if the Russians and the resistance agreed on a token communist presence in an interim government, there would be bitter debate over its size and whether the unfortunates chosen as tokens would take part as party members or as individuals.

nor anti-Soviet. In this respect the Soviet policy approximates that of the United States. Some of the other European neighbors' security is guaranteed by the existence of non-communist, though not anti-Russian, governments such as that of Finland. That "neutralization" of neighboring states in the interest of both the Soviet Union and of the United States.

But the big problem remains — the Afghans are not Finns.

John Lukacs' last two works are "Outgrowing Democracy: A History of the United States in the 20th Century" (Doubleday, 1984) and "Historical Consciousness" (Schocken, 1985).

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Los Angeles Times

## Afghanistan Was Misread on All Sides

By JOHN LUKACS

History does not repeat itself. But some historical conditions do. The possible Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1988; the American withdrawal from Vietnam 1973-75: Is it the same kind of a cruel dilemma, and failure?

Yes and no. "A great country can have no such thing as a little war," the Duke of Wellington said 180 years ago. This is even truer today. In our times, wars between states, involving professional soldiers, have often become wars between entire peoples, involving hordes of guerrillas (the very *guerrilla* means "war"). Once the armies of a state confront the armed opposition of a large portion of a population, they face new conditions of warfare for which they are mentally and physically often unequipped.

The armed forces of a great modern power are not powerless. The United States could have subdued Indochina if it had chosen to drop nuclear bombs on Hanoi or invaded North Vietnam itself. The Soviet Union could have subdued Afghanistan if it had poured into it a million soldiers, not 115,000. In both cases this was impossible because of public opinion — which, albeit in different ways, exists in the Soviet Union as well as in the United States.

But now for the differences. There was a South Vietnamese government accepted by the majority of its own people. But it eventually lost most of that often-unpopu-

lating, in retrospect, has been the American reaction of both the Carter and Reagan Administrations to the Soviet invasion of Kabul in 1979. Both overlooked the fact that the Soviets had rejected one tribal Communist Party leader and his group with another (after a bloody fight among those tribal chieftains themselves). We were also told by our "experts" that the

# The Watchful Eyes of "Khad" in Afghanistan

"KHAD," the Persian abbreviation for "governmental information services" represents a center for the entire authority and power of the Afghan government and in keeping close watch on the civil war and reinforcing the pillars of the Marxist Kabul regime installed by the Afghanistan. "KHAD" is in fact the Kabul regime's intelligence and security agency.

In line with Soviet policy and on account of the growing opposition of the Muslim people of Afghanistan to the atheist Soviet occupiers, the puppet regime in Kabul had to establish "KHAD" branch offices throughout the country.

In 1361 (A.H.) (Mar. 21, 1982- Mar. 20, 1983) its espionage network which can be considered part of the Soviet intelligence agency, the "K.G.B." began to mushroom, providing various public and private sectors with espionage and security services.

The said services cover the highest government officials, ministers, military divisions, radio and television, universities and colleges, schools, commercial organizations, provincial governments, etc.

Following the occupation of Afghanistan the Kremlin leaders immediately assigned the K.G.B. to provide basic services and facilities for the Soviet government to attain its predetermined interests and aims in Afghanistan. Teaching posts at the Kabul police academy were awarded to East German security and espionage experts. The officers of "KHAD" were sent to Russia, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia to undergo training courses.

The KHAD intelligence office has been equipped with Soviet-made electronic apparatus and lie detectors. Also a special office similar to the "third office" of the K.G.B. has been formed within "KHAD" well-known as the "death office." KHAD's intelligence offices have been established mostly in the sensitive centers of the capital and provinces, including universities, public and private commercial centers, and other offices which can somehow be in contact with abroad.

The total number of individuals employed by the said organization is estimated to be between 25 and 30 thousand. Only the city of Kabul has been divided into 182 districts by KHAD for easy control and pursuit of the inhabitants. Each district is watched by a network comprising over a hundred spies.

In 1364 a special committee was founded within "KHAD" to deal only with party issues and pursue two chief aims: firstly to identify and somehow do away with those party members who were against the Soviet presence in Afghanistan; and secondly, to indoctrinate party members on the presence of Russian forces and attempt to increase solidarity among the pro-Soviet party members. It is notable that the

"Khalq" wing of the Marxist Party of Afghanistan, led by Nur-Muhammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin, and chiefly made up of army members was against the presence of Russian troops in Afghanistan.

"KHAD" reports back to the members of the Russian espionage agency, the "K.G.B." which has a branch office in Kabul. In fact, all reports and functions of the "KHAD" are examined by the liaison officers of the K.G.B. at the Soviet Embassy in Kabul and it is these officers who make the final decisions. More than 57 Russian advisers at the Soviet Embassy in Kabul keep in close contact with KHAD offices throughout the city and are informed of their daily activities.

The KHAD headquarters, formerly located inside the prime ministry, was recently transferred to the "Azar Akbar Khan" area, adjacent to the embassies of the U.S. and other foreign countries, in order to keep close watch on them.

The new headquarters has been equipped with modern phone taps control the telephone conversations of foreign embassies and commercial representations.

For external intelligence purposes the "KHAD" espionage organizations has established several offices in the towns of Assad Abad, Jalal Abad, and Khost bordering Pakistan in order to carry out espionage activities in Pakistan, especially within the Afghan refugee camps to locate the residence of leaders of the Afghan guerrillas in Peshawar.

Besides espionage activities, KHAD has embarked a major drive to push the Islamic nation of Afghanistan toward the Soviet desired tendencies in all fields. It has held compulsory Marxist ideological classes for school and university students, political classes for the armed forces and Russian language classes for party members in all provinces.

In 1356 (Mar. 21, 1980- Mar. 20, 1981) a special institute was founded for education of the children of Marxist Party members killed in war by the Afghan Mujahideen in order to brainwash them and send them to Russia to undergo long-term courses. The said institute known as the "Home-land's Planning Center" was established by Najibullah, head of the "KHAD" espionage service and the present chief of the Kabul regime. This institute has also played an effective role in deceiving young adults into joining the army. KHAD has attempted to recruit the young adults of the Pashto-speaking tribes neighboring Pakistan whose families have been allured by the promises of the Kabul regime to send them abroad, pay pensions, etc.

In order to gain legitimacy for its reign over Afghanistan the Marxist Party pretends to carry out Islamic deeds. A special committee by the name of the "66th

Office of KHAD" has been assigned by the head of "KHAD" to fulfill the financial needs of mosques and other religious centers.

Also three Soviet advisers expert in religious affairs supervise all religious centers and buildings. Meanwhile, KHAD is in close contact with the "High Council of Afghan Ulama" in Kabul. This organization has also founded "the Islamic Ulama Association" and "the Office for Propagating Islamic Culture" under the superintendence of Molawi Abdul-Aziz who is a mercenary and lackey Afghan clergyman.

Muhammad Ghassam Mafnun and Brigadier General Mahabud Yab Mongol were two of the heads of the 35 members delegation of the Kabul government to the Hajj ceremonies in 1361 (Mar. 21, 1982- Mar. 20, 1983) who sought refuge in Pakistan on their return from Mecca. They revealed that the Marxist regime had wanted 20 members of the "High Council of Afghan Ulama" to issue a statement condemning the activities of the Muslim Afghan Mujahideen, support the Soviet-installed regime, and garner people's support for the Kabul regime. It is interesting to note that a pamphlet containing the statement of the so-called ulama and "Molevis" was, despite suppressing the country entitled, "the message of truth." Simultaneously the government-controlled mass media launched a heavy propaganda campaign and several trips and speeches were carried out by the leaders of the Marxist Party to justify and support "the message of truth" and dissuade the Muslim people of Afghanistan from struggle and Jihad.

In a proposal to the "66th Office of KHAD" the service "ulama" stipulated that the prayer leader of every mosque should be allured by the government with various ruses. As a result, a few were deceived. But most of the genuine ulama of Afghanistan resisted torture, prison, and exile but never agreed to fight Islam under the guise of religion.

It should be mentioned that out of the 4,206 Afghans sent to Mecca in 1361, hundreds had been assigned by "KHAD" to gather information for the secret police of Afghanistan and also a number of the officers of this organization had been ordered to carry out propaganda in Arabia in favor of the puppet Marxist regime.

Also in 1364 (Mar. 21, 1985- Mar. 20, 1986), out of the total 3,000 people sent to Saudi Arabia for Hajj ceremonies, two thirds were KHAD agents.

Special attention is paid by the KHAD organization, especially by the K.G.B. experts supervising it to the religious minorities in Afghanistan, particularly the Sikhs and Hindus living in Kabul and other provincial centers. The

Sikhs and Hindus are encouraged by various means to act as intelligence agents of "KHAD", join the armed forces, or become members of the ruling party. Many of those who have succeeded in proving their commitment to the ruling party have been sent to Russia to learn the Russian language.

The chief duties of the "KHAD" intelligence agents are to control the members of the ruling party, establish order and discipline in the army, investigate the prisoners, and annihilate the enemies of the regime. Also one of KHAD's other important tasks is to infiltrate the struggling Afghan guerrilla organizations, refugee camps, and the opponent parties in Iran and Pakistan.

They also carry out espionage and sabotage within the ethnic groups living near the Pakistan-Afghan border. The wave of violence and explosions in Peshawar in 1361 was the direct and indirect result of the infiltrative work of these espionage and sabotage teams. KHAD also tries to bribe the win over the political opponents of Gen. Zia ul-Haq from the Pathan and Baluch ethnic groups working in the army and other parts of Pakistan in order to compel them to assume a hostile and pessimistic attitude toward the Afghan refugees.

However, as many political observers believe, despite suppressing heavy expenses in forming a border militia of local forces and taking advantage of racial differences, the Marxist regime in Kabul has not had much success in gaining access to its communist ends.

Any native resident who helps the Kabul regime advance its ends is evaluated and awarded even more than a university professor.

In many parts of Afghanistan the Marxist regime's "divide and rule" policy has not been successful. Many of the delegations sent by the regime to sow discord among the people have been rejected by the chiefs of tribes. Besides the resoluteness of the chiefs, another reason for this failure is in the basic policy of the "Khalq" and "Parcham" wings within the ruling "Democratic Party of Afghanistan."

KHAD attempts to arouse ethnic and racial hostilities and rivalry among the various groups of Afghans.

The political and administrative reforms that were effected by Stalin to prevent the uprising of the central Asian Muslims of Russia are being followed by the Marxist Kabul regime in the northern regions of Afghanistan. The government has given each ethnic group certain priorities and relative autonomy, thereby instigating a power struggle amongst them.

However, the struggles of the brave Muslims of Afghanistan have never let the Marxist regime in Kabul realize its aims. Today, not only have the local agents of

KHAD failed to foil the Muslim Afghan Mujahideen operations, but increasing raids by Mujahideen against government installations, offices, and transportation lines have caused numerous problems for the illegal government.

If the Marxist regime has made futile attempts to take advantage of ethnic differences to infiltrate the ranks of the Mujahideen, the resistant Muslim forces of Afghanistan have also tried to penetrate the innermost divisions of the KHAD organization by means of various tactics.

The subtle intelligence work by the Muslim Afghan Mujahideen has penetrated many of the key offices of the Marxist regime in Kabul. They have even managed to receive a great deal of money and arms from the government for the Mujahideen. Therefore, the enemies of an independent Afghanistan should await yet heavier blows from the Muslim people of this country.

Kayhan Int'l 1/9

## SEMINAR

TEHRAN (IRNA) — A one-day seminar on the Islamic Revolution in Afghanistan, was held here on Dec. 25 on the eve of the 9th anniversary of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The seminar reviewed the struggles of Afghan Mujahideen as well as ways to achieve the final victory.

In the seminar, attended by representatives of Afghan opposition groups and freedom movements around the world, speakers outlined Afghan Muslims' struggles against the occupiers, stressing that the Mujahideen will continue their struggle until they attain their Islamic goals.

Spokesman for the Council of the Islamic Revolution in Afghanistan Moheqqe Afshari, told the seminar that the Soviet Union is unable to strip Afghan Muslim people of their faith in Islam through armed or political ploys.

Kayhan Int'l 1/2

# A ten-year sentence is "encouraging"



By Sylvie Kaufmann

MOSCOW — The French ambassador in Kabul is taking steps to obtain the expulsion from Afghanistan of Alain Guillo, the French journalist and photographer who was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment on January 4 by a special Afghan revolutionary court for "subversive activities and espionage on behalf of Western powers".

Diplomatic sources said contacts with the Afghan authorities had not been broken off and the court's decision to hand down a ten-year term, which is shorter than the 18-year sentence passed on the French television journalist Jacques Abouchar in 1984, could be interpreted as an encouraging sign for future developments. No appeal is possible against the sentence, but Guillo could submit a request for pardon to Afghan President Najibullah. This is precisely what the French representatives in Kabul immediately did.

Christian Lambert, the French chargé d'affaires in Kabul, who was allowed to see the accused only once — on December 22 — was informed towards midday (local time) on January 4 that the

embassy would be authorised to send an observer to the hearing. An adviser, Roland Petit, accompanied by an interpreter, was led to the revolutionary court by a "guide". But it was only at 6:40 pm that they and seven or eight journalists from the USSR and the socialist countries were admitted into the room where the case was tried to hear the verdict. At the end of the hearing, Petit was able to have a few words with Guillo, who appeared to him to be "in good and vigorous form".

Guillo, according to the diplomats, was able to explain himself at length during the hearing. Soviet television moreover showed footage on the trial in its main evening newscast. The photographer looked calm. He was wearing a light pullover, and was seen talking from the dock, but his words could not be heard. The Soviet correspondent also interviewed a "distinguished Afghan legal expert" who gave assurances that the hearing took place in "conformity with international law".

The accused was assigned a

court-appointed Afghan lawyer to defend him, together with an interpreter. Guillo's paraphernalia for "spying" was also displayed on television: according to the charge, when he was arrested on September 12 near the Soviet border in northern Afghanistan, Guillo had 26 topographic maps, a notebook containing detailed information of a military character, photos and videocassettes, whose contents were of "military interest". Guillo's guide and interpreter who testified against him were both condemned to 16 years' in jail for treason.

While the trial was getting under way, Kabul took on the appearance of a fortified town with tanks and helicopters deployed in anticipation of the arrival of Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze at 3 pm — the visit had been treated with the greatest discretion in the Soviet press. A Western diplomat said that half an hour before his arrival there was an explosion which sent up a column of smoke over the capital.

## Afghan Refugees Can Avail All Educational Facilities

ZAHEDAN, Sistan-Baluchistan Province, Jan. 1 (IRNA) — All Afghan refugees having valid identity cards from the Interior Ministry can avail educational facilities at Iranian schools or take the annual university entrance examination.

Interior Ministry director-general for expatriates and refugees, brother Bashir said that fifty Afghan refugees were admitted to Iranian universities and colleges after they passed university entrance examination held early this summer.

At present, Bashir said, 2.5 million Afghan refugees are living in the Islamic Republic, out of whom 50,000 have been taught to read and write by the Literacy Movement classes.

Kayhan Int'l

1/2



Mohammad Khan Jalalair RMR

terms. But even servicing these was a big burden.

President Najibullah last week said the war had cost Afghanistan 50 billion afghanis (HK\$7.8 billion at the official rate).

Mr Jalalair said that this was in terms of damage to fixed assets in a country whose gross domestic product last year was only US\$3.5 billion (HK\$27.3 billion). The cost of the war itself was far higher, he said, confirming, without giving figures, that most of this was borne by the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union accounted for 55 to 60 per cent of Afghanistan's two-way trade, other communist countries 10 per cent, Japan 10 per cent and Southeast Asia and the West each five to 10 per cent.

"We are landlocked, far from the big markets in Europe, America and Asia. Our other neighbours are developing countries like ourselves," Mr Jalalair said.

"I would not use the term 'economic colony', but our northern neighbour is very important to us," he said.

SCMP 1/29

## Moscow's goodwill crucial for Kabul

KABUL: Afghanistan will remain heavily dependent on Soviet aid and trade even after the withdrawal of Soviet armed forces but has no intention of being an economic colony of Moscow, Afghan Commerce Minister Mohammad Khan Jalalair said.

In an interview in the Afghan capital, he painted a

picture of a small country far from world markets, its economy ravaged by nine years of war which would leave it more than ever dependent on the goodwill of its big northern neighbour.

"Even before the war we were running a big trade gap. Now we are in an even worse position — we have a very negative picture," said Mr Jalalair, speaking at his heavily-guarded ministry in the Karte Seh quarter of south

Kabul.

The minister, a fluent English speaker who has held senior government posts since before the 1978 leftist revolution, was reluctant to give exact figures but agreed that the excess of imports over exports was now greater than the 30.5 per cent recorded two years ago.

The budget deficit last year was around 32 per cent and inflation was running above 20 per cent.

The trade and budget shortfalls were filled partly "by eating a little each year from our limited reserves" but mainly with credits from the Soviet Union, Mr Jalalair said.



# Kabul varsity professor tells his woeful tale

From Our Peshawar Bureau

JAN. 12: A senior professor of Kabul University, who spent five years in jail, has been an Afghanist and crossed over the border to take shelter in Pakistan along with his family.

Dr. M. Hassan Kakar, 56, until recently Professor of Modern Afghan History at Kabul University, has been one of the staunchest opponents of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

He was arrested by the Kabul regime in April 1982 along with other professors. After a show trial he was sentenced to eight years of imprisonment.

While he had spent nine months in isolated confinement in the cells of the Khad headquarters in Kabul city he was shifted to Puli-Charkhail jail. Immediately after his arrest, Prof. Kakar was declared as a prisoner of conscience by all human rights agencies including Amnesty International. Prof. Dr. Ar-macora, special U.N. representative on Human Rights in Afghanistan, also put pressure on the regime and offered leadership for his immediate release, as a result of national and international pressure on the Kabul regime was freed in March last year. However, he reached Peshawar a few days back.

Addressing a Press conference this evening, Dr. Kakar said that the academic freedom had been shattered in Afghanistan.

After release, Dr. Kakar was allowed to resume his work at the Department of History to which he was head. He resumed his duty but later said goodbye to the campus.

He also said on release he found that the number of teachers and students had considerably gone down.

There was a university for name and there was no academic freedom. It was really tragic. "Boys have to study and many sent to army", Dr. Kakar said.

He told a questioner that he had

written two books in Pash-to in Afghans in the spring of 1987 in a state of war with Russia and a last word of second Republic of Afghanistan.

Similarly, he intends to write another book to be entitled five years in the Russianised prison in Kabul.

Dr. Kakar said that prisoners in Afghanistan pass through two stages. In the first stage inhuman kinds of punishments are inflicted on prisoners during supervision period. In the second stage, prisoners are shifted to Puli-Charkhail Jail to pass the terms of imprisonment.

Years were shed in his eyes as he told the newsmen that both the men and women were subjected to inhuman and unphysical tortures in jail. In this connection he referred to the move of body was injected with solution of salt.

Dr. Kakar quoted that particular prisoner as having said that for 24 hours he felt as if he was in fire.

He said that he was charged he was in jail for 15 months without trial and was victim of mental torture.

Asked about his future, he said: "If I could be of any service to resistance movement at intellectual level I will not lag behind."

He said that he was charged with being pro-West, anti-Soviet, engaged in overthrowing Kabul government, member of Afghan Mujahideen and Social Democratic Party, founder member of emancipation group (Giroh-Rihai), Editor of clandestine anti-state journal (Dunya), involved in teaching teachers and students for boycotts.

The Press conference was attended by a large number of Pakistani, Afghan and Western journalists.

Dr. Kakar's son and a daughter were also present. The Press conference was arranged by Writers Union of Free Afghanistan.

The Pakistan Times

January 13, 1988.

See article on p. 21

## Mujahideen's attacks subside

The Mujahideen have launched more successful attacks in the province of Afghanistan causing heavy casualties on the joint Soviet-Kabul troops.

In response to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (VIRA), the Mujahideen in Illias Karez area set on fire a post of the Soviet troops and destroyed a Soviet vehicle and a tank. Thirty-three Soviet-Kabul troops were also killed by the Mujahideen in the area.

Similarly, as a result of the mine blasts in Khoti Dastan area of Herat province recently one jeep and a Soviet truck were destroyed, and six Kabul regime troops were killed, including a militia officer.

The radio, quoting a commander of the Mujahideen, said that the Mujahideen of Balkh and other northern provinces of Afghanistan are in a strong position. They have liberated 70 per cent of Balkh province from the Soviet-Kabul troops.

The commander said the morale of the Soviet-Kabul troops in the province was very low. He said the Mujahideen are firmly determined to continue the struggle for the true independence of Afghanistan and establishment of an Islamic government.

According to Haddo Tengeran, the Mujahideen in an organised attack on the Soviet-Kabul troops destroyed the building of the customs and in Kandahar province, they crossed a mine field and launched a surprise attack in another operation, the Mujahideen destroyed two tanks of Soviet-Kabul troops and some security force posts and killed 14 enemy soldiers in Ghazni province.

Yet in another offensive the Mujahideen killed 28 Soviet troops and injured 17 others.

VIRA said according to reports from Khoti the Mujahideen have recently destroyed positions in the nearby mountains from where they are subjecting Khoti city of rocket firing.

According to another report, the Mujahideen in a series of successful operations have captured a base of Soviet-Kabul troops in Parghistan province. In the operations 140 Soviet-Kabul troops were killed and 149 were injured.

Radio Tengeran in its report said the Mujahideen have shot down 14 fighter planes of the Soviet-Kabul troops and captured three pilots in the recent fighting around Khoti city.

hiden are reported to have destroyed five tanks and a helicopter besides killing 30 soldiers and capturing a number of others. They also ambushed a military convoy in Nimroz province, killing 20 troops and destroying some tanks and vehicles.

According to VOA, a Kabul regime general has acknowledged that fighting continues between Soviet-Kabul troops and Mujahideen near the town of Khost.

According to a report in the course of the attacks conducted by the Mujahideen in the first half of January in Kabul and its surrounding area, a total of 24 Soviet-Kabul troops were killed or injured and 20 tanks and a jeep were destroyed. The urban guerrilla Mujahideen operating in and around Kabul there is rockets over the military installations in Kabul on Jan. 4. The losses taking place after the operation could not be confirmed.

The same day the Mujahideen attacked Qaja Rustam security post where four Soviet troops were killed and nine others were injured in another operation by the Mujahideen, led by Commander Abu Samad, they conducted attacks on the security posts of Goga Manda and Yousaf Khel where

# Afghan tragedy

NINA BACHKATOV & JOHN MADELEY

MOSCOW: Eight years after the entry of Soviet forces into Kabul, the Soviet Union is still torn between two versions of the Afghan war. For reasons of international prestige, and because, since the arrival in power of Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet leader has consistently sought a settlement of the Afghanistan problem, Moscow has been increasingly putting forward the picture of a war among Afghans.

But for social reasons and motives of internal politics, it has been simultaneously obliged to say more and more about the lives and deaths and the paradoxical return of its soldiers. It is a paradox which is increasingly reflected by the Soviet media in popular preoccupations.

The wish to "Afghanise" the war was illustrated by the telecasting last month of a film showing Afghan forces, and only Afghan forces, confronting the "Vietnamese" or "Lengas" as the Soviet media call the Mujahideen.

There has been a measurable change of tone and direction, with more and more newspaper reports leaving the Soviet forces in the background, and focusing attention on Afghan internal politics, presenting the war as a national struggle about who shall govern the country. This "Afghanisation" of the war is also evident in the casting of the "understanding" of which the Soviets are nevertheless always willing to give proof, as evidenced by the eight years of war.

According to Najibullah to the guerrillas, with an obvious green light from Moscow.

And, it is also necessary to pay attention to the home front, and particularly the millions of Russians who have been affected by eight years of war: widows, relatives or friends. And the more the war becomes a purely Afghan affair, the more individual Russians ask themselves: "Are our young men are still going there."

Although the Western media have depicted the war as Moscow's "Vietnam", the impact of the war on public opinion is nothing like America's first "television war". Yet, impact there is — and more so now — as it takes the form of the following video offered three months ago by a youngman of 24: "We give our lives, and spend enormous sums of money which we need ourselves, would understand it, if we were going there to help people defend ideas or an ideal. But not to support one of the feudal lords against another. If they want to live in the Middle Ages, veil their women, and have their children taught by mullahs, it's their business. And it's a question of frontiers, what difference would it make in a real war if the Afghans were to install their own move rockets in Afghanistan?" (It may sound a bit brittle, but there are quite a few officials who have come to very different conclusions.)

Internationally, the human factor pushes the authorities in the direction of "Sovietising" the war just at the moment when, internationally, they want to make the Soviet role seem small. For there are the mounting numbers of war-wounded, whom, for some years now, the public has refused to let be forgotten.

There are also strong feelings on the part of veterans who want to be respected, and who, spontaneously formed groups to help the families of the dead and the wounded, are coldly told by bureaucrats who are slow to attend to these new social needs.

After first keeping a shameful silence, the authorities have made a remarkable U-turn. The veterans now have a place in work collectives, enjoy the facilities of university courses, and form "internationalist clubs" whose members have taken over from the veterans of World War II the duty of furnishing youth with an "education in patriotism."

In a country where words such importance, they have established that what matters is not recounting feats of arms but

sharing their experience "down there" when they come back. The media have started publishing stories of their lives as soldiers: these may not be literary masterpieces, but they do permit a more realistic view of the war. For some things happen with the poor performance of songs which move, and more openly address themes connected with Afghanistan.

Last month at Dushanbe, in Communist Asia, 2,000 members of "internationalist clubs" met for their first "national congress," with the goal of examining "how to teach young people what we learned as fighters" and how to put ourselves at the service of the perestroika. This important breakthrough has been made necessary by the difficulties the veterans encounter in returning to civilian life where violence, conflict and shattered family lives are common problems.

Afghan peasants, meanwhile, continue to leave their country. In the north of the country, a peasant farmer in Soviet troops moved across the border in December 1979.

For eight years he endured the disruption caused by the war between the Soviet-backed Afghan government and the Mujahideen. His farming suffered as irrigation systems were bombed, trading was disrupted and the cash economy slumped. In the north, a Soviet soldier, Mohammad Yusuf finally gave up. After his village was being bombed every day in retaliation for his desertion, he told his wife, Yusuf said a sad goodbye to the land they loved.

I didn't want to leave my home, but I saw that I had to. I took eight years of war to make me and my family refugees."

With 18 other families, the refugees are presently en route to Pakistan. Bombed and ambushed on the way, 60 of the convoy did not survive the journey. When the families crossed into Pakistan, they joined another three million of their countrymen who have also fled from the conflict. Weak and exhausted, it was overcrowded refugee camps that greeted them. Camps originally built for 10,000 people are today occupied by up to 100,000.

Overcrowded camps mean that water supply, sanitation, health and other services are unavailable. Pressures are mounting that everyone can get in. "We are still not registered as refugees," says Yusuf, "so we don't receive relief. We hope to find relatives in the refugee camps whom might help us. In the meantime, we have nothing."

Mohammad Yusuf's story is told in a remarkable new book THE AFGHAN TRAGEDY which highlights the suffering that the Afghan people have brought to Afghanistan's civilian population.

We draw attention to the massive human tragedy of this conflict," says Martin Barber, Director of the British Refugee Council, which co-ordinated the book. The cost to the Afghan people is figures. About one half of Afghanistan's population of 15 million has been uprooted, killed or exiled. The Afghan people's attachment to their land "means the decision to flee is never taken lightly," says the book.

The Pakistan Times, Sunday, January 17, 1988.

From the Editor:

Wheels are spinning,  
The Soviets may go.  
Lots of chinning,  
Is it or isn't it so?

Speculation is rife & everyone wants to get in on the act, but only the FORUM brings you a bad poem and as much of the fine print as we could squeeze in the following pages. So far we have received only 3 complaints on the size of our type, so continue to keep a magnifying glass handy.

The Geneva talks begin as we go to press and the chickens are already being counted. We hope the next issue will contain even finer print, in every sense of the word, on the settlement progress.

In the meantime, thanks to everyone who sent us information & Nawroz greetings to all our Afghan readers. Let's hope that the year 1367 will give everyone something to celebrate.

Please keep sending us information. The deadline for the next issue is 4/15.

## EVENTS

French scholar Olivier Roy will speak on Afghanistan in Room 1118 of the Int'l Affairs Bldg. at Columbia University (118th St. & Amsterdam Ave.) at 4 p.m. on Tuesday, March 8. FORUM readers are encouraged to attend.

A concert at the Jewish Museum (5th Ave. & 92nd St., NYC) on March 6 at 4 p.m. features Shashmaqan Dancing of the Bukharan Jews.

Admission is \$10; \$8 for students & senior citizens.



"Approaches to Islam in Central & Inner Asian Studies" is the topic of a conference to be held at Columbia University, March 4 & 5. The conference is sponsored by Columbia's Middle East Institute & will be chaired by Jo-Ann Gross.

The Committee for a Free Afghanistan will hold its annual Afghanistan Day celebration on March 21 at the Reserve Officer's Club in Washington, D.C. Starting at 4 p.m., the program will include the premier showing of Mike Hoover's 1-hour documentary film of his 16 visits to Afghanistan, a sale of Afghan handicrafts & an Afghan dinner. Everyone is invited but reserva-

Continued on p. 31

From Peshawar comes the news that the 7-Party Alliance has agreed on the leadership of an interim gov't for Afghanistan. Engineer Ahmad Shah, the Financial Director of Ittehad-e-Islami (Sayyaf's party) won the honor. Born in 1944, Eng. Ahmad Shah graduated from the Engineering Faculty in Kabul & did graduate study in Arkansas. He taught in Saudi Arabia where he married [an American, reportedly]. He speaks Pashto, Dari, Arabic & English. Selected as "Head of State" [Prime Minister?] is Zabiullah Mojdeddi, reportedly nominated by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.

# Land of Jihad

ASMA QADIR HASAN

There stood around the pillars of Masjid stating a glorious chapter of Islamic History. Colourful ornaments on the walls with black borders were adding to the beauty of the structure. I was standing in the yard of Mahabat Khan Mosque, Peshawar, a symbol of Muslim dominance and glory in the north-west region of Sub-Continent. This area has been of great political importance in the history of this area, as it was a pass between Central Asia and India. Every change that came to Khurasan, i.e., Modern Afghanistan, spread over Indian territory also. Then it became a military path for Mongols and other Central Asian conquerors. Many powers in India was crushed by Ahmed Shah Durrani, all, who also came from this region.

Current political event of this region is Russian occupation of Afghanistan, which has been a centre of Muslim civilisation since sixth century. Russians, who have conquered long ago that they could conquer the whole world, had not to fight in Central Asia, have once again tried their luck. Afghanistan has proved to be another example where they have been facing a tough resistance offered by Afghan Mujahideen. About one-third of the whole population has migrated and over half have died, keeping the spirit of Jihad alive.

Considering the international importance of this war, many journalists have visited Afghanistan and have projected their views on Afghan issue. Recently a group of Pakistani journalists visited Afghanistan to study the situation, and I was part of this group. We first visited the Afghan Female Hospital and went round the premises to enquire about the condition of the patients. There are different wards in the hospital, a labour-room and an operation theatre is also built. Free medicine service is provided to Afghan women. Condition of cleanliness is unsatisfactory — not because of overcrowdedness. We are introduced to staff members, who are doing their best to perform their duties efficiently and have to accept the superstitions of their patients. For example some women are not ready to give their blood for transfusion.

We then visited the Afghan Surgical Hospital (Male). It is the first special hospital for Afghan Mujahideen and only those patients are admitted who have got injured in Jihad. It is not an ordinary hospital, where patients are taken to get cured and go back to their homes. Here, the patients come to get well enough to go back to Jihad.

The Surgical Hospital has services of very different specialists and doctors and all kinds of orthopaedic surgery is done there. We were taken around the hospital which had 100 beds, two laboratories and two operation theatres. Some of the patients have no one to look after them. War has been forced on Afghanistan and they have accepted it as Jihad, a duty of truth against false. When you know that you are on right, things get much different. And it is the determination of being on right that helps them recover soon with the help and experience of

very cooperative staff at Afghan Surgical Hospital. We wished that every Afghan would see this purpose and meet his enemy with a question in mind: "Why we human beings get so cruel to each other?"

At 5.00 P.M. 4th September, we were going for a visit to Madina Charity Trust, founded by a Sufi Dervish, to see the orphan schools and hotel for orphan children. First we visited the boys school and hostel in Sarder Ghalibagh. Most of the orphans have none of their family members left alive, while some of them are left by their relatives as they are busy in their work. All the expenses of their education, clothing, food and medical services are paid by Madina Charity Trust. Their education is planned with the view of their preparation to handle the government and administration of the country. Their motto are, "We are the sons of Allah" and "Father; I am the Trust of your weapons".

Our bus has parked near the playground, and I was surrounded by healthy, beautiful children under the age of twelve or thirteen, the youngest victims of this war. They were a strange expression of joy on their faces as we went to them. May be they were looking for their mothers and sisters among us. One of them was asked why he was here. He said that "Jets came, they bombed, our homes were destroyed, and now we are here", and then he couldn't speak. I asked where would he go from here. He answered "Afghanistan". An elder one of them replied that "I am from Afghanistan", may be he could recall how his whole village was destroyed.

It was evening prayer time when our bus was leaving the Orphan School. We had been with them for only few minutes but we could not forget their faces and their cute faces. I think they do not return of those who love them and say good-bye. I will come again. After visiting the boys school we went to the Orphan Girls School and Hostel, a few miles away. It was temporarily formed here as new building is under construction for them. Ninety Afghan girls under the age of twelve are residing in the school, under their teachers and caretakers.

Most of the girls here have no one in this world, but Allah. They are orphan children. They are confident faces lack the liveliness of childhood. They are brought here to camp. They cry for their parents.

We were there for more than half an hour and didn't hear even a single laugh of childhood. Afghanistan is a land of orphans and refugees will return to their motherland but many of these girls will stay with their relatives to welcome them in their own country.

It was the morning of 25th September. I was asked to keep with us warm clothes and reliable shoes. It seemed as if we were to go on a long travel to Pakistan. I felt tired. But the sake of security we were not exactly in Afghanistan.

We reached F.A.T.A. (Federal Agency for Technical Assistance) and then passed through Darul Adam Khail, an open market of arms and heroin.

During our long journey to Parachinar, we passed by many Afghan Refugee Camps. Mujahideen are now built small mud houses for themselves and their families have even started cultivating

the nearby lands. Night was approaching when we reached Tril Mangel. Throughout this way many graves were seen pointing a green flag. There used to be no road for jeeps or other vehicles some years back, but now Mujahideen have built one and their next aim is its proper construction. It was a stirring journey for ladies, but their enthusiasm to know the situation and to visit their Muslim brothers are fighting, helped them. At 9.00 p.m. we reached our destination. It was quite cold and everyone had to sleep. In the morning we had to wait for the dinner the Mujahideen cooked for us. Next morning was a very important day for Mujahideen as they were going to destroy the Soviet army port and watch the real fighting. In the morning we were briefed about the situation in that area. There are about fifteen

hundred Mujahide fighting in the jurisdiction of Al-Fateh Cantt. In the morning we went to visit Girdiz, which is under the control of Pakistan. It is occupied by Naheeb Government, but Mujahideen have surrounded it and have cut down their supplies from all sources. That day they were going to attack a Russian Cantt placed in Girdiz Valley surrounded by their posts.

At 8.30 a.m. (26th September), we started our journey on an uneven, bumpy road. Our destination was Jawah Shaded Post, formerly known as Zaghner, which is named after the name of the first Mujahide. We had reached the post 12,000 feet high and were shown different types of anti-aircraft guns, most of them were Soviet. Russian jets which were fired to show us their working and the proficiency of Mujahideen.

We were at the post for more than six hours. Bombing was going on from both sides. A bomb exploded near fifty yards from where we were. Apart from the spirit which had brought us here, the fearlessness of Mujahideen. They kept on laughing and sharing jokes with each other during the fight. In fact their bravery and courage had poured more love for Jihad and martyrdom in the hearts of their guests.

It was a honour for me to spend three days of my life among those who have created a miracle of human history. When Russian forces entered Afghanistan only few people hoped for rebellion, and they hoped for their surrender in about one week. But more than eight years have passed and the rebels failed to come over this rebellion despite of all its military power and strength in numbers. Existence of this force in Afghanistan has made the world to be loved and recognised internationally.

What are the reasons behind the success of Afghan Resistance? What made them face such a tough challenge so courageously? Some of the answers to this question, I could find in general character of Afghan Mujahideen. They are full faith in God, and in His superiority over the whole world. Turst in Allah has strengthened their determination. Even inside Afghanistan, that kind of education is being pushed on children, and it is the only kind allowed in areas under Soviet government control.

The books at the schools and literary centres are printed in the USSR, and the teachers who use these books must be party members. Loyalty to the Islamic education, is the criterion for teaching in Afghanistan's government schools. For the teachers, the regime uses army officers and has imported large number of Soviet teachers especially from the zone of Uzbek. Tajik clergy never dies whose women's respect is kept alive. I wish my Af-

ghan Brothers a glorious victory; they deserve it.

Afghan Mujahideen are normally very brave people. Since eight years they are on front. Fighting in all sorts of trouble, but distinctive traits of their character are devotion and mildness towards non aggression and arrogance.

All of the Mujahide I met during this journey had one thing in common, they were devoted. They are all very devoted to their cause and this devotion has created an uniqueness of thinking which has united them. They have different codes but they reject the need of any clashes among them. Their tracks may be different but they all lead to the same destination. The goal is the most important thing in the world for them. Everyone of them who was asked for his needs, replied the same answer, "I or best wishes." They are very grateful to Pakistanis and their message for them is "Don't forget us." In fact, this is a universal message for all human beings. We must care for those of us who are in trouble.

PT 12/8

## Soviets wipe out Afghan education system

LONDON, Feb. 3: Over the last eight years the Soviets have wiped out the Afghan educational system. 94 per cent of the population, according to latest statistics collected through various sources.

The Soviets have selectively reduced the balance of Afghan resources to suit Moscow's needs, and have tried to mould the surviving class of Afghanistan into model Soviet citizens. That is a crime, damage that will have to be undone when the Afghan war finally comes to an end, perhaps the most difficult task to be imposed on the inevitably indelible mark the Soviets have made on the educational system and culture of Afghanistan.

Moscow's long-term plans for Afghanistan never included the Afghans. At least not the Afghans who lived there before the invasion. The Soviets had planned a long-term conquest that required killing or driving out most of the population, while re-educating the children to suit Soviet ideals.

Pursuant to that strategy, the Soviets have taken tens of thousands of young Afghans to the north for Soviet education. More than 30,000 Afghans have gone to the USSR for training and education in the last eight years. In half of those were children, most of whom have not yet been brought to their families. These children have been raised in the city that neither respect nor allows studies in Afghan history and culture.

According to the independent counsel on international human rights, communist forces have in the past year on Afghan children and the Islam. The forced removal of children to the USSR is one of the main weapons in this Soviet strategy. The organisation reported in November 1981 to create a new generation of Afghan youths who share the values of the Soviet Union. Even inside Afghanistan, that kind of education is being pushed on children, and it is the only kind allowed in areas under Soviet government control.

The books at the schools and literary centres are printed in the USSR, and the teachers who use these books must be party members. Loyalty to the Islamic education, is the criterion for teaching in Afghanistan's government schools. For the teachers, the regime uses army officers and has imported large number of Soviet teachers especially from the zone of Uzbek. Tajik clergy never dies whose women's respect is kept alive. I wish my Af-

The Afghanistan war is another chapter of human misery and sufferings at the hands of other human beings. Human beings were sent on earth to discover it and make it more attractive with their power of thinking and creative talents. They were supposed to live in its natural beauty not to diminish it. It is time to turn earth into a comfortable home for all of them but they are trying their best to make it impossible for each other.

We should try to look at Afghan issue not as historians or political scientists but as human beings. Humanity is more important than statistics. I can never forget the innocent faces of those parentless children who are orphaned. Why do we deny others of their shelter? The question is of saving the whole human race. Human beings are not to be destroyed when their race will be destroyed by themselves.

PT 12/8

The teacher might think differently if he were allowed to read a report published by Geneva University and the French Government in December. According to that report, based largely on U.S. and aid organisation figures, 12 million Afghans, or nine per cent of the total Afghan population, have been killed since the 1978 communist takeover. That is more than a third of the population lost by any nation in World War II.

Another five per cent, or about 700,000 have been wounded. The group hardest hit has been the Pashtuns, who in 1978 composed 39 per cent of the population. In 1987, the Pashtuns had been reduced to 20 per cent of the Afghan population. The single worst year was reported to be 1984. One of every six Afghans, who has been killed in fighting since 1978, died that year.

For those who survive the daily bombings, searches, arrests and tortures, life is a long struggle to live under communist rule. The Soviets and the Afghan communists have imposed a whole set of rules that go hand-in-hand with the Sovietisation of youth in the schools.

Soviet soldiers, however, have shown no respect for the Islamic code of conduct for the Afghanistans. A UNESCO report says that 12 principal monuments listed by the U.N. in Afghanistan, some of the great masterpieces, have been damaged by gunfire from Soviet pilots who use them for target practice. The minaret of the Shah in Kobani, built 500 years ago, has been "totally demolished", while the Cupola in one of the great mausoleums in Herat has similarly been destroyed.

The regime, of course, blames the destruction for the damage done by the Soviet Union. It is noted that it has built 50 mosques since the revolution. The regime's destruction of 7,500 mosques is not mentioned.

While Najib and other leaders make a show of going into the mosques and for the prayers, they are not allowed among the rank and file. According to an Afghan pilot, party workers and their families are not allowed to pray. The pilot said that the wife of an officer in his unit was discovered in prayer by the security forces and was arrested. The wife was mistaken as a warning to the officer and to other soldiers in the unit.—PPI

The Pakistan Times, Thursday, February 4, 1988.

# Money-changers thriving in battered Kabul economy

KABUL, Feb. 1: Saroop Singh sits behind his rickety desk, a blue turban on his head, a wolfish smile on his face. Before him lie the piles of banknotes, red 100 Afghanias, green 50s, purple 20s.

"Business is good," he says with satisfaction. "It has grown since the revolution. The war has not affected us, except that business is much more."

A head appears through the door, glances at the foreigners and mutters in Pashto: "Twelve Indian."

"Thirteen," says Saroop.

The man nods, and has gone. Saroop Singh has just bought 12,000 Indian rupees (50 dollars) for 13 Afghanias a piece. He would sell them back to you for 12.5 Afghanias. His profit margin is less than four per cent, but he is happy. Centuries ago, long before foreign-exchange dealing was a worldwide business, the money changers of Kabul were already here.

At the crossroads of the overland trade routes between East and West, Kabul was ideally placed for what is now called arbitrage, and it still is.

"A businessman wants to trade in Afghanistan," he needs Afghanias. The banks give 50 Afghanias for a dollar and then charge commission. "We give 200 Afghanias, no commission. So he comes to us."

"Importers want to pay for cloth or tyres or Japanese televisions, he needs dollars. The banks have got no dollars. So he comes to us."

In Shikharzai market there is none of the furtive whispering of moneychangers elsewhere.

The trade is not technically illegal, but Afghanistan's war-tattered economy cannot run without it and the Government has no present intention of moving against it. The changes operate openly and on strict business terms.

In a land where more than 90 per cent of the people are Muslims, nearly all of Kabul's money changers are by tradition Hindus or Sikhs.

"We have always been here—my family has been in this business for four generations," says Saroop.

He and the 200 other traders in the market have few clients. The costs: a desk, a bench for the clients, a filing cabinet for money. But their tiny stores, crowded together in a huddle of three-story arched tenements take like seats on the New York stock exchange.

Each morning the changers listen to the money reports on the BBC, make their calculations, agree their fixed rates for the day. There is no bargaining, it is no use shopping around.

Each day some half a million dollars changes hands here. Most of the business is in dollars, then Indian rupees, Deutsche marks,

Pakistan rupees trade in lesser amounts, but Saroop and his colleagues in this ancient cart are give you a price for anything. "Just as easily cash. Take it or leave it."

The piles of notes in front of Saroop Singh show indiscriminate looting by King Zahir Shah, Mohammad Daoud, the man who deposed him and was himself later ousted, and the anonymous peasants of the countryside. Wars and revolutions come and go, but money remains. So do the traders.

Prudently, they were reluctant to discuss the Soviet soldiers in their land.

No, they said they did not see many Russians in Shikharzai. But yes, they would take roubles—34 or 35 Afghanias for one a piece only half as favourable as that for dollars, but still tempting enough for a homebound soldier intent on some shopping.

"Compared with previous times", Saroop said, there is greater freedom.

After the (1978) revolution they tried to take over the banks and businesses, but trade dried up—there was no money—so they had to give them back.

"The only difference now is that prices are so high," he said, adding the fact that his own trade helps fuel the country's galloping inflation.

"Outside the alley, half a dozen children squatted in a circle, counting piles of notes.

"Change money," they offered hopefully. The new game was learning its trade.—Reuter.

PT 2/2

## Afghan Pullout Must Be Unconditional

BY MOHAMMAD HASAN KAKAR

PESHAWAR, Pakistan—The problem of how to end the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan has assumed a new urgency in December's summit meeting in Washington. General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, other Soviet spokesmen, as well as the United Nations' mediator, David Cordovez, say the round of talks that began Wednesday in Geneva will be the last and perhaps the decisive one.

The Soviets claim to have made many concessions. Mr. Gorbachev has stated that the Soviet Union will pull its troops out of Afghanistan in 10 months, starting May 15, if an agreement is signed by mid-May. According to Soviet and U.N. spokesmen, everything hinges on whether the U.S. and other resistance supporters agree to stop all aid to the mujahideen from the moment the Soviet Union starts recalling its troops.

Let us suppose the U.S. government agrees, what will happen then? At the very least, the Soviets probably will leave behind the vast quantities of weapons they have stored in Afghanistan ever since their invasion. It is also likely that before they leave, the Soviet forces will launch a major offensive to exterminate weapons supplies of the mujahideen.

We Afghans have become sufficiently realistic—or sufficiently wise—to be extremely cautious when dealing with the Soviets on their own deeds, especially after their invasion of our land, they themselves have taught us to mistrust them. We have come to know two kinds of Soviet rulers, the pre-invasion ones and the post-invasion ones. The first showed themselves as considerate, sympathetic, helping and trustworthy, while the second proved to be just the opposite and more. Prof. Anwar Khan summarized what we have learned about them. "The Russians are ruthless rulers," he writes. "They are oppressive in the primitive sense. They go for owning everything, from land to the individual and his conscience."

### Soviets Could Win Admiration

Now there is a good opportunity for Soviet leaders to prove their sincerity by laying the mistrust they themselves have created by pulling their troops out unconditionally, instead of demanding that U.S. and other military aid to the mujahideen first be stopped.

This may sound impractical to those who argue that the Russians simply cannot pack up the way the Americans did in Vietnam. I see no reason why they can't if, as they contend, they are confident about the correctness of their decision. They would win the admiration of the world for what

would be viewed as a magnanimous action. An atmosphere of greater trust in international relations would be created and pave the way for other major advances. More to the point, an unconditional pullout would compensate for the lack of representation of the Afghan people in the Geneva talks.

For the smooth and full implementation of any negotiated solution, it is imperative that all Afghan participants in domestic politics abide by it. This would be the case if the views about the future of their country are taken into account. The resistance rightly questions why after all the suffering Afghans have experienced, they should settle for less than the unconditional withdrawal of Soviet troops from their soil and full independence for their country. Mr. Gorbachev claims to be dropping the demand for a "nationalized and neutral Afghanistan" but he continues to talk of a coalition "government of reconciliation" based on the Afghan Communist party.

The resistance regards both as limitations on the sovereignty of Afghanistan. It is true that before the Russian invasion, we were "nonaligned and neutral" in our foreign policy, but this was our own choice, not imposed on us. The inclusion of any such requirements would limit the sovereignty of our people and would make it impossible for a future government to become a member of, say, a regional grouping if it came into existence and furthered our interest. At any rate, it is for the Afghan to decide, not for others to dictate.

The resistance movement is based upon one essential point: full independence. What has happened in the Geneva talks—agreed upon or not accepted by resistance leaders—who, after all, control 80% of Afghanistan? In that case there will certainly be chaos of a different kind. If all parties seeking peace in Afghanistan really believe the principle of self-determination to be the cornerstone of a nation's life, then they should leave the Afghans free to decide their own affairs.

Setting up a joint government is, of course, the most difficult problem. Many groups inside Afghanistan are armed to the teeth, and the custom of revenge is still a dominant feature of our national life. The animosity between Communist party members and other Afghans is beyond the imagination of outsiders. Communist regimes in Kabul, encouraged by the mighty power of the Soviet Union, have over the past 10 years committed such atrocities that they have rendered quite ineffective the healing potential of the relatively minor policy of "national reconciliation."

It is therefore out of the question for

any member of the seven-party alliance or other significant resistance leaders to form a coalition government with the Kabul regime. Those trying to bring about such a coalition are simply wasting their time and may in fact actually be opposed to a solution to the Afghan crisis. Many of the solutions advanced by outsiders are unworkable because they have not taken into account the hard realities of Afghanistan.

This does not mean, however, that the crisis defies solution. If the Soviet Union genuinely wants to bring about a workable solution, it can play an effective role.

First, it must remove about 5,000 top leaders of the Communist party (People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan) to the Soviet Union. That is a negligible number of people when compared with the more than five million Afghan refugees living in Pakistan, Iran and elsewhere.

### Centuries of Experience

Second, in order to monitor the phased withdrawal of the Soviet troops and at the same time serve as a deterrent to more chaos and bloodshed, it is essential for a United Nations peace-keeping force and an international supervisory commission to operate inside Afghanistan, along with an interim government. Leaders are at least acceptable to the majority of the people, until a representative government starts functioning.

Third, following the pullout of the Soviet troops, Afghans must be left free to bring about a government of their own choice. Afghanistan is not a new nation, and we don't need to be told how to organize a

state for ourselves. In this respect we are much experienced: We have well-tried, centuries-old social and political conventions and traditions; our main problem always has been foreign interference. Despite our economic and technical backwardness, our concern for independence has been the most forceful element in our national life. Just as our forefathers preferred independence to material progress, so today the overwhelming majority of Afghans unwaveringly follow in their footsteps, even in a confrontation with a superpower. We are tired of war—but we will not sue for peace on the enemy's terms.

If these basic steps are followed, an agreement on the formation and composition of a broad-based interim government is possible. With the removal of Afghan communist functionaries and the pullout of Soviet troops, the first major steps will have been taken towards ending hostility and returning to normality.

The interim government should exist for a relatively short period, during which a commission should be set up to draft a new constitution and a Loya Jirga (supreme national council) should be convened to debate and adopt it. This will pave the way, finally, for the establishment of a free, independent, representative government and the return of lasting peace.

Mr. Kakar, former head of the history department of Kabul University, was imprisoned by the communist regime in Afghanistan from 1982 until last March for the "crimes" of trying to form a human rights group and distributing "anti-state propaganda." He recently escaped from Afghanistan. This is condensed from a forthcoming article in *Freedom in Asia*.

WSJ 2/26



# Afghanistan War Pictures Under Attack

## Supporters, Critics Clash Over Work Done by U.S.-Trained Rebel Camera Crews

By RONE TEMPEST,  
Times Staff Writer

PESHAWAR, Pakistan.—The camera was focused on a convoy of Soviet tanks and trucks making through a rocky gorge along the Kabul River north of Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

As the vehicles reached a point where the gorge narrowed, Afghan rebels opened fire with rocket-propelled grenades. Several vehicles hit, sending sprays of black smoke into the air.

The camera remained steady as the tanks returned the fire, peppering rebel positions on the rocky slopes.

Dramatic film of this battle was the centerpiece of a two-part report on the "CBS Evening News" last summer. Anchorman Dan Rather said the film was the work of a veteran cameraman Mike Hoover, a government for CBS.

But the key Kabul River segment of the report, CBS officials have confirmed since, was filmed by a young Afghan, Mohammed Salam, who had been recruited under a controversial U.S. government program to train Afghan rebels and send them into battle armed with cameras.

The program dates back to 1985, when Congress approved an appropriation of \$500,000 to tell the world about the struggle of Afghan rebels against Soviet troops and their Soviet-backed government. Afghans themselves would be trained to do camera work.

According to supporters of the U.S. program, the CBS footage, as well as other photographs that were reproduced in magazines and newspapers around the world, demonstrates that in a short time the rustic Afghan guerrillas have been able to produce professional-quality material.

"With the right type of distribution," said Stephen Olsson, an American documentary film maker who serves as an adviser at the U.S. government-funded Afghan Media Resource Center here, "we have the potential to really open the window on the Afghan war. We are proving that the Afghans themselves can do it."

But opponents contend that what is being produced is war propaganda, filmed by combatants on one side of the 8-year war who have been known to put down their cameras and pick up their rifles.

For most of the Vietnam War, U.S. newsmen and women were on hand to document the action, including to dozens of network camera crews in the field with the troops. Afghanistan has four times the territory of Vietnam, yet on any given day fewer than a dozen foreign journalists can be found there.

The United States is not directly engaged in Afghanistan, as it was in Vietnam, but this rugged country is the setting for the largest covert CIA operation since Vietnam's last year, when \$600 million in U.S. funds were used to supply arms, including Stinger ground-to-air missiles, to Afghanistan's rebels, the *mujahideen*.

"Clearly Afghanistan is near the top of the agenda for United States



Afghan rebel leaders at Sayd Karam plot their strategy against the Soviet-backed government in this 1979 photo taken by rebel photographer Afzal Khan. Since 1985, the U.S. government-funded Afghan Media Resource Center has trained rebel journalists.

foreign policy," Kurt Lohbeck, a CBS contract journalist, said not long ago. "But Afghanistan is not near the top of our agenda in news coverage in the United States."

Lohbeck, one of the few American newsmen based on the Afghan border, has made many trips inside Afghanistan.

Western reporters are occasionally granted visas by the Soviet-backed Afghan government so that they can join strictly supervised tours of Kabul and other government strongholds. But assignment inside Afghanistan to cover the rebel side of the conflict is extremely time-consuming, expensive and dangerous.

American networks are not likely to make the long, arduous months to remote Afghan cities such as Herat or Mazar-i-Sharif, but "we pay these guys \$7 a day and they will go anywhere," Olsson said, referring to the Afghan newsmen.

Recently the dangers have increased for the media. Reporters have been caught in the cross fire of rival rebel groups. At least three Westerners were killed working in Afghanistan last year, two of them Americans. Documentary film maker Les Shapiro of New York City and James Lindorf of Los Angeles were killed by government soldiers in an October ambush.

Two others were captured. Early this month, one of them, the free-lancer Alan Guillo, was convicted of espionage by a court in Kabul and sentenced to 10 years in prison.

In a critically acclaimed documentary shown in July, also the work of cameraman Hoover, anchorman Rather intoned ominously: "This may be the last serious documentary to come out of Afghanistan for some time."

Olsson, a San Francisco-area native who made six trips to Afghanistan before he became an adviser to the Media Resource Center, said, "In 1984, I was willing to go anywhere. With the kind of security risks now, you are putting your life on the line. You have to think twice before you go in."

And this, Olsson said, makes the center's work more important than ever.

According to Acting Director Raju Said Daud, an Afghan formerly affiliated with two rebel units, the center has trained 70 fighters-reporters, recruited from all the main rebel groups, since the center was established last year.

He said that 70 more by rebel reporters have resulted in more

than 200 hours of film and 6,000 photographs and slides. He said the center's material has been used in 122 countries, most of them in the Third World.

The U.S.-financed project has recently become an important source of information in Pakistan, where 3 million Afghans live as refugees and which acts as a vital conduit for getting American weapons to the rebels. Film supplied by the center is an almost nightly feature on the Pakistani government television network. Independent newspapers use the center as a source for news of fighting in Afghanistan.

Daud said that in a single recent week, 18 rebel crews trained and supplied by the center were in Afghanistan, several of them filming the fighting at Khost, in Paktia province.

One of the rags against the Media Resource Center, a U.S. official associated with the project said, "is that they don't come up with quality equal to Western commercial standards. But for an organization that has only been around for such a short time, I think what they have done is impressive."

The media center distributes its material free, yet when its material is used, as in the case of the Aug. 11 and 12 CBS News programs, the center wants credit. On the other hand, because of the possibility of danger to relatives in Soviet-occupied Afghanistan, some rebel reporters do not wish to be identified by name with their work.

Another credit dispute arose over a photograph that appeared among Time magazine's "pictures of the year" Dec. 28. The photo showed the bodies of an Afghan family buried in a Soviet air attack, posed in prayer and preserved as in a scene from Pompeii. It was said to have been shot by Radek Sikorski for the London Observer. But U.S. officials affiliated with the Afghan Media Center say they have an identical negative.

A spokesman for SIPA Press, the New York agency that represents Sikorski, said Sikorski did take the photo.

"(In general if the source and the circumstances of a photo are unusual," said Alvin Shuster, foreign editor of the Los Angeles Times, "we try to explain all that background our readers need.")

Critics of the program contend that the amount of quality work being produced by the Afghans is still very low.

"Out of the hundreds of hours of film that they shoot, there might be two or three minutes of good stuff,"

said a Western journalist who has covered the Afghan conflict for several years. "I think it is a mistake for them to try to compete with American or European national television."

Even more troubling to critics is that it is rarely possible for independent journalists to verify the claims of the Afghan rebel reporters.

How, some critics say, can a recipient of Afghan Media Resource Center material be certain that the village the rebel reporter says is under attack is actually that village, or that the attackers are who the rebel reporter says they are?

"The problem of any of what you see from these people is credibility," the experienced Western journalist says. "There is no question that you are seeing things, but what is the context?"

Olsson and others defend their Afghan cameramen against such criticism, saying that the pictures usually speak for themselves. Moreover, they say, the pictures are subjected to extensive editing at the center before they are distributed. There is no doubt, for example, Olsson said, that the attack on the Soviet convoy on the Kabul River was anything other than what it was described as.

It is an advantage rather than a disadvantage, Olsson said, that the men assigned to report on the *mujahideen* are members of the *mujahideen*.

"Our men move with the *mujahideen* because they are *mujahideen*," he said. "They are willing to stay in longer and put up with more hardship."

After all, Olsson said, Americans have been in Vietnam and French journalists covered the battle of Algiers.

"When people say, 'How can an Afghan cover the Afghan war?' He is too involved; it is in many ways a racist comment," he said. "If it is unfair to say they can't be objective merely because they are Afghans."

Few government projects in recent years have been debated as intensely as the Afghan Media Resource Center, and the debate touches on the question of academic integrity as well as journalistic ethics.

Under a \$180,000 contract with the U.S. government, Boston University sent specialists to the center to train Afghans in camera work, editing and writing. The contract expired in December and was not renewed. The program had become the subject of campus debate, questioning whether the university should be involved in what was widely perceived as a government propaganda project.

Since then, the U.S. Information Agency has taken over, and this position of the center in the position of sending Afghan soldiers and their families into a war zone and arranging for the distribution of their reports.

We hope it is an interim measure," a U.S. official in Pakistan said. "We don't like doing it. We don't like charging the center is a U.S. government propaganda agency." The official said the government has begun looking for a new independent contractor for the program to take the place of Boston University.

Under U.S. law, it is illegal to use within the United States material

produced by the information service, and in letters to Boston University officials, CBS executives said the network had inadvertently used the film on the Kabul River battle in its Aug. 11 and 12 program. Had they known and that the material was produced by a government-funded organization, they said, they would have been prevented from using it under the network's own rules.

As the debate continues, the quality of news and still photographs arriving at the center continues to improve. And many of the fighters-turned-film makers say they have no intention of giving up their work, regardless of whether they continue to have the U.S. government's support.

One of them, Kamaluddin Kochoi, 30, was a teacher of biology and chemistry in his native Jalalabad before the Soviet Union sent troops into Afghanistan in December 1979. He and his father were jailed because of ties with a previous government, and when they were released, the center extended a family of 120 people moved to refugee camps in Pakistan.

Afghanistan may need biology and chemistry teachers more than it needs cameramen, but Kochoi says he will go back to teaching, even if there is peace.

"I want to be a cameraman," he said. "I am very keen to learn everything about camera and film."

Los Angeles Times

January 13, 1988

Cont. from p. 14

Incomplete document. It is now being said that this episode prevented the United States from doing exactly what officials at the time saw as a basic obligation: to weigh the agreement as a whole before offering an American guarantee.

Here the balance among provisions is essential. In December 1983, for example, the Pakistani position was that Soviet forces had to withdraw as fast as feasible, which was understood to mean no more than three or four months. Now the Russians have proposed 18 months, a time limit that is to be accepted, shouldn't the Soviet Union offer other safeguards against military offensives to "trust the resistance?"

"Similarly, if the agreement is really to provide for Afghan neutrality, shouldn't the Soviet Union accept limitations on its military support to the Kabul Government once the agreement takes effect? (Somewhat imprecisely, the word "neutrality" in 11 finds such a limitation unreasonable.) President Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq of Pakistan said that the intention of the agreement was to ensure the legitimacy of all who shall sign for Afghanistan? His reason is simple: The regime's legitimacy — its ability to implement the agreement — is in doubt. Obviously, the Soviet side would like to argue that certain provisions are no longer necessary, so it is the one blocking agreement."

STEPHEN R. STANOVICH, Director of Soviet Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, Feb. 12, 1988

NYT

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*Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan and Its Implications for Pakistan.* Massachusetts, 1985 (Ph.D. in Political Science). 336p. DAI 46, no. 12 (June 1986): 3854-A; UM 8602688. Concerned with the extent to which the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan has been viewed as a threat to Pakistan and with the ways in which it has affected Pakistan's relations with both its neighbors and with extra-regional powers.

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*Arms Transfer as an Instrument of Soviet Policy in the Middle East: Toward a More Complete Understanding.* George Washington, 1986 (Ph.D. in Political Science). 376p. DAI 47, no.4 (Oct. 1986): 1475-A; UM 8615745. Includes scattered information about Soviet arms transfers to Afghanistan.

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*Pretexts of Rebellion: The Cultural Origins of Pakhtun Resistance to the Afghan State.* Michigan, 1986 (Ph.D. in Anthropology). 575p. DAI 47, no.3 Sept. 1986): 958-A; UM 8612257. Examines the reasons for the development of popular resistance to the Marxist government which took power in Afghanistan in 1978.

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*Herrschaft, Raub und Gegenseitigkeit: die politische Geschichte Badakhshans 1500-1883.* [German, with a summary in English: Dominion, Robbery and Reciprocity: The Political History of Badakhshan, 1500-1883.] Freie Universität Berlin, 1982 (Dr., Fachbereich Geschichtswissenschaften). Analyzes the political conditions and system of government in a peripheral area of Central Asia up to 1883, when this region was divided into two zones and integrated into present-day Afghanistan and Russia respectively. Published as *Herrschaft, Raub und Gegenseitigkeit: die politische Geschichte Badakhshans 1500-1883* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1982. 254p.).

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*Beyond Plato's Pond: The Greeks and Barbarians in Bactria.* Virginia, 1984 (Ph.D. in History). 283p. DAI 46, no.7 (Jan. 1986): 2043-A; UM 8515477. Examines the evidence for Bactria's earlier historical development under the Achaemenid kings, Alexander the Great, and the empire of the early Seleucids (6th-3rd century B.C.).

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*Rol' periodicheskoi pechati v kul'turnoi revoliutsii v DRA.* [Russian: The Role of the Periodical Press in the Cultural Revolution within the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.] Moskovskii gosudarstvennyi universitet imeni M. V. Lomonosova, 1984 (Kandidat nauk in Philological Sciences).

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*The Historical Development of the Nuristani Languages.* Minnesota, 1986 (Ph.D. in South Asian Languages). 137p. DAI 47, no.2 (Aug. 1986): 522-23-A; UM 8608903. Investigates the phonological developments in the Nuristani languages (Ashkun, Kati, Prasun and Waigali) that are spoken in northeastern Afghanistan in order to examine their position with respect to the Indic and Iranian branches of Indo-European.

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*Ob'ektivnye uslovia i sub'ektivnyi faktor razvitiia natsional'no-demokraticeskoi revoliutsii v Afganistane.* [Russian: Objective Conditions and the Subjective Factor of Development of the National-Democratic Revolution in Afghanistan.] Moskovskii gosudarstvennyi universitet imeni M. V. Lomonosova, 1985 (Kandidat nauk in Philosophical Sciences).

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*Die Baluch in Afghanistan-Sistan: Wirtschaft und sozio-politische Organisation in Nimruz, SW-Afghanistan.* [German: The Baluchi in Afghan Sistan: Economy and Sociopolitical Organization in Nimruz, Southwestern Afghanistan.] Köln, 1982 (Dr.). Published as *Die Baluch in Afghanistan-Sistan: Wirtschaft und sozio-politische Organisation in Nimruz, SW-Afghanistan* (Berlin: Reimer, 1982. vii, 299p. [Kölner ethnologische Studien, Bd.4]).

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*Afghanistan im internationalen Spannungsfeld 1938-1945: dargestellt unter Berücksichtigung seiner Aussenpolitik seit dem 19. Jahrhundert.* [German: Afghanistan in the International Field of Tension, 1938-1945: Shown with Regard to Its Foreign Policy since the Nineteenth Century.] Hamburg, 1984 (Dr.). 471p. Consists of 5 microfiche. For copies, write to the Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek, Moorweidenstrasse 40, D-2000 Hamburg 13, West Germany.

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*The Use of Economic Sanctions as a Political Weapon in U.S.-Soviet Relations.* Massachusetts, 1986 (Ph.D. in Political Science). 221p. DAI 47, no.9 (Mar. 1987): 3554-A; UM 8701211. A study of U.S. sanctions against the Soviet Union in January 1980-April 1981, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

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*Der Boycott der Olympischen Spiele 1980 und die Öffentliche Meinung.* [German: The Boycott of the 1980 Olympic Games and Public Opinion.] Freie Universität Berlin, 1983 (Dr.). 190p. On the boycott initiated by the United States in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

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Barytes Deposits in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.] Moskovskii gornyi institut, 1984 (Kandidat nauk in the Mining of Useful Minerals).

TURBIVILLE, Graham Hall, Jr.

The USSR and the Projection of Military Force in the Third World: Soviet Foreign Policy and Role of Strategically Mobile Military Forces, 1945-1980. Montana, 1985 (Ph.D. in History). 415p. DAI 46, no.6 (Dec. 1985): 1717-A; UM 8517599. See chapter 7, part C (pp.344-50): "Employing Strategically Mobile Forces in Third World Conflicts: Military Coercion, Surrogates, and Direct Intervention—Soviet Military Intervention in Afghanistan."

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Erhöhung der Lebensdauer von Lehmbauten in erdbebengefährdeten Gebieten Afghanistans. [German: Increasing the Longevity of Loam Work in the Earthquake-Prone Regions of Afghanistan.] Gesamthochschule Kassel, 1985 (Dr.). 127p. For copies, write to the Gesamthochschul-Bibliothek Kassel, Münchebergstr. 19, D-3500 Kassel, West Germany.

Cont. on p. 27

## Entries for A SELECTED & ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON REFUGEE WOMEN, Refugee Documentation Center, UNHCR:

**AFGHAN NOMAD REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN.** Sweetser, A. In Nomads Stopped in Their Tracks? Camouflage MA Cultural Survival Inc. 1984 p. 26-30 illus. [Cultural Survival Quarterly vol. 8 no. 1] (eng.)

This article on the conditions of Afghan nomads in Pakistan contains references to certain women's problems, especially their restriction of movement to poor, ventilated and crowded camps and their decreased exposure to sunlight because of Purdah.

**AFGHAN REFUGEES. FIVE YEARS LATER.** Jones, A. K. Washington DC United States Committee for Refugees. 1985. 24 p. (eng.)

This publication analyses the situation of Afghan refugees in Pakistan their ethnic make-up, the location of the camps, their impact on local populations and assistance programmes. A section on Afghan women reminds readers that these women suffer from special social, health and economic problems.

**AFGHAN REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN: FROM EMERGENCY TOWARDS SELF-RELIANCE: A REPORT ON THE FOOD RELIEF SITUATION AND RELATED SOCIO-ECONOMIC ASPECTS.** Christen son H. Geneva UNHRSO. 1984 87 p. illus. tabl. (UNHRSO Refugee Settlement Series, no. 84/2) (eng.)

The need for education and vocational training projects for younger and older women is underscored in this report. Direct communication with women is severely restricted because of purdah hence it has been difficult to design and implement programmes to improve their situation.

**AFGHAN WOMEN IN CRISIS FOUR YEARS AFTER THE SOVIET INVASION.** Refugee Women in Development Project Washington DC, Overseas Education Fund 1984 3 p. illus. (Afref) (eng.)

Religious constraints have made adaptation in refugee camps in Pakistan particularly difficult. Suggestions are made regarding improvement of health and for economic self-sufficiency within their cultural context.

**AFGHANS. THE CHALLENGE OF SPONSORSHIP.** Nyack NY World Relief Corporation Refugee Services Division. 1982 9 p. (World Relief Ethnic Profile) (eng.)

This paper provides background information on the Afghan way of life for sponsors involved in the resettlement and integration of Afghan refugees in the United States. The author describes their religion, his ability, family structure, relations between men and women and discusses the cultural differences that may affect their adjustment in life in the United States.

**COLLOQUE SUR LE PROBLEME DES REFUGIES AFGHANS.** Bureau International Afghaniste Paris. 1984 50 p. illus. maps (La lettre du BIA) (Nombres Special) (fr.)

Cette brochure relate les principales phases du Colloque international sur le probleme des refugies afghans qui s'est tenu a Geneve en 1983. Les principaux themes abordes sont: l'origine du probleme des

refugies; la necessite de l'aide et de la protection internationale; les besoins sanitaires et educatifs des refugies; l'impact de leur afflux au Pakistan; la situation des femmes et des enfants; Le Colloque a entendu le temoignage de quatre refugies afghans et les declarations de nombreuses personnalites.

**DEUX MILLIONS ET DEMI DE REFUGIES AFGHANS AU PAKISTAN.** Accueillir (Paris), no. 58 March 1983 p. 9-13 maps (fr.)

Cet article decrit la situation des refugies afghans au Pakistan. Il s'attache a constater les efforts d'assistance educative et medicale mis en oeuvre dans les camps de refugies et cite le temoignage d'une femme afghane medecin, et celui d'un jeune refugie afghan, chef de famille.

**EDUCATING YOUNG REFUGEES.** Nunez K. Refugees (Geneva) no. 5 May 1984 p. 12 (eng. also in fr.)

The education of Afghan refugee girls in Pakistan, where traditionally women's literacy rate among Afghans has been very low is the subject of this article.

**FROM AUTONOMY TO DEPENDENCY: ASPECTS OF THE DEPENDENCY SYNDROME AMONG AFGHAN REFUGEES.** Bosman I.W. Copenhagen, Danish Refugee Council. 1983 (eng. also in dan.)

This paper resulted from a field trip to refugee camps in the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan. It focuses on the dependency syndrome and its impact on the refugees, particularly the females.

**THE INVISIBLE WOMEN.** Cornelius B. Refugees (Geneva) no. 2 January 1983 p. 21-22, illus. (eng. also in fr.)

This brief article details the prejudice against women that exists in traditional Afghan society, whereby the process of a woman's becoming invisible begins at her birth.

**NASIR BAGH.** Nunez K. Refugees (Geneva) no. 11 November 1984 p. 22, illus. (eng. also in fr.)

This is a brief account of a visit to the Nasir Bagh camp in the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan. This camp was set up for housewives and their children. Now the camp is also the home of elderly and disabled Afghan refugees.

**A REPORT ON THE PLIGHT OF AFGHAN REFUGEE WOMEN: TRADITION BOUND.** Roland Schiem, L. The Boston Globe Magazine (Boston, MA) 21 August 1983 5 p. illus. (eng.)

This is a detailed report on Afghan women in Pakistan; the author describes the consequences of religious constraints upon psychological and physical health, and social and economic progress. Widows and single women are particularly vulnerable.

**SOCIOCULTURAL CONCERNS AFFECTING ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS FOR WOMEN AMONG THE AFGHAN REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN.** Dupire, N.H. 26 p. (eng.)

This is a situation report on the state of Afghan refugee women in Pakistan and efforts to meet their specific needs in the context of conservative Muslim society. The structural focus of the study is on housing, health, education, crafts, and role/status.

**SUSTAINING AFGHAN REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN: REPORT ON THE FOOD SITUATION AND RELATED SOCIAL ASPECTS.** Christenson H. Geneva UNHRSO. 1983 63 p. tabl. illus. (UNHRSO Refugee Settlement Series, no. 83/3) (eng.)

The author surveyed Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan's North West Frontier Province: Baluchistan and Chitral. Sex-role differences are reviewed.

**TOWARDS THE SELF-RELIANCE OF AFGHAN REFUGEES? A STUDY OF THE NEED AND FEASIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING INCOME-GENERATING AND SKILL TRAINING PROGRAMMES FOR AFGHAN REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN, PARTICULARLY WITH A VIEW TO WOMEN.** Bosman I.W. Study report Copenhagen Danish Refugee Council, August 1983 84 p. annexes, tabl. maps (eng.)

In this study it is noted that Afghan refugee women are economically viable; skills may include: clothes making, knitting, handicraft and khatm weaving. A proposal for textile and handicraft production is included. There are details on the projects' implementation and on product marketing.

**TRADITION AND DYNAMISM AMONG AFGHAN REFUGEES. REPORT OF AN ILO MISSION TO PAKISTAN (NOVEMBER 1982) ON INCOME-GENERATING ACTIVITIES FOR AFGHAN REFUGEES.** International Labour Office. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Geneva. 1983 171 p. maps annexes, illus. tabl. (eng.)

Included in this report are International Labour Office self-help projects. Of particular concern to women is the Chitral or Lura, Herads. Fulfillment through Women's Development, which describes a comprehensive approach to developing economic life, through lightening certain domestic tasks. Education for better health and developmental activities are also discussed.

**THE WOMAN'S DIMENSION AMONG AFGHAN REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN.** Dupire, N. 17 p. (eng.)

The implications of Afghan women's needs in the refugee, settled villages of Pakistan are discussed, with special emphasis on health considerations and handicrafts through which self-sufficiency can be achieved.

**WOMEN AND HEALTH IN AFGHAN REFUGEE CAMPS.** Billard A. Refugees (Geneva) no. 2 January 1983 p. 21-23 illus. (eng. also in fr.)

This brief article focuses on a woman doctor caring for Afghan refugee women. Some of the problems she encounters are infectious diseases and an alarmingly high birth rate that is the result of a woman's worth being measured by how many children she can bear.



## RECENT PUBLICATIONS

"Home from Afghanistan" by Bill Keller in THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, February 14, 1988. P. 24.

"The invincibility of Soviet power is the last great myth of our system," one young Moscow intellectual mused recently. "We can accept sacrifice if we see a result, but we are psychologically unprepared to deal with the idea that we fought for nothing. That's why the real problem of Afghanistan will emerge after it's over." ■

"Afghan constitutional amendment expects Mujahideen's ceasefire" in SOVIET MUSLIM BRIEFS, Vol. 3, #4, Nov.-Dec., 1987. "Dr. Najibullah has legalized a 'People's Islamic Party', expecting to gain the party's full support & loyalty to his gov't."

The ORIENTAL RUG REVIEW is now a color bi-monthly magazine. The Oct/Nov issue included articles on South Persian, Turkoman, Turkish & Indian rugs. An annual subscription is \$45 (\$55 1st class) from George O'Bannon, 2100 Spring Street, Philadelphia, PA 19103.

Volume 2 of CONTAINMENT, CONCEPT & POLICY, edited by Terry L. Deibel & John L. Gaddis, contains a chapter by Selig Harrison on "Containment & the Soviet Union in Afghanistan." The volumes, based on a symposium cosponsored by the Nat'l Defense Univ. & the Foreign Service Institute, were published by the Nat'l Defense Univ. Press in 1986 & are available from the US Gov't. Printing Office. (Pp. 457-477) Selig Harrison also has a chapter in LOW INTENSITY WARFARE, Counterinsurgency, Proinsurgency, & Antiterrorism in the 80s, edited by Michael Klare & Peter Kornbluh. (Pp. 183-206)

AFGHANISTAN WHOSE WAR? by Syed Shabbir Hussain & Absar Hussain Rizvi, El-Mashriqi Fda., 52 Bazar Road, Ramna 6/4, Islamabad, 105 pp. Rs 35. (see p. 28)

"Afghan Rebels Never Say Die" by Richard Mackenzie in INSIGHT, 1/25/88. Pp 8-21.

**SUMMARY:** For months they have been planning this offensive. The goal of the Afghan rebels is to capture seven Soviet bases in

northeastern Afghanistan. Taking the bases would cut travel time for supplies from Pakistan and would boost morale for the rebels in their eight-year war against Soviet occupation, in which more than 1.2 million Afghans have been killed. They pray for victory. Insight senior writer Richard Mackenzie spent more than three months in the beleaguered country, getting a rare firsthand look at the rebels' struggle.

"Ambush at Silk Gorge" by John Barron in THE READER'S DIGEST, February 1988. Pp.74-78.

THE SECURITY OF SOUTH ASIA, American & Asian Perspectives, edited by Stephen Cohen, University of Illinois Press, 54 East Gregory Drive, Champaign, IL 61820, February 1988. \$29.95.

"US Policy & the War in Afghanistan" by Alex Alexiev in GLOBAL AFFAIRS, Winter, 1988.

"The Soviets in Afghanistan: Risks, Costs, & Opportunities" by Marvin Weinbaum is the title of a chapter in THE SOVIET UNION & THE DEVELOPING WORLD, edited by Roger Kanet & Edward Kolodziej, soon to be published by Macmillan & Johns Hopkins Univ. Press.

DANZIGER'S TRAVELS, BEYOND FORBIDDEN FRONTIERS by Nick Danziger, Grafton Books, 9/87. 352 pp. \$12.95. 0-246-13025-3. Danziger traveled from Turkey to China, spending 2 months in Afghanistan along the way. The book is available from Hatchards, 187 Piccadilly, London W1V 9DA. (Add \$2.10 for postage.)

The author spent several weeks crossing deserts and mountains in Afghanistan with the mujahideen. They would walk for up to 18 hours a day at a blistering pace, often with no more than one pancake-sized piece of bread a day.

"A Status Report on Gemstones from Afghanistan" by Gary Bowersox in GEMS & GEMOLOGY, Winter 1985. Pp 192-204.

Although Afghanistan has historically been well known for its lapis lazuli deposits, significant amounts of fine emerald tourmaline, kunzite, and some rubies are now emerging from that embattled nation. Emeralds come primarily from the Panishir Valley, northeast of Kabul. Large amounts of green, blue, and pink tourmaline, as well as considerable quantities of kunzite and some aquamarine, have been taken from the pegmatites of the Nuristan region, east of Panishir. Smaller quantities of fine ruby have been found in the Sorobi region, between Jalalabad and Kabul. The occurrence, mining, and distribution of these gem materials are summarized as are their gemological properties. Lesser amounts of garnet, amethyst, spinel, and moissanite have also been located. The prospects for future production of emeralds and pegmatite gems, in particular, are excellent.

SITUATION IN THE NORTH OF AFGHANISTAN 1987 by Moh'd Es'haq is a publication of the Political Office of Jami'at Islami Afghanistan, P.O. Box 264, Peshawar, Pakistan. Chapter titles are the Situation in the North, Development Work in the North, Cdr. Masood Speaks & A Short Trip to the North. Appendices contain a list of districts where the Supervisory Council of the North is active and maps.

DOSSIER FOTOGRAFICO #4 AFGHANISTAN, published by the Int'l Committee for the Aids to the Struggle for the Afghan People's Freedom, Casella postale N 13093, 00184 Rome, was prepared by Angelo Pitoni, Giorgio Ciulla & Vito Cirillo. The issue covers the Afghan situation in 1984 - a calendar of events, articles, photographs - & is in Italian, French, German & English. 40 pp., 6 Lira.

A collection of plays has been published by the Artist's Union of Afghanistan. The book contains "The Ransom" by Mahdi Doagoi, "The Mother's Call" by Qader Muradi, "Countrymen" by Sayed Abdurrashid Paaya, "The End" by A.A. Mahmood Ferogh & "Dilemma" by Salem Sayeq. Also from Kabul: 2,000 copies of MANIFESTATIONS OF BEAUTY IN ART, the memoirs of Yousof Kohzad, a prominent painter. (BIA)

Volume III, Fascicle 2 of the ENCYCLOPAEDIA IRANICA, edited by Ehsan Yarshatar, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987, contains an article on Aybak, now Samangan, by Louis Dupree & one on the Aymaq by Alfred Janata.

Subscribers to FREE AFGHANISTAN, issued by the Afghanistan Information Office, 18 Charing Cross Road, London WC2H 0LT, will receive a bonus full-color map of Afghanistan along with 4 issues of the publication. Annual subscriptions are \$25. Julian Gearling edits the publication.

AFGHANISTAN - AGONY OF A NATION by Sandy Gall was published in January. Gall also produced a documentary of the same name which was shown on British TV. He has made 3 trips to Afghanistan, the last in the fall of 1986.

THE FRONTIER REVIEW, P.O. Box 434, Palo Alto, CA 94302, ceased publication with Vol. I, #4. The last issue contained articles on "Afghan Obstetrics & Gynecology," "Domed Homes," "Nordhilfe Hospital," "Battle for Kandahar," "Soviets Execute Afghan Troops" & "Afghan War Spillover into Pakistan." There is a limited supply of back issues available for purchase. Any leftover funds of the REVIEW will be donated to the Afghan Refugee Fund, P.O. Box 176, Los Altos, CA 94022.

The 1988 Austrian Relief Committee Calendar is available from the Committee, P.O. Box 489 GPO, Peshawar, Pakistan, for 40 rupees. The color calendar has lovely water color paintings by Wahid Ullah, all depicting some aspect of food - tea-houses, bakeries, etc. There is a recipe for each month - aushak, boulanee, maushawa, baunjaun boranee, ketcheree quroot, etc., making the calendar useful even after the year has expired.

#### THE SOVIET UNION AND THE THIRD WORLD

The Last Three Decades

Edited by Andrzej Korbonski

and Francis Fukuyama One of the first books to deal with Soviet Third World policy under Gorbachev's leadership, it contains essays by twelve internationally known specialists who analyze policy in the Middle East; Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the countries of the Persian Gulf; India and Pakistan; Indochina; Southern Africa; and Cuba and the Caribbean Basin.

Contributors: Abraham Becker. Shahram Chubin. Francis Fukuyama. Harry Gelman. Galia Golan. Edward Gonzalez. Melvin Goodman. Robert Horn. Andrzej Korbonski. Colin Legum. Stephen Sestanovich. Donald Zagoria.

Cloth 2032-6 \$35.00 Paper 9454-0 \$12.95  
325 pp. Cornell University Press • 124 Roberts Place,  
P.O. Box 250, Ithaca, NY 14851-0250

DOCTORAL DISSERTATION Cont. from p. 25

Kerry M. Connor

An Analysis of the Residential Choices  
of Self-Settled Afghan Refugees in  
Peshawar, Pakistan.

Dept. of Geography, University of  
Nebraska - Lincoln. 1987.

"Afghanistan Whose War?" by Syed Shabbir Hussain and Ahsan Hussain Rizvi. Published by El-Mashriqi Foundation, 52 Bar Road, Ramna 4/4, Islamabad. Pages 105. Price Rs. 35.

Afghanistan is an important region, once described by Allama Iqbal as the heart of Asia, where an apparently unending war is being waged since 1979 - "the longest war", as the authors call it. Much has been said and written about it, but the present book is confined primarily to a single question. Whose war is being fought in this landlocked Muslim country?

It is the attempt to answer this question that has distorted the character and consequences of this agonising conflict. The authors, both senior journalists of Pakistan, have examined the logic and psychology of all those who have answered this question in the light of their particular thinking and then given their verdict. Their verdict may or may not be acceptable to every reader but it would certainly provide a new framework for a fuller view of all that is sought to be unraveled or distorted.

The book provides a glimpse of Russian expansion, particularly in Central Asia which once constituted a great seat of Muslim culture and power. By analysing this expansionism, which received a new impetus and assumed new dimensions after Russia's conversion into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the authors have also scrutinised the character of Afghan resistance. Soviet plans and efforts to Russify the Afghan population to a mere million by killing them or pushing them out of their homeland and then bringing their own indoctrinated Russians to settle there.

The Afghan Khalqi Commander of Pul-i-Charkhi Prison in Kabul declared soon after the Soviet invasion: "A million Afghans are all that should remain alive - a million Communists. The rest we don't need, we'll get rid of them." The authors' conclusion is that what is being done stage by stage in Afghanistan by the mighty Soviet Union: to reduce the Afghan population to a mere million by killing them or pushing them out of their homeland and then bringing their own indoctrinated Russians to settle there.

Then they have posed a question: who knows what actually is in store for the Russians themselves? Have not in the long history of mankind, small, apparently weak and insignificant peoples humbled their mighty adversaries in straight encounters? Such then is the encounter in Afghanistan: a single-handed Afghan struggle against a giant Power. Or is it, in effect, Russia's war of aggression against a small neighbour, the type of war which it has been waging against unarmed people over the last four-and-a-half centuries, expanding in all directions, rising during this period from an insignificant small Duchy to be the world's largest state occupying over one-sixth of the world's landmass? - Shahid Kamal

BANDITRY IN ISLAM: CASE STUDIES FROM MOROCCO, ALGERIA AND THE PAKISTAN NORTH WEST FRONTIER, David M. Hart, Middle East & North African Studies [MENAS] Press Ltd., Cambridgeshire, England, 1987.

Dr. David Hart, like his mentor, the late Professor Carleton S. Coon, has cast a wide anthropological net over Islamic society, from Morocco to Pakistan. His latest work examines the theory of Eric J. Hobsbawm (*Bandits*, London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1969; Penguin Paperback, 1972). Hobsbawm maintained that bandits were expressing displeasure over a regime's political policies; i.e., "popular protest against prevailing social, political and economic conditions."

Therefore, banditry, like pornography, is in the eye-and-mind of the beholder. One man's terrorist is another man's hero, etc. Hart applies Hobsbawm's thesis to banditry in Morocco, Algeria & Pakistan's North West Frontier, those "Lands of Insolence" which fascinated Coon. Using exhaustive data from the three areas, Hart concludes that the Robin Hood syndrome relates primarily to the way that locals and others report on the actions of the bandit. Myths often replace the facts of history and those who report on the lives of bandits tend to identify with their actions as being launched against unpopular regimes for political purpose, and, just incidentally, to rob the rich to pay the poor.

From personal experience I can verify that the "have-nots" in most societies tend to identify with the mythology of the social bandit. Growing up during the 1930s depression gave me and my friends such heroes ("role models" as John Dillinger, Pretty Boy Floyd, Machine Gun Kelly, Ma Barker & her boys, Bonnie & Clyde, etc. We even collected post office "most wanted" posters.

The facts, according to Hart, often indicate that the bandits are just that - bandits, in it for the loot. But it must be added (as Hart does) that bandit groups of the past and present have evolved into freedom fighters (or resistance fighters) if their turf has been threatened by outside invaders. Several current resistance groups in Afghanistan fall into this category - although some still practice a little "legitimate banditry" on the side.

Hobsbawm relates to three types of "social bandits": the noble Robin Hood; the resistance fighter for justice or freedom; the avenger of tainted honor. Hart lists Hobsbawm's criteria for attaining Robin Hood-dom as follows:

- 1) noble robber begins his career as a victim of injustice, and generally does so as an unmarried youth in his late teens or early twenties;
- 2) he rights wrongs;
- 3) he takes from the rich to give to the poor;
- 4) he never kills except in self defense;
- 5) if he survives his generally brief career of two to three years as a bandit, he returns to his people as an honorable citizen and as a member of a community which he never really left in any case;

- 6) he is admired, helped and supported by this community;
- 7) he dies only through treason, as no respectable member of the community would in theory, at least, help the authorities against him;
- 8) he is, again theoretically, invisible and invulnerable;
- 9) he is not the enemy of the king or emperor, who is the fountainhead of justice, but only of the local nobility or other oppressors.

Hart's discussion of various Pushtun bandits along the Durand Line of 1893 is most instructive and contains several pertinent case studies. Much of the late 19th-early 20th century banditry involved the kidnapping of wealthy merchants (mainly Hindus) and their families for ransom. Although Hart does not mention it, a new type of hostage-taking has sprung up since the 1947 Partition: car-napping or car-lifting for ransom! The bandits seize cars, buses or lorries inside the settled districts, drive them into a Federately Administered Tribal Agency (FATA), outside provincial jurisdiction, and demand money to return the vehicle.

Banditry in Islam is recommended to anyone interested in imperial administration, tribal socio-economic and political patterns, and conflict resolution. A few brief caveats, really comments more than criticisms.

Like many others before him, Hart is somewhat confused about the system of FATAs on p. 47. Malakand, although technically created as a Tribal Agency, remained under direct control of the Government of British India. Before 1901, when Lord Curzon launched the NWFP, the original four TAs (Khyber, Kurram, North & South Waziristan) came under the Government of Punjab. From 1901-47 the TAs came under the administrative wing of the British Indian central Government in New Delhi. When Pakistan became independent, the TAs became the administrative responsibility of Pakistan's central Ministry of States and Frontier Regions (SAFRON).

Also, three, not two, new FATAs were created after the 1947 Partition: Mohmand in 1951; Bajaur and Orakzai in 1973.

Hart's evidence tends to tarnish Hobsbawm's Robin Hood but, although down for the count, he is not completely knocked out. As Hart aptly illustrates, the Truth (or facts) is not as important as what people believe; the half-truths of today are generally replaced by the half-truths of tomorrow.

However, his statement (p. 61) that "myth is myth and history is history, and, to paraphrase Kipling, never the twain shall meet" is, in my opinion, an overstatement. Much depends on who is writing the history and for what purpose and which audience. An historical event occurs and then ceases to be a "fact," but an incident subject to interpretation. For example, Soviet and American histories of WW II vary considerably in interpretation.

For a discussion of the above theses, see my: "The First Anglo-Afghan War and the British Retreat of 1842; The Functions of History and Folklore," East and West [IsMEO], n.s., 26(3-4); 503-530, 1976, Rome.

Louis Dupree  
Duke University

FOXCATCHER, William H. Hallahan, Gold Eagle Worldwide Paperback (first published by William Morrow, 1986) New York, 1987. 382 pp.

A mythical Khyber Pass Restaurant in Washington, D.C. is mentioned in passing on p. 143 and the restaurant is described as an "intelligence hangout." The mention is the only license I have to review the book for the Forum. However, there is a real Khyber Caravan Restaurant in Washington which serves an excellent mun-to, among other Afghan gastronomic goodies. I cannot verify any intelligence connection.

Foxcatcher, although purported to be fiction, is worth reading for the insights into

## IN MEMORIAM

### SAYD BAHAUDDIN MAJROOH (1928-1988)

Prof. Dr. Sayd Bahauddin Majrooh was brutally murdered on 11 February, 1988 in Peshawar, and the country of Afghanistan and all of its friends lost a voice which will be missed as Afghanistan moves toward freedom. Foreign scholars and newspapermen always sought out Majrooh when they arrived in Peshawar. His office was usually full of interesting people: mujahidin leaders; refugees; Pakistani officials and scholars.

Majrooh was born in Kabul in 1928 into a distinguished family. His father, Sayd Shamsuddin Majrooh served as a cabinet minister, was elected to Parliament, and was a key figure in writing the 1964 Constitution.

Bahauddin Majrooh graduated from Lycée Istiqlal in Kabul, studied at the Sorbonne in Paris, and earned a PhD in philosophy from the University of Montpellier (France). He served as Dean of the Faculty of Letters at Kabul University, as Governor of Kapisa Province and as Director of the Afghan Cultural Office in Munich. Returning to Afghanistan, Majrooh once again became Professor and Dean of the Faculty of Letters, in addition to being President of the Afghan Historical Society.

In 1980, he moved to Peshawar and organized the Afghan Information Centre which became a focal point for news of the war inside Afghanistan. Majrooh participated in any number of conferences in Europe and North America on the situation in Afghanistan.

The last time I saw him was at Bellagio, Lake Como, Italy, in October 1987 where he gave a paper at a conference sponsored by the Islamic and Arabian Development Studies program of Duke University. Majrooh's paper, "The Afghan Intellectual as Refugee: Philosophical and Political Dimensions," broke new ground in Afghan refugee studies. The conference papers will be published and the book will be dedicated to Majrooh's memory.

I first met Majrooh in 1963 when he was Dean of the Faculty of Letters, then located in an obscure back street of Shahr-i-nao in Kabul. Using his considerable charisma, he tried to convince me that I should introduce social anthropology and archaeology to his students. So I did. Dean Majrooh attended every lecture, every slide session (especially those relating to fossil man!), so that he could protect me from the mullahs who also attended the early sessions, having been alerted by student members of the Muslim Brotherhood. Majrooh did such a good job of explaining many of my concepts in Persian that he actually had most of the mullahs nodding their heads like an approving Greek chorus. Those who were not converted left early on.

Majrooh was like that. He could antagonize, but he could also convert. He frustrated many of his colleagues, but they never denied his intellectual capability, nor his integrity, nor his honesty, nor his love of country. He will be missed by all who knew him and the many more who depended on his Afghan Information Center Monthly Bulletin for reliable information about Afghanistan under the Soviet occupation.

Prof. Dr. Majrooh published extensively in many languages and his bibliography includes such works as "The Dialectics of Liberty and Necessity" (1963); "L'education de soi et la psychologie du 'nous'" (1968); "The Ego-Monster, or an Account of a Kingdom (the Soul) Devastated by a Monster named 'Ego'" (1972, 1984; 2 parts); "Le suicide et le chant: Poesie populaire des femmes Pashtounes" (1984).

If the tears of his friends were ink, I could write volumes.

Louis Dupree

"Do not go gentle into that good night, but rage against the dying of the light."

Dylan Thomas

pagne at the French Embassy. He was also a regular at the Bamboo Bar, which French aid workers had set up at their residence, the Maison Blanche.

Majrooh was a rarity in rough and tumble Peshawar, an intellectual in a den of ignorance, an aesthete in a place of gross and persistent violence. This latter quality was revealed one night at the home of an American diplomat.

Majrooh had consumed several large whiskeys, and a Western reporter, fresh from a clandestine journey into Afghanistan, was talking earnestly about having seen fields of opium poppies that were being nurtured by the Afghan rebels, possibly to sell opium to raise money for their cause.

Suddenly an ecstatic look glazed Majrooh's features. He sprang from his chair and limped into an adjacent room, where he collapsed on the floor singing, in French, "Fields of flowers, beautiful flowers, beautiful, beautiful flowers."

Despite his love of the West, Majrooh was thoroughly Afghan, and he possessed a near-encyclopedic knowledge of his country and its terrain. This made him an ideal interviewer of battlefield commanders coming to Peshawar to rest and resupply.

The newsletter for the Afghan Information Center that he directed in Peshawar was regarded as by far the most authoritative publication on the war.

His death, therefore, is a serious blow to the sparse information network used by Western diplomats and journalists who monitor the war.

"Anybody who has ever had anything to do with Afghanistan knew him," a Peshawar journalist said.

Majrooh was responsible for breaking several stories on the Afghan conflict, including some that were adverse to the rebel cause, like the 1986 loss of the rebel base in Jawar. Even when spokesmen for the U.S. State Department insisted that the base had not been lost, Majrooh, depending on his excellent sources among the fighters, insisted that it had. In the end he was right, and the loss was considered one of the guerrillas' worst of the war.

"The professor" had a keen eye for a story, and loved nothing more than to spring an unusual war on reporters. One of his more famous media coup came when he introduced a fat rebel commander, a rustic bumpkin from a border province, to a small group he had invited for tea. The commander, totally unaware of his newsworthiness, told the reporters he was in Peshawar to buy spare parts for his squadron of Japanese motorcycles.

As the reporters reached for their notebooks, Majrooh listened and giggled. The rebel commander explained that his guerrillas were preparing for a motorbike attack on a Soviet unit—Afghan tribesmen on Suzuki's descending on the sleeping soldiers.

The story was on the front page of many newspapers the next day...

BIA (2/12) on the death of Majrooh: ...Sayed Bahamoodin Majrooh was an intellectual Afghan who had recently adopted a wise and realistic stand on the continuation and discontinuation of the fratricidal war in Afghanistan...

## Slaying Spotlights Afghan Riffs

By RONE TEMPEST, Times Staff Writer

NEW DELHI—His name was Syed Bahauddin Majrooh, but everyone called him "the professor." He had a doctorate from a university in France and was once dean of the literature faculty at Kabul University in his native Afghanistan.

Under former Afghan King Mohammed Zahir Shah, he had been a provincial governor and a diplomat.

But for the past eight years, until he was shot to death Thursday, Majrooh had lived as a refugee in Pakistan, in the North-West Frontier city of Peshawar, where he edited a monthly newsletter on the progress of the Afghan rebel war against Soviet and Soviet-backed troops in his homeland.

Majrooh was widely respected for his candor and intellectual honesty, in a place where these are uncommon virtues. Peshawar's main market is The Story Teller's Bazaar. . . .

Thursday evening, according to a report from Peshawar by the British news agency Reuters, someone went to Majrooh's office and shot him six times with a Kalashnikov rifle. Majrooh's body was found sprawled over the threshold of the front door. His son, Masood, told Reuters he had no idea who killed his father.

Diplomatic sources here and in Pakistan speculated that his death was linked to a power struggle within the Afghan resistance, a

loose collection of fighting groups known collectively as the *mujahideen* (holy warriors) that included mystics, fundamentalists and other Muslim sects.

Majrooh was certainly no fundamentalist. He was a Muslim, yet he loved whiskey and champagne. He was educated in France and he adored everything French, but he spoke English and German as well as French and his native Pushtu and Persian, in which he wrote a volume of poetry.

Every July 14, which the French celebrate as Bastille Day, he shed his traditional Afghan garb and donned a double-breasted navy-blue blazer and traveled to Islamabad, the Pakistani capital, to attend the festivities and drink cham-

how some in the Washington establishment and intelligence community could possibly pull off (or almost pull off) an "Iran-Contragate" gambit.

Take my word: this is a thriller and probably closer to the truth than many suppose. Now, all we need is a novel about the Stinger-Blowpipe pipelines.

Louis Dupree  
Duke University

THE FALL OF AFGHANISTAN, AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT, Abdul Samad Ghaus, Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, McLean, VA, 1988. \$24.

This book is exactly what has been needed: an insider's account of the fall of Afghanistan. The author, Abdul Samad Ghaus, is the top official of the Afghan Foreign Ministry to survive the 1978 coup. Formerly the Deputy Foreign Minister, he can write from experience:

"I personally had my moment of surprise when I arrived at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the morning of April 29, 1978, to confront my fate after the Communists had taken over the country. The person who received me there that morning in the name of the "Democratic Republic of Afghanistan" seemingly in charge of the Ministry's administration and security, was a certain Mohammed Akbar Mehr, a young and well-thought-of member of the Protocol Department of the ministry, whom everybody, including myself, had always thought to be a staunch patriot! (Later that day I was arrested and taken to the Ministry of Defense, while our former colleague of the Protocol Department looked amusedly at the spectacle.)"

A front seat in the historic events of the last days of his government really belonged to Abdul Samad Ghaus. He sat in on the conversations which Mohammed Daoud held with Zulficar Ali Bhutto regarding the Pushtunistan issue. When he asked Daoud's opinion of Bhutto, the reply was, "Bhutto is certainly a statesman and an extremely intelligent person, but I do not know to what extent he can be trusted."

Ghaus was also present in 1974 when Secretary of State Henry Kissinger conferred with Daoud. He expresses no opinion, either his own or Daoud's, about Dr. Kissinger, possibly because Daoud seems to have done all the talking.

More important, he sat across the table from Brezhnev during Daoud's visit to Moscow in April, 1977, and noted that the Soviet leader seemed ill and possibly drugged. Ghaus was shocked by provocative statements that presaged events to come exactly a year later.

A close ally of Daoud, Ghaus gives estimates of his personality that make him a more sympathetic figure than many of his descriptions.

It is of inestimable value to have such recollections as these down on paper before time removes all the eyewitnesses to history.

Rhea Talley Stewart  
Manchester, Connecticut

DA MĀNDZE KĀ'IDA ("rules for prayer") by Mulla Muhammad Gul, Education Dept. of the Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Peshawar, 1987. xviii + 113 pp.

Mulla Muhammad Gul (1885-1952) was born in Hadda and was one of the first attendees at its madrassa. Author, newspaper contributor, and school principal in Ningrahar Province, he went on to teach Pashto in Kabul, where he was active in the Literary Society and the Pashto Academy. According to the introduction to the present volume, he earned the nickname "the second Rahman Baba" through his emulation of classical Pashto verse. His family background and education qualified him in the subject matter

of this text. In Pashto verse couplets it instructs and advises the reader or hearer in proper Muslim ritual practice and social behavior of everyday life. In a series of short sections, each with a specific topic, it begins with ablutions and proceeds through daily prayer to the other religious obligations (and their violation, as in the case of the fast). It continues on to diverse matters of ritual (pure and impure water, excrement) and of social practice (such as food handling, "things done with the left hand," burial). The couplets roll on comfortably and the author is willing to be as basic as can be:

When one person passes another  
or two persons separate,  
one should salute the other  
and observe the rule of greeting.

And so on, on how to give and receive a salam. In domestic affairs he affirms traditional religious law and he gives the reader (as husband) a parting admonition:

She is your wealth and also your honor;  
protect her as a master should.

Viewed from a literary standpoint, Muhammad Gul was carrying on an old Pashtun tradition of rendering religious teaching in popular language easily remembered. In writing this text he was probably thinking of the needs of the Pashtuns of his own province. It may help now to educate a wartime (and postwar) generation in the ways of Muslim Afghan behavior. Those who read or hear it will have no excuse if they hear the old reproach musulman asti? - "Are you a Muslim or what?"

Christopher J. Brunner  
New York, New York

## ABSTRACTS

### *Soviet Profits in Afghanistan*

"Soviet Economic Interests in Afghanistan" by  
M. Siddiq Noorzooy, in *Proceedings of Commu-  
nism* (May-June 1987), U.S. Information  
Agency, 301 4th St. S.W., Washington, D.C.  
20547.

How costly has the invasion of Afghanistan been for the Soviet Union? Noorzooy, a University of Alberta economist, believes that the Soviets have forced the poverty-ridden Afghans to pay most of the expenses of the war themselves. The Soviet Union, Noorzooy argues, "eventually expects to make economic gains from its involvement in Afghanistan."

Prior to 1978, the Soviet Union pursued two economic goals in Afghanistan: first, to penetrate the Afghan economy by diverting Afghan trade from free world markets to the Soviet Bloc, by granting large credits at low interest rates, and by "insinuating" direct Soviet participation in Afghan economic planning. Second, to increase Afghan dependence on the Soviet economy through bilateral trade, expanded credit, and complex monetary or barter arrangements. By 1978 the USSR accounted for 37 percent of all Afghan exports and 34 percent of Afghan imports.

Since the 1979 invasion, Soviet control of the Afghan economy has expanded sharply. In the 1985-86 fiscal year, the Soviet Union and its East European client states purchased 76 percent of Afghanistan's exports, and provided 67 percent of its imports. Many of the goods "exported" by the USSR to Afghanistan are military. For example, the Soviets "sold" \$486 million worth of aircraft and \$233 million worth of trucks to Afghanistan between 1979 and 1984; from 1974-1978, Afghanistan imported \$4.2 million worth of trucks and no aircraft from the USSR.

Afghan agricultural output has been hard-hit by the war, and industrialization has lagged. To pay for loans and a balance-of-trade deficit that now total \$2.1 billion, Noorzooy expects that the Afghan government will increase sales of minerals to the Soviet Union. The Soviets already buy Afghan natural gas at prices far below world market rates; they paid \$48 per 1,000 cubic meters in 1979-1981 for gas worth \$115 on the world market, resulting in a loss of \$336 million to Afghanistan. An atlas compiled by Soviet geologists in 1977 shows extensive deposits of gold, emeralds, and uranium, which may be mined in the future.

The Soviets, Noorzooy concludes, expect to exploit Afghanistan's mineral wealth for years to come. "In economic terms," he concludes, "Afghanistan is certainly not 'Moscow's Vietnam.'"

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### EVENTS - continued from page 1

tions are necessary as there will be room for only 400. Call (202) 546-7577 to reserve your place. The Committee asks for a \$10 donation.

The Committee has also set up a hot-line with Western Union so that those interested can send President Reagan the following telegram:

"Dear President Reagan: As a member of the CFA, I am asking you to continue aid to the Afghan resistance even after the Soviet Army is out of Afghanistan. Don't trust Soviet propaganda to remove troops" By calling toll-free 1-800-257-4900 and asking for hot-line operator 9346, you can have your name signed to one of these missives. The \$4.50 cost will be put on your telephone bill.

On March 16, Matthew Erulkar will speak on Afghanistan at the University of Pennsylvania. The program is sponsored by the International Affairs Assn. For further information call (202) 965-6683.

"Afghanistan: 10 Years Later" will be the topic of a talk by Farhad Kazemi at Fordham Univ, 113 W. 60th St., NYC on March 29 at 4 p.m.



# AFGHANISTAN

## Information Division

PERMANENT MISSION OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC  
OF AFGHANISTAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS  
366 UN PLAZA, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017

PRESS RELEASE  
04/88

STATEMENT BY NAJIBULLAH, PRESIDENT OF THE  
REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN, FEBRUARY 2, 1988

In the Name of God, the Most Gracious and Most Merciful:

It is for several years now that an imposed war and various interferences and interventions, including armed interferences are being waged against the Republic of Afghanistan which have resulted in great catastrophe and tremendous losses for the country. This has also brought about the situation around Afghanistan and has created a seriously tense situation.

Proceeding from its peace-loving policy, the Government of the Republic of Afghanistan has, from the very beginning, made tremendous efforts aimed at peaceful, negotiated solution of the problems, avoiding to resort to military means which are void of any prospect. On the basis of such a policy and as a result of the good offices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the process of Geneva talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan through the personal representative of the United Nations, Secretary-General started in June 1982 and continues till now. It is to be added that, despite the fact that Iran has not directly participated in the Geneva talks, the personal representative of the United Nations Secretary-General has regularly kept informed the Iranian authorities of the process of Geneva talks.

The Afghan side has always manifested its political good-will and necessary flexibility with an aim to ensuring an early political solution of the situation around Afghanistan. All these efforts are aimed at ensuring peace in Afghanistan in the interests of the stability of the situation in the region.

Since nowadays the process of Geneva talks is reaching its crucial and final stage, I would like, once again, to state the position of the Republic of Afghanistan in that respect.

Notwithstanding the continuation and broadening of the dimensions of the imperialist armed interventions against our country, there has been remarkable progress in the process of Geneva talks as a result of the constructive position adopted by the Afghan side. The Republic of Afghanistan has always appreciated the efforts of the UN Secretary-General and the mission of his personal representative aimed at successfully concluding the Geneva negotiations.

Moreover, in order to end the war and fratricidal bloodshed and to ensure lasting peace throughout the country, the Government of the Republic of Afghanistan has proclaimed and is successfully implementing the real priorities of national reconciliation having various dimensions in the interests of national security, which is a clear manifestation of the powerfulness, wisdom and providence of the Republic of Afghanistan. The proclamation of the policy of national reconciliation greatly helped the acceleration of the peaceful solution of the situation around Afghanistan to our forward a concrete proposal on the formation of a coalition government, including the opposition armed groups and the forces confronting the Afghan State. This proposal was made as one of the dimensions of the efforts for ensuring peace in the country and its implementation is in progress.

Afghanistan is an independent, sovereign and non-aligned country. It is only Afghans who have determined and continue to determine the destiny of their country. No one, other than Afghans can settle the Afghan problems. No one should doubt this indisputable fact.

Those who desire for peace in our country cannot but utilize the policy of national reconciliation as a firm base for their peace-seeking activities. Among the real priorities of their beloved country, the Afghan people are a noble, valorous, free and heroic people. Our people want peace and are striving for construction and progress of their country. At this important and crucial stage of the development of our country, we have based ourselves politically on the multi-party system and economically on the multi-sectoral and multi-strata basis.

Presently there exist tremendous hopes and possibilities for the forthcoming work of Geneva negotiations, aimed at the solution of the external aspect of the problem to become a fruitful and final round and rapidly to result in the signing of the documents comprising the settlement.

The documents comprising the political solution of the situation around Afghanistan are: the declaration of non-interference and non-intervention between the Republic of Afghanistan and Pakistan, the declaration on international guarantees for the cessation and non-recurrence of interference and intervention, the Agreement on the return of the Afghan refugees to their country, the document on interrelations between the above-mentioned issues, on the one hand, and the solution of the question of the return of Soviet limited contingents from Afghanistan, on the other, and an agreement on the mechanism and arrangements for the implementation of the agreements concluded between the parties.

All these documents have been virtually completed and finalized in the course of five and a half years of Geneva negotiations.

As regards the withdrawal of the limited contingent of Soviet troops, it must be mentioned that the conditions for the withdrawal of the troops are stipulated in the speech by the head of the Afghan delegation given at the jubilee session in Moscow on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution, and the time-frame for the withdrawal of the troops has been agreed upon during the negotiations between the Afghan leadership and the Soviet leadership.

It must be stressed that the question of the withdrawal of the limited contingent of Soviet troops from Afghanistan is directly linked with the cessation of interference and the cessation of the sending of military hardware and equipment to the extremist groups opposing the Afghan State.

With an aim to helping the early and successful conclusion of the process of Geneva talks, the Government of the Republic of Afghanistan and the Government of the Soviet Union have agreed that, provided that the Geneva agreements are signed on 15 March 1988, the withdrawal of Soviet troops will start on 15 March 1988 and will be completed within a period of 10 months. As regards the phasing of the withdrawal, it would be acceptable for the Afghan side that a relatively greater portion of the troops be withdrawn in the first phase of the time-frame for the withdrawal of the Soviet troops. In case the agreements are signed prior to 15 March, the withdrawal of the troops will also start earlier.

We are convinced that following the withdrawal of the limited contingents of Soviet troops, the military conflict in the country will not be intensified. In our opinion, the occurrence of anti-fighting events can be prevented, provided that the forces opposing the Government of the Republic of Afghanistan, who are busy with continuing the war, adopt a responsible position and contribute to peace-seeking activities for ensuring peace and tranquility for our people. They should understand that if they refuse to heed the voice of wisdom, they will face the staunch resistance of the Afghan people, who will ensure peace and tranquility in the country, and will also face the commitment of the States who call for the cessation of interferences against Afghanistan.

Adopting such a constructive position, the Afghan side is determined to take part in the forthcoming Geneva talks with a good will and firm political determination.

If certain States or political personalities adopt a position aimed at prolonging the signature of Geneva agreements, under any pretext whatsoever, it will be one of the manifestations of their desire for the continuation of the tense situation in the UN Secretary-General and his personal representative and, finally for the failure of the process of Geneva negotiations. In such a case the responsibility of all the consequences will rest with those whose position contributes to the failure of the process. We, however, hope that such a thing will not occur.

It must also be stated that the conclusion of the Geneva talks and the withdrawal of Soviet limited contingents of the Geneva not be linked with the conclusion of efforts aimed at the formation of a coalition government in Afghanistan. The national reconciliation and the coalition government is an exclusively domestic matter and it is only Afghans themselves who must materialize them.

It is not irrelevant to make a mention, here, of the all-sided internationalist assistance of the Soviet Union to the Afghan people on the basis of good-neighbourly relations and traditional Afghan-Soviet friendship. The Soviet Union has always extended its helping hand to the Afghan people in difficult situation, particularly the military assistance of the Soviet Union to the Afghan people and brave sons of the Soviet Union, accepting all sacrifices, stood by our side in the struggle for the freedom of our country.

With the withdrawal of the limited military contingents of Soviet troops, all patriotic Afghans are duty bound to express their gratitude to the brave sons of the Soviet Union, to those messengers of peace, justice and progress who, in destiny-making moments, have devoted their lives to the cause of the Afghan people, defending the freedom, independence and territorial integrity of our country.

No country and people in the history have joined hands in co-operation with our people in sad days as Soviet Union and its people have done.

In accordance with its traditional role in ensuring peace and stability in Asia and following the decisions of the Loya Jirga, particularly the historical Loya Jirga of November 1987, Afghanistan will not agree to the use of its territory or a part of its territory become a springboard of aggression against its neighbouring countries. It is our desire to live in peace and friendship with all neighbouring States.

I fully agree and highly evaluate the stand of the Soviet leadership, headed by Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet Union Secretary of the CC CPSU, regarding the political normalization of the situation around Afghanistan. We expect good will and constructive steps from our neighbors, Pakistan and Iran. We hope that Iran will not be left aside from the political solution of the situation around Afghanistan and we wish its positive contribution in this regard.

It is obvious that the cessation of interferences in the internal affairs of Afghanistan is in the interests of our neighbouring countries and their peoples and also in the interests of peace and stability in the region and the international situation at large.

In the series of the peaceful solution of regional conflicts at this sensitive stage, let Afghanistan be the first country to play its historical role in a sense of deep responsibility for world peace and the consolidation of peace and stability in the region.

The peaceful solution of regional conflicts constitutes one of the dimensions of peace and security in the world, the favourable conditions for which is provided by the Soviet-African summit meeting in Washington and the Treaty resulted from it.

We invite all the genuine patriots of Afghanistan, all the different groups of the people, tribes and nationalities, among them the honest and patriotic clergy, to be active participants in the struggle for attaining the noble aim of peace and tranquility in Afghanistan. We are sure that, as a result, the Afghan people will certainly relieve from war and restore peace in the country.

# KABUL NEW TIMES

WE HAVE OUR OWN HISTORY DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF OTHER COUNTRIES: WE HAVE OUR OWN CUSTOMS AND TRADITIONS INHERITED FROM OUR ANCESTORS: WE HAVE OUR OWN REASON THAT HAS ACCUMULATED WISDOM OF MANY GENERATIONS WHO HAVE CREATED AN INDEPENDENT STATE IN THIS LAND AND HAVE DEFENDED ITS INDEPENDENCE IN THREE WARS WITH BRITISH COLONIALISM. WE HAVE NOT BEEN AND WILL NOT BE AWAY FROM HUMAN CIVILIZATION. BUT OUR CARAVAN IS HEADING TO HIGH PEAKS OF FREEDOM, JUSTICE AND PROSPERITY ON ITS OWN ROUTE. FROM THE INEXHAUSTIBLE TREASURY OF DEEDS AND THOUGHTS OF HUMANITY WE WILL GRATEFULLY TAKE ONLY THAT WHICH WILL CONFORM WITH OUR NATIONAL CONDITIONS AND BE ACCEPTED BY OUR PEOPLE.

DECEMBER 5, 1987

(President Najibullah)

## Bakhtar cycles start production

The Bakhtar bicycles assembly project in the industrial estate area of Pul-Charkh has begun initial production.

It is a joint sector enterprise which has been set up with Soviet aid and assembles ordinary and sports bicycles as well as children bicycles. It is envisaged that in future it would also assemble motorcycles.

Fazel Rahman Insaft, president of Bakhtar bicycles said: "The protocol on Bakhtar bicycle

assembly project was signed by the Chamber of Commerce and Industries of the Republic of Afghanistan and Economic Consulate of the Soviet Embassy in Kabul in April 1987. It has an initial investment of 25 million Afghanis and a working capital of 50 million Afghanis. The Chamber of Commerce has 40% share, the rest is my own.

The installed capacity of the project is 15,000 bicycles per annum which can increase to 40,000.

As per the protocol,

machinery and equipment for the project arrived in Kabul recently and were installed in the factory.

The project will give employment to 120 persons. The factory has started functioning under the guidance of a Soviet expert named Kovalenko Yuri.

Insaft said that the project will pass through three stages. The first stage is when all the required parts are imported from the Soviet Union, and the assembled bicycles are

marketed. In the second stage only those parts the production of which requires sophisticated machines will be imported from the Soviet Union and the rest would be produced here in the factory. In the third stage all parts would be produced in the factory, in other words the project would become self-sufficient. Speaking of the state assistance to private entrepreneurs, Fazel Rahman Insaft said: "The government of the Republic of Afghanistan has always

supported foreign and local entrepreneurs for the further growth of industry in the country. The state assistance to industrialists includes land for the factory, customs duty exemption, bank credit, raw material supply etc. It is because of this comprehensive government assistance that I have besides owning a textile mill, started the Bakhtar Bicycle Factory also.

By our staff reporter  
Farooq



Kovalenko Yuri, Soviet expert helping workers in the assembling of cycles.



The first assembled bicycle of Bakhtar Bicycle.

SUNDAY, JANUARY 11, 1988

## WESTERN NEWSMEN VISIT KHOST

**PAKISTAN, JAN. 10 (BIA)**  
A group of western journalists who have come to familiarise themselves with the conditions in Paktia province, particularly the situation in Khost division visited yesterday economic, cultural and other institutions of Paktia and Khost.

On Thursday they visited Sayed Karam district, Badkash village of Gardes city, civil defence units of Sayed Karam and parts of Gardes city. The journalists travelled by bus from Gardes to Khost division. They talked with Khost inhabitants and saw the relief caravans that reached

Khost after the opening of the Gardes-Khost highway.

They recounted what they had seen over Gardes local road.

Over 11,000 tons of foodstuffs and other essential goods have so far been distributed to 2100 families consisting of 21,000 persons in 115 villages in the centre, two districts and five subdistricts of Khost division since the opening of Gardes-Khost highway.

With the 15th relief caravan carrying 18630 tons of relief goods reaching the division the problem of scarcity has

been completely overcome.

To meet the shortage of drinking water in the division, 21 water pumps are being installed with assistance by Azerbaijan SSR. This will also solve the problem of water scarcity 2400 jeribs of land in Khost division.

The rehabilitation of four health clinics has started. Construction material has been delivered and work on buildings has started. Forty-seven km of Gardes-Khost highway have so far been repaired and macadamized. Over 7000 cm long diversion has also been built. (BIA)

1/17

## Public libraries expanded

The Public Library which was once the sole library in the city for the public has now about 70 branches in almost all provinces of the country.

A total of 400,000 books are available to readers in these branches. said the president of Kabul Public Library in an interview.

A great majority of readers of these libraries are young men and women, showing increasingly great interests of youth

in reading 65,000 persons made use of the public libraries in the six first months of the current year, he added.

It should be pointed out that in addition to the above, many libraries have newly been set up in schools, institutions for higher and vocational education, trade unions and social organizations.

Great attention is being paid to increase libraries in schools and higher educational institutions of the country in

view of the new educational system and to help students in their studies.

Not only the number of books and libraries have increased in recent years, but library science is being taught.

Our future plans envisage extension of Public Libraries. In 1988 all provinces without exception would be having one public library each, and existing ones would be more equipped, he concluded.

(By: Nezam)

DECEMBER 16, 1987



President Najibullah addressing the military parade.

H. K. S. Photo

## Grand ceremony marks Khost victory IMPRESSIVE MILITARY PARADE IN CAPITAL

KABUL, JAN. 19 (RIA)

The successful mopping-up operation launched by the units of armed forces for lifting the economic blockade of Khost division and reopening of Gardes-Khost highway for traffic was marked yesterday at a grand military parade held in Revolution Square of Kabul.

Najibullah, President of the Republic of Afghanistan and Supreme Commander of the Arm-

ed Forces of the country, extolled the heroic activities of soldiers and officers of the units who took part in the operations in Pakia province and emancipated 40,000 people of Khost division from the economic blockade.

He also inspected a guard of honour on the occasion.

Present at the ceremony were Sultan Ali Keshtmand, Prime Minister,

members of the Politburo and Secretaries of the CC of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, leaders of political organizations included in the coalition, Chairman of the National Front, members of Revolutionary Council and Council of Ministers, generals and high ranking officials of the armed forces, ambassadors and members of diplomatic corps, heroes of the Republic of Af-

ghanistan and work heroes of Afghanistan, foreign guests, journalists and a large number of Kabul citizens.

At the beginning of the ceremony, Shah Nawaz Tanai, Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces, presented a brief report on the activities of the units in Pakia.

The proceedings began with the recitation of verses from Holy Quran by Qari Barakatullah Salim and playing of the

national anthem of the Republic of Afghanistan. Twenty-one shells were fired as a mark of honour.

Maj. Gen. Zabiullah Ziarnal, general president of political affairs of the armed forces, briefly spoke on the celebrations.

Lt. Gen. Mohammad Rafe, Minister of Defence, delivered his speech on the combat preparedness of the armed fo-

rces in defence of independence, national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country.


The text of his speech is carried else where in this issue.

Captain Mohammad Amin Akrami, an officer of infantry unit, and Mirwais, a soldier who played an active role in removal of economic blockade of Khost division, thanked the government for its permanent attention to the per-

sonnel of the armed forces and pledged to make sacrifices in defence of the homeland and establishing peace throughout the country. They promised to elevate their combat preparedness and combat capability.

JANUARY 26,  
1988

## Caravans that brought cheer to Khost



Maj. Daoud Shah

The first caravan of foodstuffs, clothes and other essential goods, which our men accompanied, arrived in Khost city on December 30. The caravan was draped with slogans such as "We do not want war", "We are peace messengers", "We are here for the realization of national reconciliation policy" etc. We received such a warm welcome in the city that I would never forget it.

The beautiful valley of Zadran was mined by the armed extremists, Maj. Daoud Shah reminded. "But the armed forces combed the highway for mines, using modern equipment and removed all the mines from their way. They also repaired 17,000 sq. m. of road, big and small bridges which had been ruined by the enemy between Setakandaw and Sayed Khail. It has to

be mentioned that in this operation 1,603 extremist elements were crushed and their huge arms caches containing Chinese, French and American made weapons were seized by the armed forces.

After ensuring security on Gardes-Khost highway, it was around 3 p.m. on Dec. 30 that the first caravan of 155 vehicles carrying 1200 tons of material arrived in Khost division. With the arrival of this caravan the atmosphere in Khost was filled with joy and happiness. Men, women and children rushed to welcome the officers and soldiers showering flowers on them and offering their bouquets."

Maj. Daoud Shah continued: "This is now the fifteenth caravan of essential goods which is moving towards Khost. From the opening of Gardes-Khost highway, I

have till now led five times my own unit and escorted the goods caravans to Khost city. These days the supply caravans arrive in Khost in one day without facing any incident, and after unloading they leave for Kabul the next day. Prices in Khost division are now lower than in Kabul city. There is plenty of food articles and other consumer goods, and Khost city and bazaar have completely changed."


He said: "As an officer, I do not uphold war and our armed forces also have not yet been brought up to commit aggression on others' soil. The duty of our armed forces is to defend the homeland, achievements of April Revolution and national integrity. Our armed forces today have the potential to confidently defend our borders. April Revolution

and its achievements."

Babjan, a noncommissioned officer of the transport regiment, replied to a question said: "I joined the army six years ago. During this period I have voluntarily accompanied six hundred times supply caravans to various provinces. This is the fifth time that I am accompanying the supply caravan to Khost division. I can assure you that not only I, but all the soldiers in our unit are ready to go to Khost division to assist the citizens there."

Khost residents can now travel without fear to Kabul by private transport because security has been maintained. They have resumed their tranquil life again. There are no more extremist elements to block the Gardes-Khost highway."

(By our reporter Asis Medayal)



Babajan, noncommissioned officer.

JANUARY 26,  
1988

This is how Maj. Daoud Shah Wafadar deputy political head of

Trade forms one of the substantial fields of economic activity in the country. It has considerably grown despite the subversive activities of extremist elements and the undeclared imperialist war during the post-revolution years.

In 1978, the share of foreign trade turnover had been 72.4 million dollars while in 1980 it was 101.61 million dollars. The turnover of domestic trade in 1981 was 6,653 million Afia, while it rose in 1980 to 26,815 million Afghani. The figure shows a growth of 207.38 per cent.

Efforts have been made to increase the share of State sector aimed at better regulation of trade and preventing a rise in prices.

On account of this, a number of State trading institutions have been

## Rising trade figures boost economy

set up. These institutions have played a noteworthy role in recent years. Some of them are:

1—Afghan CARI company;

This joint venture company was established in 1978 to strengthen the State sector in the field of trade and make an active contribution to foreign and domestic trade.

To maintain the price line and help the household economy of our compatriots, the company offers essential goods both in wholesale through its head office and retail through stores, peasants' cooperatives, and co-operatives of the "ministries of State Security and Interior in the capital

and provinces.

The import volume of the company during 1980 was 39.26 million dollars and its sales figures 26.61 million Afghani.

2—Friendship organization for assistance and trade;

This firm was established in 1980 with the assistance of Soviet Union under Commerce Ministry. This enterprise has imported hundreds of essential goods from the Soviet Union, GDR, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, India, Japan and other countries and put them in the market.

The volume of trade and gratis aid by this enterprise during 1980 were of the order of 38.72 million dollars and the sales turnover 727.8 million

on Afia.

3—Frontier Trade; Frontier Trade was also set up in 1981 on the basis of an agreement between the governments of the Republic of Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. In the beginning the exchange of goods was on a limited scale. In 1980, the Frontier Trade figures reached 6.03 million dollars. During the current year, the volume of Frontier Trade was nine million dollars on the request of the provincial residents.

4—Retail trade enterprise;

This enterprise was established after the revolution within the framework of Commerce Ministry to help maintain the price line. The enterprise sells primary goods through 36 stores of its in Balkh, Nangarhar, Paktia and other provinces.

The volume of retail trade in State, joint and cooperative sectors during 1980 has increased by six per cent. The turnover of retail trade during 1987 has been predicted at Afia 28 billion which indicates a growth of 15.6 per cent as compared to 1986.

Apart from promoting the State, joint and cooperative trade, Commerce Ministry has created a favourable climate during the recent years for the national traders who play a major role in en-

gineering the national economy. The ministry encourages and protects their activities. Many facilities have been provided to the firms and merchants because of the importance of the private sector in raising the socio-economic level of the country.

To ameliorate the state of exports in the country, trade service institutions have been set up in different fields. The role played by the export development department has been increased in marketing and guiding the national traders in export of Afghan goods to foreign markets.

The trade service institutions like Karakul export promotion institute, union of carpet exporters, raising export development institute and Emporium of handicrafts have played a significant role in improving the quality of products and their marketing in foreign lands.

After the revolution, the Republic of Afghanistan has been exporting its products to world markets in exchange of necessary goods. Trade relations have been expanded without any restrictions. But the figures show that, after the revolution, trade with Socialist countries headed by the Soviet Union has registered an impressive increase. The foreign trade

volume during 1978 with Socialist countries was 221.63 million dollars which reached 622.4 million dollars during 1980. It shows an increase of 400 per cent.

To promote trade relations with friendly countries, "Afghan trade agencies" have been set up in Prague, Hungary, GDR and Kuwait.

To protect and control the private sector, a number of import unions have been set up in the framework of the Chambers of Commerce and Industry. So far, 23 unions among other essential goods have been formed.

Furthermore, with a view to control prices, five joint stock companies have been set up to regulate the share of individual traders and Chamber of Commerce and Industry to control essential goods. The companies have had a positive impact on holding the price line.

For instance, the edible oil and soap joint company recently imported 800 tons of powdered milk and offered it to market through its retail stores. The company has also purchased 800,000 tons of edible oil, a major part of which has been brought in to the country and sold.

The Chamber of Commerce and Industry has imported during this period a large quantity of tea, batteries, for vehicles, cloth, string, rayon paper and other essential goods.

The question of establishment of joint and mixed companies and industrial projects was discussed in the first nationwide conference of private entrepreneurs held in 1987. It was aimed at providing further facilities for the private entrepreneurs and national capital holders. As a result, 171 projects were undertaken. So far, the joint stock companies such as AFTORG and AFTENTO, Herat joint company, import-export company of Kabul Transit, Jamy company in Herat, leather and shoe making company of Balkh, Jausjan mill, Kabul bakery, cycle manufacturing and wool wash companies have been set up.

The State-run and joint stock companies supply essential goods for different resources as sell them at reasonable prices through the retail stores, cooperatives, trade unions, and assistance and trade, as well as individuals in capital and provinces. Essential goods worth 11801 2 million Afghani have been offered to the market.

(By Farooq)



A retail store established recently in Kabul.

(Photo by Yousuf 1/16)


## Progress achieved in key sectors of industry

KABUL, JAN. 18 (BIA)

The periodical session of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Afghanistan was held yesterday. The results of the realization of state plan and budget, banking plans for nine months of the current Afghan year (began March 21, 1987) and 30 legislative documents were scrutinized in the session.

Mahboobullah Kushani, Deputy Prime Minister and Chairman of the State Committee for Planning and Management, Kabul Minister of Finance, Abdul Basir Ranjar, general president of the Central Bank and Basir Baghlani, Minister of Justice presented their reports at the session. Chairmen of the state Committees and Ministers and presidents of departments spoke in the discussion. It was noted in the session that concrete achievements have been scored in the nine months of the current Afghan year in the socio-economic growth of the country.

The production plan of mixed and state sectors of industry was implemented by 103 per cent and 14 ministries and departments have achieved



Sukhan Ali Rakhimand, Prime Minister addressing the Council of Ministers.

the targets of industrial production of their respective enterprises and institutions. The production plans of power energy, fertilizer, reinforced concrete, brick, flour, wheat, meat and vegetable oil have been successfully implemented.

Industrial products valued at Afia 336.1 million have been produced in private sector. Thirty new projects were commissioned in private sector.

9.2 billion Afia from domestic sources and Afia 7.8 billion from loans and foreign assistance were

spent on construction of 159 medium and small development projects. The figure shows an increase of 18.2 percent compared to the nine months of last year.

Over 50 small and big projects have been commissioned in the nine months of the current Afghan year. The plan for goods transport was overfulfilled by 18.1 per cent and for passenger transport by 51.1 percent. Plans for retail and wholesale trade of state, mixed and cooperative sectors have been over fulfilled.

Concrete achievements

have been scored in education, higher and middle education, technical and vocational, education, public health and culture.

The existing faults and shortcomings in the work of the ministries, state committees and departments and shortcomings in the realization of the nine month plan of the current Afghan year were scrutinized and criticized in the session of the Council of Ministers. Sultan Ali Keshimand, Prime Minister spoke and assessed the results in work and imple-

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mentation of targets in the state plan and budget. The Council of Ministers through a resolution directed the ministries, state committees and departments to implement their plans better before the end of the year and to tackle all problems in the way of realizing the plan targets. The resolution pointed out the realization of budget revenue plan and specific measures were decided on economization of budget expenditure and materials. (BIA)

JANUARY, 19, 1988

1/16

## Repa triates' rights protected Announcement by State Committee

The State Committee for Repatriates calls upon all countrymen to refer to the committee in case they have any complaints in the following matters:

— If they are drafted or bothered during the period of six months exemption from military service;

— If their movable or immovable properties are not returned to them;

— If officials are not reemployed in the post which they held before emigration or in an equivalent post.

— If the workers have not been re-employed;

— All repatriate students of universities and schools have the right to exemption from military service till the end of their education. Despite this, if they have been bothered by any body, they may refer to the committee;

— If the repatriates are bothered on account of their criminal record before emigration;

— If the repatriates are harassed for their indebtedness, contracted prior to emigration which has been cancelled through decrees.

The State Committee for Repatriates informs with pleasure all the repatriate countrymen that no returning countryman has so far complained of the above cases.

It should however be stated regretfully that some foreign media ignore the realities and raise the propaganda that the rights of the repatriates are not restored to them as per the decrees issued.

To further prove the realities the committee asks the repatriates to convey their complaints, if any, to the committee.

Address: First part of Miorozayon,  
State Committee for Repatriates;  
1st administrative block  
Telephone: 24687, 62353, 62666, 62667. 1/17

## Winter clothes: variety plus beauty

With the weather getting more cold and already set in, the demand for woollen dresses had shot up and there is brisk sales in the stores of the capital.

Furs, woollens, quilts and leather clothes are in high demand. Hand made local products are especially popular. Furs, overcoats and hoods made of Karakul, sheep, foxes etc not only keep one warm but are also considered fashionable by youth. Some of them have elegant embroidery for which they are famous.

Couturers and dressmakers display sweaters, pullovers and other garments made of wool of sheep, camels and mountain sheep. They are both hand knitted and machine made. Throughout the country, women are employed in knitting and weaving their choice items of wear. They also knit garments from black and white wool.

Knitted Afghan socks and gloves have more facts than foreign products.

Mufflers, cravats, scarves, shawls, caps and blankets made by Afghan craftsmen are popular both at home and abroad. Afghan craftsmen get their raw material from local markets.

The influx of artificial yarn from abroad in recent years has caused craftsmen to mix them with local wool. But they have less elegance and quality compared to the pure indigenous articles.

In the cold northern regions of the country such as Kunduz, Balkh, Ja-




Warm and beautiful, Afghan fur is popular.

uzjan, Fariab, Badkhashan and Herat, craftsmen make warm clothes from Kurk (a kind of soft wool). They are worn by local people during heavy snowfall and severe cold.

Quilted garments are also popular. They are made of cotton and have elegant embroidery. In recent years export of such dresses have started. Quilted Afghan gowns called Chapans are widely favoured, the best of them by Uzbeki and Turkmen.

12/12

(Z. Raheen)



## The mosque of nine domes

Haj-i-Piada mosque in  
Balkh province.  
DECEMBER 12, 1967

In Afghanistan, Balkh is famous. It has a glorious past in the ancient Ariana, in Khorasan and in the present-day Afghanistan no other cities are renowned as Balkh. The New Bahar shrine of Balkh has been a centre of pilgrimage and worship of the ancient religious sects for thousands of years.

When the sacred religion of Islam found its way in to Afghanistan, Balkh still retained its fame. It was called "Umul Belad" (Mother of Cities) by Arabs. Since then, in spite of the fact that it has faced many upheavals, the remnants of past glory of Balkh have been preserved. A glance at the ruins of Balkh is enough to convince any one that this ancient city has witnessed years of glory and cultural richness.

Among the most significant remnants of this well-known city is the

Haj-i-Piada Mosque, which dates back to the dawn of Islam in Afghanistan. Located 12 kilometers south of Balkh city, the mosque is of great importance; it deserves scholarly research and investigation.

The mosque is one of the most beautiful ancient Islamic constructions in Afghanistan. It is a unique treasure that is not seen in Iran nor in Mawara-unnahr, now a part of the Soviet Union.

The Damagan Mosque might be older but it has lost its original glory and beauty in the course of time.

The architecture and style of the Haj-i-Piada Mosque has very close relations with that of the Old Samra Palaces of Iraq, built in the middle of third century Hira. Nevertheless, the architecture of the Haj-i-Piada Mosque has more unity and integrity from the technical point of view. The style of Samra constructions seems to lack this uniformity.

The interior of the Haj-i-Piada Mosque closely resembles the decorations carved on utensils found in the ruins of Teheristan. This is indicative of the fact that Haj-i-Piada Mosque is one of the oldest constructions of Afghanistan, and that it belongs to the first era of Islamic art in this part of the world.

Another point of great significance about the mosque is the fact that the columns and the arches, which are still left intact, reflect its extraordinary beauty and elegance. The Samra Palaces are, on the contrary, have been ruined to such an extent that it is very difficult to fully determine their architectural style and decoration.

It will be a good idea if the mosque is preserved in its present form and shape.

(By Qasim Sarmad)

TELL A  
FRIEND  
ABOUT  
THE FORUM.



## THE GOLDSMITHS' BAZAAR

Char Chata and Lab Daria are famous crowded bazaars of the Afghan capital. Long lines of shops of goldsmiths and engravers with their show-cases of gems and jewelry attract the passers-by. The handicrafts are much developed compared to old times. Now intricate patterns and designs enrich the ornaments in gold and silver embedded with precious stones and gems such as diamonds, rubies, emeralds, lapis lazuli etc.

These gems are found in different places in the country. For instance, emerald and lapis lazuli are found in Kunar and Panjshir, ruby in Jagdalak, and spinel, ruby and lapis lazuli in Badkhashan and Kunar. Spinal ruby of Badkhashan and lapis lazuli of Panjshir are world famous and have unique traits. Afghan jewelry enjoys high demand both in domestic and international markets.

(Aminia Azmoon)



An engraver in his studio.

(KNT Photo)

# CHRONOLOGY

12/31 - BIA - Kampuchea & Afghanistan signed a treaty of friendship & cooperation during Najibullah's visit (12/29-30) to Phnom Penh. Both sides stressed their efforts to have friendly & peaceful relations with each other & their neighbors.

1/1 - BIA - The Islamic Party of Afghanistan & the Farmer's Justice Party have become active in the process of Nat'l Reconciliation.

- Various projects of Afghan-Soviet cooperation account for "60% of the total industrial produce of Afghanistan & 75% of the industrial produce of the state sector, income from which constitutes 50% of the revenue of the state budget from domestic sources."

- LA Times - A second convoy arrived in Khost bringing 1,423 tons of food & consumer goods. The 1st convoy arrived 2 days ago. (See p. 34).

1/2 - PT - In Pakistan in 1987, 263 people were killed & 1,370 wounded in 289 bomb blasts. Pakistani officials blamed KHAD, the Afghan secret service, for the blasts.  
- BIA - The USSR has given rubles 35m to the ROA to establish professional & technical schools.

1/4 - PT - Pres. Reagan sent a message to Yunis Khalis assuring the mujahideen that the US would continue & even strengthen its military & political support as long as the USSR has troops in Afghanistan.  
- Radio Tehran reported that 3 attempts have been made on Najibullah's life in the past 2 months.

1/5 - CSM - Soviet Foreign Min. Shevardnadze was in Kabul for a "working visit." His trip coincided with US Undersec'y of State Armacost's visit to Pakistan to discuss efforts for an Afghan settlement.  
- LA Times - French journalist Alain Guillo was convicted in Kabul of spying & collaboration & sentenced to 10 years in jail (see p. 17). Yesterday BIA reported that Guillo said in an interview: "I have not yet full information on the policy of cessation of bloodshed...proclaimed by the Gov't of Afghanistan. I came to know of it only in jail..." The French Gov't denounced the sentence & called on Moscow to help secure his release.

1/6 - BIA commenting on Shevardnadze's visit said that recent US-Soviet contacts "stress the existence of brilliant int'l reasons for the solution" of the Afghan issue, paving the way for a 12-month Soviet troop withdrawal. BIA also noted that "Afghan-Soviet cooperation has at a large extent increased recently."  
- UN Human Rights Special Rapporteur Felix Ermacora arrived in Kabul for a week's stay.

1/7 - PT - Forged Pakistani 10 & 100 rupee notes are being printed in Afghanistan & given to Afghan agents for operations in Pakistan, according to "reliable sources."  
- LA Times - Shevardnadze said yesterday in Kabul: "We would like 1988 to be the last year of the presence of Soviet troops in your country."

*Middle East Eye*



1/8 - PT - Pakistan has suggested that the UN monitoring force for the Soviet withdrawal be enlarged to a "peace-keeping" force to supervise law & order. The Soviets have agreed not to engage in military actions except in "self-defense" - the definition of which is causing concern in Pakistan.  
- LA Times - US State Sec'y Shultz said yesterday that even though a Soviet withdrawal is "close at hand," the US will continue to send weapons to the mujahideen until the establishment of a self-governing & neutral nation has been assured. He said the US "presumes" that Moscow will end its support of the Afghan army once it removes its own troops.

## 1/9 - The Economist -

Things move slowly in Pakistan. A notice in Lahore airport says, "In case of fire please ring 373 098, extension 222." The way telephones behave in Pakistan, it might be quicker to send a letter. Living in a country where

nothing is expected to work has perhaps made Pakistanis come to accept as inevitable the interminable progress of the negotiations to end the war in Afghanistan. It may come as a surprise when it ends, perhaps as great as the surprise when it began eight years ago.

1/10 - PT - Soviet Deputy Foreign Min. Yuli Vorontsov was replaced as Moscow's chief arms control negotiator so he can concentrate on Afghanistan & other regional conflicts.

- Soviet proposals made to ex-king Zahir Shah have been rejected by the royal family. However, Italy announced that it would like to see Zahir Shah return to Afghanistan.

1/11 - TIME - Statistics since 1979:

Dead Soviets	20,000
Dead Afghans	1 million



LA Times  
1/22

BIA - A protocol expanding agricultural cooperation between Afghanistan & the USSR was signed in Moscow.

- Since 1/15/87, 116,000 Afghan emigrants have returned home.

1/12 - NYT - Stephen Weisman reports that there is concern in Pakistan over rivalry among the guerrilla groups about who might take power in Kabul if the Russians leave. Some organizations have charged that Gulbuddin attacked them to prevent relief or publicity from going to rivals. In an interview Gulbuddin did not deny this, but said that many of the others have been financed either by the CIA or the KGB or both.

- BIA - Assadullah Habib, Rector of Kabul Univ., reported that 7,600 students are currently enrolled in the school.

A "Friendship School" for 1,300 students has been built with Soviet aid. It has laboratories, a gym, a teahouse, a conference room & a bathroom.

- LA Times - Pravda reported that Soviet troops could start withdrawing from Afghanistan as early as 5/1 if a peace settlement is signed by 3/1. The 2-month interval is needed to give Pakistan time to "demolish the dushman (rebel) bases on its territory." The US says it will halt its military aid only if the Soviet forces are withdrawn in a way that shows they don't plan to return.



**Dr. Assadullah Habib.**

1/13 - NYT - Pres. Zia & Prime Min. Junejo of Pakistan have concluded that some PDPA members must be allowed to take part in a successor gov't in Afghanistan as a condition for the Soviet withdrawal. Zia said that PDPA participation was "not much of a price," in his opinion, to assure a withdrawal. Junejo said that Pakistan could not say that only the mujahideen should govern Afghanistan & that the mujahideen should accept reality.

1/15 - NYT - The US says it has no interest in trying to propose an interim gov't in Kabul. The State Dept is concentrating on drawing up specific conditions which the Soviets would have to meet before the US would stop supporting the mujahideen.

1/16 - PT - The Mujahid Press Agency reports that Khalqi General Imamuddin was killed at Khost. Imanuddin was a captain during the 1978 coup & reportedly is the one who killed Daoud. He was a close friend of Interior Min. Gulabzoi.

1/17 - NYT - The Geneva talks are scheduled to begin 2/20. UN officials say the USSR asked for an even earlier date. Diego Cordovez will spend the rest of January [ & much of February] shuttling between Kabul & Pakistan.

- PT - PDPA members have been issued "special escape cards" allowing the holder to enter military air bases in an emergency. The red cards bear a special stamp & allow the holder to take 10 kgs of luggage, but no weapons or food. Also rumored are that families of at least 60 PDPA members have been moved to the USSR & that India has agreed to give asylum to 1,500 PDPA members if necessary.

- NYT - From an article by Steven Weisman on US interest in South Asia:

"Let's face it, the C.I.A. and the Pentagon, and not the State Department, set American policy in South Asia," said an Administration official.

- J.F.Cushman, Jr. writes on the difficulty of firing Stingers;


The biggest flaw in the Stinger, weapons experts say, is the complexity of firing it. Army tests showed that none but the most highly trained and intellectually adept troops could use the weapon to its maximum effectiveness.

But the Afghan rebels, who are rough mountain men with little technical background, have helped put this claim to rest by their effective use of the weapon. In practice, it turned out, the 18 steps needed to fire the weapon, while they require considerable practice and fast thinking, were not much more complex than the procedures used by footsoldiers of the Revolutionary War to load and fire their muskets.

1/19 - NYT - The Afghan military staged a parade in Kabul yesterday to celebrate the victory at Khost (see p.11 & 34)... A Western diplomat recently said in Moscow that the "Russians wanted to demonstrate that they were not being run out of town the way the US was routed" from Vietnam



Another diplomat said that "Najibullah needs to convince his army, his people & his foes that the military can be effective."



1/20 - BIA - Kabul Univ. has admitted 37 candidates for the PhD degree.  
- The ROA declared a 4-day mourning period for Ghaffar Khan who died in Peshawar at age 98 (see p. 10).  
- The ROA Pharmaceutical Dept. has made a shampoo which will be marketed next year.

1/21 - BIA - Assistance from the USSR to the ROA forms 75.7% of all foreign aid to Afghanistan.  
- Afghanistan now has 69 hospitals with 5,223 beds, 1,722 doctors & 366 pharmacists.

1/22 - HK Standard - Gulbuddin said that the USSR had contacted the mujahideen through private channels & now appears ready for direct talks with the mujahideen.

1/22 - CSM - Paul Quinn-Judge reports from Kabul that the US\$ is worth Afs. 205 on the black market.

- NYT - From Philip Taubman in Kabul:

After an unnerving flight this week from Khost back to Kabul, a Soviet reporter turned to an American correspondent on the plane and said, "Your missiles and your women, they are both very dangerous."

1/23 - SCMP - A car bomb blast interrupted Ghaffar Khan's funeral (see p.10).

- The Sydney Morning Herald - From an article about Zahir Shah:

"I have no ambition to restore the monarchy," Zahir says. "All I want is to restore the unity and prosperity of my country after this horrible war. Does Europe realise that we have lost a higher proportion of our people than Russia did during World War II, or that four million others are refugees packed into camps in Pakistan and Iran?"

Zahir has no illusions about the troubles and trials ahead. As a boy he saw his father assassinated. He escaped attempts on his own life when he introduced a liberal constitution to a feudal law. Not everyone of his age would be willing to exchange an agreeable family life in a villa kept by

the State to house royal exiles for a devastated homeland. But his Afghan visitors assure him that his long reign is remembered as a golden age of growing prosperity and unbroken peace. The country wants him back. . . .

The idea of returning Zahir was first suggested by Dr Kissinger to Dr Armand Hammer, the Kremlin's favourite US capitalist and an old friend of Zahir. "The King is an astonishing man," says Dr Hammer. "He's a master of tactics - calm, subtle, high-minded. The years of conspiracy and exile have left his serenity untouched."

1/24 - PT - Haji Almas, leader of Afghanistan Milli Islami Mautahida Jabba (Great United Islamic Front of Afghanistan), said that only Zahir Shah, "a man of rare insight & political calibre, can play a historic role in defusing the Afghan crisis."

1/25 - BIA - FAO will give the ROA \$116,000 for special agricultural projects.  
- Sayed Amanuddin Amin, 1st Dep. Prime Min., is leading a state & private sector delegation on an official visit to Czechoslovakia.  
- Over 8,500 Afghan students are receiving vocational & professional training in the USSR.

1/26 - BIA - Najibullah pardoned 6 opposition commanders who were sentenced to death in absentia last 7/21: Ahmad Shah Masood & Moh'd Pana from Panjsher; Moh'd Esmael from Herat; Jalaluddin Haqani from Urgan; Abdul Saboor from Kapisa & Saleh Moh'd from Kandahar.

1/27 - NYT - Tass reports that an abominable snowman is living near the Afghan border.  
- SCMP - From an article by S. Faramarzi:

In the city of Jalalabad, two Afghan soldiers surrounded an old fortune teller sitting on a stool at a street corner with four thick and faded books and two dice on a table.

Asked what they were doing, one said: "To see if I will go back to Kabul alive."

1/28 - PT - The mujahid Alliance asked Diego Cordovez to accept 2 conditions if he desired to meet with them: that the mujahideen be recognized as a real party in the issue & that any decision taken without their consent would not be considered valid. The Alliance has reached an agreement on the formation of an interim gov't to supervise the Soviet withdrawal & to pave the way for elections in Afghanistan. (See 2/1. & page 1.)

- Radio Bangladesh reported that mujahideen have regained control over part of the Gardez-Khost highway.

- The Times of India suggested that India would be exposed to great ridicule if she attempted to seek a mediatory role in the Afghan issue. The paper said it was logical for India to redefine her attitude toward the present Kabul regime but it is not possible for her to win influence among the mujahideen. Even though India "backed the wrong horse in Afghanistan," she will "naturally take time to gain the confidence of whoever eventually comes to power in Kabul."

2/1 - TIME - Alliance Chairman Yunis Khalis refused to meet with UN mediator Cordovez, demanding that Cordovez bargain directly with the Soviets & the mujahideen. However, Gailani criticized Khalis for not clearing his statements with the other mujahid leaders & told TIME that he favored talking with Cordovez so that Cordovez would at least know what the Alliance position was & pass it on. [Khalis eventually met with Cordovez. - see 2/7.]

- PT - Yaqub Sharafat, newly appointed liaison & public relations officer of the Alliance, told newsmen that the mujahid gov't would consist of mujahideen, Afghan refugees & Muslims inside Afghanistan. He said the gov't would take power before the Soviet withdrawal, restore peace & tranquility inside Afghanistan, arrange for the refugees' return & reconstruct what's left of Afghanistan. The Alliance called on all foreign organizations to make plans for the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Sharafat said that all Muslims inside Afghanistan should contact mujahideen commanders to receive special cards for future clearance.

2/2 - BIA - Abdul Wakil, ROA Foreign Min., left Kabul for a friendly visit to Kuwait, Libya, Syria & Jordan.

- The ROA Min. of Mines & Industries & the Soviet Gas Min. signed a cooperation protocol following the visit to Kabul of a "high ranking" Soviet delegation.

- "The patriots of Afghanistan, among them the members of the PDPA, who have always been sincerely serving the people of Afghanistan & defending independence, freedom & progress of the country, do not recognize any fear. They prefer to stay in honor in their homeland than to live in disgrace..."

- The opening of an Afghan restaurant in Moscow is being negotiated.

2/3 - LA Times - On the fighting front, mujahideen are holding their own in Kandahar & stepping up attacks on power facilities near Kabul. New fighting was reported in the Shomali area.

2/3 - PT - The speaker of the Iranian Parliament, Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, said that Iran will make efforts to prevent US influence on Afghanistan after a Soviet withdrawal and that Iran was ready to extend cooperation for a smooth Soviet exit.

2/4 - BIA - Khan Ghazi Khan Kabuli, a colleague of Ghaffar Khan, died yesterday in India at the age of 99.

2/7 - PT - At the request of Pres. Zia, Yunis Khalis met with Cordovez. Khalis said the mujahideen would recognize a settlement only if they are recognized as the real party in the issue & that they would keep fighting even if there were only 1 Soviet adviser left in Afghanistan.



Manchester  
CT Herald

1/29

2/8 - McNeil/Lehrer Report - Mikhail Gorbachev announced that a Soviet troop withdrawal could begin on 5/15 if an agreement was reached in Geneva by 3/15. (See p. 13.) The US will wait to see the fine print.

2/9 - BIA - The protocol on direct railway links between Soviet Central Asia & Hairatan was signed. A unified railway dept. will facilitate the transport of goods.

2/10 - The Outlook (Santa Monica) - Diego Cordovez announced yesterday that a virtual agreement had been reached to end the Afghan conflict.

All that remains is to "fill in the blanks" of the Soviets' disengagement, Cordovez said.

"What we have now to work out is exclusively the logistical, technical and practical details, location of personnel, accommodation facilities, etc., which usually take some time," he said. "There is virtual agreement on a time frame."

- NYT - Pakistan said it would only sign a peace agreement when a neutral gov't was set up in Kabul.

Without that, Pakistan fears fighting between rival guerrilla armies & other tribal groups.

- The US says it needs to await the start of the Geneva talks & see how they progress, but it is encouraged at the prospects.

- BIA - An "authentic report" states that Gulbuddin planned to shoot down the plane carrying Diego Cordovez from Peshawar to Kabul. Afghan authorities, ever alert, prevented this from happening.

2/11 - NYT - The 1985 American commitment to end military aid to the mujahideen at the start of the Soviet withdrawal was made without the knowledge of Pres. Reagan, according to US officials.

who then cleared it with Secretary of State George P. Shultz and sent it to the White House. There, officials say, it was cleared by Donald Fortier, head of political-military affairs for the National Security Council, who died in August 1986. Why the matter was not put before President Reagan is not known.

"There was a certain hypothetical quality to some of this" at the time, a senior State Department official said.

(See p. 12)

2/12 - NYT - Sayd Bahouddin Majrooh was assassinated in his Peshawar office by an unknown gunman (see p. 2). - From an article on Soviet Muslims:

Last year, Soviet Moslems signed an agreement with the Ministry for Islamic Affairs in Afghanistan, an effort to help develop an Afghan clergy more sympathetic to the Soviet Union.

Western specialists have speculated that a victory by Islamic guerrillas in Afghanistan might encourage Soviet Moslems to more aggressive resistance.

But the war in Afghanistan may have helped diminish the allure of Islamic fundamentalism by exposing a generation of young Tadzhiks and Turkmen to the poverty and illiteracy south of the Soviet border.

2/13 - NYT - Leaders of the main mujahid groups are reported to have endorsed a coalition that would exclude current ROA Gov't members but could include, as a compromise, lesser PDPA members.

2/14 - BIA - The recent new ROA Press Law "ensures freedom of thought & speech as well as the expansion of the press in the ROA." Citizens are eligible to publish newspapers & periodicals, but radio & TV still belong to the State. Applications for new publications will be processed in 20 days; articles & essays will not be censored before they are published. However, if an offensive item appears, a "specific punishment against it" occurs.

- Sarwar Mangal has been appointed Chairman of the PSFO of Afghanistan.

2/15 - BIA - Socio-economic growth has improved 182% this year; cotton production is up 16%, sugar beets up 2.3%. Over 149,000 tons of wheat has been purchased from domestic markets for the 1st time. Industrial production is up 3.5%.

- The joint Soviet-Afghan space flight will take place in August. The Afghan astronauts will be Col. Moh'd Dauran & Capt. Abdul Ahmad who were selected from 467 candidates.

2/17 - NYT - The USSR said that Pakistan was obstructing an end to the Afghan war by insisting that a change of gov't precede the signing of an agreement. Pakistan contends that the return of the refugees would not be possible under the current Kabul regime. On 2/13, David Shipler reported the following:

"We cannot go and sign an agreement that is repudiated by the refugees," a Pakistani official said. "Instead of having three million grateful and obliging refugees you would have three million angry, armed men."

A Nation Torn by Eight Years of War



NYT  
2/14

2/18 - NYT - Sec'y of State Shultz assured Pakistan that he would convey its demand (see 2/10) to the Soviets. Mujahideen spokesmen say they will not accept any PDPA members in a new gov't. (Diego Cordovez said a new gov't could consist of the PDPA, the mujahideen & representatives of the Afghan refugees & exiles. Gulbuddin said there could be no role for any Communist, but others say they might accept some if they renounce the PDPA.

- CSM - India, reportedly at Soviet urging, recently sent an emissary to Rome to meet with Zahir Shah. The visit was seen as an attempt to nudge negotiations toward a compromise on a moderate Afghan gov't:

"India, for the last 8 1/4 years, has behaved in a manner which could not have earned them popularity with the Afghan people," says Zain Noorani, Pakistan's foreign affairs minister. "They are trying to regain whatever credibility they have lost, not only among Afghans, but also among other countries...."

- In an article in the Soviet weekly Literaturnaya Gazeta, Alexander Prokhanov wrote that Soviet forces had originally gone to Afghanistan to defend a socialist revolution but that the PDPA had failed to become a nationally recognized force. "The original aims proclaimed by the PDPA have not been achieved. The party & the revolutionary gov't have themselves repudiated them. If this is the case, the presence of Soviet forces loses its meaning. A departure is inevitable & logical." He blamed the PDPA's problems on political mistakes & policies which offended the Afghan tradition. Afghan society was a "medieval broth" of nomadic tribes & warlords. "Yet on this swamp it was intended to build a socialist edifice."

2/23 - NYT - Sec'y of State Shultz said that the US & the USSR were generally agreed on terms for ending the Afghan war but that "delicate & tense" negotiations would be required to complete an agreement. The US apparently is not supporting Pakistan's wish for a coalition gov't, saying that such a gov't is desirable but that it is up to the Afghans. (See 2/24.)

2/24 - NYT - Mujahid political leaders are complaining that the US & Moscow have already made a deal & that the flow of US aid has already declined.


The Alliance has given Pakistan a plan proposing elections under Islamic law within 6 months after the Soviet withdrawal. The country's new name would be the Islamic State of Afghanistan. (See p. 1)  
- Soviet troops are being "garrisoned in a more defensive way" & departing Soviet soldiers are not being replaced, US State Dept. officials say. Shultz said, after his Moscow visit, that the Soviets now seem to regard their presence in Afghanistan as "counterproductive." On a coalition gov't:

In their wish to help expedite the Soviet withdrawal, State Department officials are decidedly cool to a demand by Pakistan that a coalition government be formed in Afghanistan before a final accord on a withdrawal is signed in Geneva.

While such a coalition may be "desirable," as Mr. Shultz has said repeatedly in recent days, nobody thinks

the warring Afghan factions can arrange a political settlement before details of the Soviet pullout are final.

"We wouldn't want to miss the bus," another senior American official said. "We've been trying to get the Soviets out for years." Now, he said, the United States could hardly urge the Russians to "stick around" while the Afghans tried to put a coalition together.



Secretary of State George Shultz.

2/25 - NYT - Michael Armacost met with Alliance representatives in Rawalpindi. The State Dept. said that reports of a US-Soviet deal were "just ridiculous." Some supplies had been delayed because of a logistical problem, but the US plans to increase the flow of weapons for stockpiling before the aid cutoff at the start of the Soviet withdrawal.

- An aide to Yunis Khalis on the subject of the ex-king said that the king could return to Afghanistan only to be buried after his death.

2/26 - Rumor - Reports from Peshawar indicate that UNHCR aid to the Afghan refugees has been severely cut back, presumably to put pressure on the Afghans to accept a settlement.



# Magna Carta Afghaniensis



The aim of helping the Afghan guerrillas is not just to get Russia out of the place

THE question about Afghanistan is not who won the battle of Khost, or even whether that battle will hasten Russia's departure. The Russians have relieved Khost, to the extent that the arrival of a food-baker relieves a man freed by a tiger. They may nevertheless agree during 1988 to withdraw their army from Afghanistan: which will be the first communist military pull-back in a third of a century and, if it involves the fall of a communist government, the first event of its kind. Since that would amount to a small geological earthquake, those preparing to cheer should pause to remember why the West has been backing the anti-Russian guerrillas. The aim has not been just a contraction of Russian, or communist, power. It has been an expansion of the idea that a country's government should reflect the wishes of most of its people. And that, in Afghanistan, is where things get awkward.

In South Korea last month's transition from dictatorship to democracy has so far been cheerily smooth. The old re-

gime has retired into the shadows; President-elect Roh seems to recognise the limits of his 36% victory; the losers seem ready to wait for revenge until the next election. That is how things went when Spain and Portugal made the great leap, and how with luck they are going in Turkey and the Philippines. Nicaragua could probably make the same jump, if the Sandinists settled for the coalition share the French Communists accepted in President Mitterrand's first government.

Alas, there are great stretches of the globe—almost all of Africa, much of the Muslim world, maybe some of Latin America—where the two necessary conditions for democracy have only tenuous roots. In these places the sense of nationhood still struggles against loyalty to local centres of power. The humility to admit that the other camp may have better ideas than yours, at least until the next election, still raises eyebrows. Afghanistan falls plumb into both categories.

The removal of the communist domination most Afghans

loathe would be a step in the right direction. The various guerrilla groups can perhaps be persuaded to see the merit of a transitional government, including a few communists, which could oversee Russia's withdrawal without too much immediate loss of Russian face. That, and an American agreement to stop military help to the guerrillas once the Russians are unstopably on the way out, may be the chief things now standing in the way of a deal with Mr Gorbachev. But transitional governments are always a dodging of the issue. Can the different parts of Afghanistan's resistance movement, divided by language and by Islamic variety as well as by mountain ranges, agree on the rules by which government shall be conducted once Russia's placemen have been seen off?

## The warning down from Rummey

The constitutional theorists could tell the Afghans how to do it. A loose de facto confederation, they would recommend. The central government should run foreign policy and the national army (the latter perhaps limited by international treaty, which would gratify the local chiefs as well as Russia), and could raise a certain amount of taxes for that and for a simple welfare system. Most of the rest of the running of the place would be left to the regional powers-that-be. At first, the latter might draw their legitimacy from the direct democracy of the tribal assembly. That is not good enough for the central government, because there it will degenerate into a suspicious confrontation of rival clans. The Afghans' well-wishers will have to help them gently towards the choosing of a Kabul government through competing parties, crosses on ballot papers, supervisors at polling stations, and the test of it.

It may not be as dovish academic as it sounds. The past eight years of war against the Russians, though they have not turned Afghans into an amicable mix of Yorkshiremen and Devonians, should at least have taught them two lessons. Getting the Russians out requires a certain degree of military unity. Keeping them out will require just as much political unity, because the post-Russian government will have to show both that it speaks for most Afghans and that it can prevent any Afghan doing the sort of thing that could provoke another Russian invasion. To this extent, Afghanistan may be where England was when the central English government struck its bargain with the English barons in 1215. The barons at Rummey thought they were bringing an obsolescent king to heel. In fact, Magna Carta started a national process of unity and, eventually, democracy.

It would be wrong to expect Afghanistan after a Russian retreat to have the sort of politics Garv Hart or David Steel would recognise. It would be even wrong not to try to make sure that its politics are democratic enough to abash the Russians—and justify the West's aid to the guerrillas.

## An excerpt from Shevardnadze's interview with Bakhtar News Agency (BIA 1/77):

The Soviet Union & Afghanistan are linked by long-standing bonds of friendship... We are confident that such relations will remain... A program of cooperation drawn up jointly with the Afghan leadership makes it possible to predict that Soviet-Afghan relations will reach a new, higher level... Our economic ties are being adjusted to the demands of the time. The Soviet Union... will be ever more vigorously building industrial enterprises, transport & communication facilities, cultural & everyday amenities, helping train cadres of Afghan intelligentsia. The policy of nat'l reconciliation being tried out in Afghanistan becomes a basic model for the settlement of conflicts in other regions.



Eduard A. Shevardnadze

# Missiles for Afghans went to Iran

Singer missiles from the CIA's secret arsenal, intended for use against Soviet tactical aircraft in Afghanistan, reportedly have wound up in Iran — where they have been turned against U.S. aircraft in the Persian Gulf.

Intelligence sources say several American-made Stingers have been sold to Iran by Afghan guerrillas with close ties to Ayatollah Khomeini's fanatical regime. Some Stingers reportedly have found their way into the hands of the radical Revolutionary Guards, who operate armed speedboats in the Persian Gulf. There is reason to believe that Stinger missiles have already been used to down at least one U.S. helicopter.

These deadly missiles were supposed to be used by Afghan guerrillas to shoot down Soviet helicopters and planes.

The CIA has purposely made it difficult to trace its secret arms shipments. But we have been investigating this scandal for several months; our reporting includes a trip by Dale Van Atta to the Afghan-Pakistani border. Here are the pieces to the puzzle:

(1.) The Stinger scandal can be blamed largely on the CIA's obsession for secrecy and "deniability." The CIA wanted to withhold American arms from Afghanistan's freedom fighters because the shipments had to go through Pakistan and might embarrass the Pakistani government. When the Pakistanis said they had no objections, President Reagan overruled the CIA. Still the CIA tried to withhold the sophisticated Stingers from the Afghans because, as one source put it, "they didn't want

their fancy toys going to some rascals." But once again the CIA was overruled.

(2.) The Reagan administration arranged with Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, to contribute secret matching funds to pay for arms shipments to the Afghan guerrillas. The arrangement is linked to the Iran-Contra scandal. Former national security adviser Robert McFarlane negotiated with Saudi Prince Bandar bin Sultan for contributions to both the Afghan resistance and the Nicaraguan Contras. Thereafter, profits from the Iran arms sales were commingled with secret funds earmarked for the Afghan mujahideen.

(3.) The Saudis contributed \$1.5 billion, sources say, to the Afghan resistance. In return for this secret support, they demanded that the CIA arms go to four favored Afghan groups. Two are hardline fundamentalist factions—Hezb-e-Islami, led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and Ittihad-e-Islami, led by Rasoul Sayaf—with close connections to Tehran. Both groups not only draw inspiration from Ayatollah Khomeini but both also want to establish an Iranian-style Islamic state in Afghanistan.

(4.) Apparently, the Saudis hoped their financial aid would placate the fundamentalists and promote tolerable relations with Iran. The likely Saudi objective was to help the fundamentalists create an Islamic state in Afghanistan, in preference to creating one in Saudi Arabia. Thus most of the CIA's arms went to two guerrilla groups that are friendly to Iran and hostile to the United States.

(5.) Of more than 900 Stingers shipped to Pakistan for distribution to the Afghan guerrillas, an estimated one-third never reached their destination. They were stolen by arms dealers, crooked CIA middlemen and corrupt officials along the way. Not only Stingers, but weapons of all description can be purchased at black-market arms bazaars along the Afghan-Pakistani border.

(6.) Informants have told the CIA that the two fundamentalist guerrilla groups have sold several Stingers to Iran. In return, Iran provides cash, indoctrination and guidance to the guerrillas. The two groups reportedly are holding back weapons for the final struggle to control Afghanistan after the Soviets pull out.

After his trip, Van Atta concluded that the CIA has simply failed to monitor, let alone protect, its arms shipments. Now the agency has started to tighten security. CIA agents now question guerrillas closely and demand to see empty rocket canisters before replacing Stingers.

This is not intended as an argument against shipping Stingers to Afghanistan. The shoulder-launched, anti-aircraft missile has given the guerrillas an edge in fighting off the helicopter gunships that used to harass them. But hopefully, the CIA will take more care to deliver them to guerrillas who will use them against the Soviet invaders — not sell them to Iran.

**JACK ANDERSON**



Asbury Park Press 1/15

YES, WE WANT TO WITHDRAW FROM AFGHANISTAN.



...WE WANT PEACE AND TO GET BACK TO WORK.



AND IT MUST BE DONE PROPERLY. WE SEEK.



...PEACE WITH HONOR.



# AFGHANISTAN FORUM



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#### ABBREVIATIONS USED

AICMB - Afghan Information Center Monthly Bulletin  
AWSJ - Asian Wall Street Journal  
BIA - Bakhtar Information Agency  
CC - Central Committee  
CSM - Christian Science Monitor  
DRA - Democratic Republic of Afghanistan  
DYOA - Democratic Youth Organization of Afghanistan  
FEER - Far Eastern Economic Review  
FRG - Federal Republic of Germany  
IHT - International Herald Tribune  
KNT - Kabul New Times  
NFF - National Fatherland Front  
NWFP - Northwest Frontier Province  
NYT - New York Times  
NYCT - New York City Tribune  
OIC - Organization of Islamic Conference  
PDPA - People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan  
PSFO - Peace, Solidarity & Friendship Organization  
PT - Pakistan Times  
ROA - Republic of Afghanistan  
RTV - Refugee Tent Village  
SCMP - South China Morning Post  
UNGA - United Nations General Assembly  
UNHCR - United Nations High Commission for Refugees  
WDOA - Women's Democratic Organization of Afghanistan  
WSJ - Wall Street Journal

Line drawing from the 1982 Afghanistan Calendar of the  
Chicago Afghanistan Relief Committee.

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Mary Ann Siegfried  
Editor & typist

Leonard Oppenheim  
Treasurer &  
proofreader

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